Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-96-082
Friday
26 April 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-96-082 *26 April 1996*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: An * indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ISSUES

Russia: FBIS Presidential Election Report 25 Apr *[FBIS Report]* 1
Russia: Impact of Dudayev's Death on June Election Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 3
Russia: Yeltsin: Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy Would Be 'Disaster' *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Russia: Yeltsin's Reelection Chances Assessed *[SEGODNYA 5 Apr]* 4
Russia: Zyuganov Support Depends on Local Leaders *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 13 Apr]* .. 9
Russia: Filatov Calls Zyuganov's Election Manifesto 'Retrogressive' *[ITAR-TASS]* 10
Russia: Seleznev Promises Freedom of Press Should Zyuganov Win *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 25 Apr]* 10
Russia: Gorbachev Discusses Attack in Omsk, Campaign *[Moscow NTV]* 10
Russia: Lebed Merely Venting 'Spleen' in Campaign Book *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 24 Apr]* 11
Russia: Martin Shakkum Tells Reporters of His Election Hopes *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Apr]* 12
Russia: Penza Oblast Communists Said Pressuring Voters *[IZVESTIYA 24 Apr]* 12

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 26 Apr 15

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Russia: Yeltsin Views Need for New World Order *[Moscow RTV]* 16
Russia: Yeltsin in China Praises Bilateral Relations *[Moscow RTV]* 16
Russia: Yeltsin: Russia Keen To Maintain Balance of Forces in Asia *[ITAR-TASS]* 16
Russia: Government 'Source' Sees 'Powerful' PRC Economic Alliance *[INTERFAX]* 17
Russia: Yeltsin Hails Russo-Chinese 'Partnership' *[Moscow RTV]* 17
Russia: Russia, PRC Sign Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation *[INTERFAX]* 17
Russia: Yeltsin Gains Credit for China's N-Test Ban Support *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 18
Russia: Mood in Beijing 'Unusually Harmonious' During Yeltsin Trip *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 19
Russia: Yeltsin, Li Peng Vow To Strengthen Ties *[ITAR-TASS]* 20
Russia: Yeltsin in Shanghai Says Russian, Chinese Communists Differ *[ITAR-TASS]* 20
Russia: 'Powerful New Boost' to Relations With PRC *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 26 Apr]* 20
Russia: Foreign Ministry Hails Border Accord Between Five States *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Russia: Seleznev on Yeltsin Chechnya Policy, NATO Expansion *[INTERFAX]* 22
Russia: Zhirinovskiy Warns E. Europe States Against Joining NATO *[Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL 22 Apr]* 22
Russia: Primakov To Attend Bucharest Black Sea Economic Meeting *[INTERFAX]* 23
Russia: Primakov's Near East Visit Seen as 'Failure' *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 23
Russia: Spokesman Cites 'Insulting' Behavior by European Parliament *[INTERFAX]* 24
Russia: U.S. Satellites, Agents Credited With Finding Urals Bunker *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Apr]* 25
Russia: Special Services 'Never Heard' of Arrested U.S. Sailor *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 26

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Russia: Yeltsin's Far East Visit Prompts Feelings of Deja-Vu *[IZVESTIYA 25 Apr]* 27
Russia: Chernomyrdin Against Turning Movement Into Political Party *[ITAR-TASS]* 28

Russia: 'National Security Policy' Seen Reviving Bureaucratic Past *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Apr]* 28
Russia: Democratic Choice Party Split on Preferences *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 13 Apr]* 29
Russia: Anpilov Removed as RCWP Head at Party Congress *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 25 Apr]* 30

Media Issues

Russia: Media's Coverage of Grachev Speech Attacked *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Apr]* 31

Military & Nuclear Issues

Russia: Draft Message Defines National Security, Military Policy *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Apr]* 32
Russia: Yeltsin Address Marks 10th Anniversary of Chernobyl *[Radio Rossii]* 33
Russia: Official Says $100 Million Yearly Spent on Reactor Safety *[INTERFAX]* 34

Federal Assembly

Russia: New 'Defense' Law Seen Meeting All Sides' Interests *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Apr]* 34
Russia: Deputies Urged To Review Budget Spending on Armed Forces *[ITAR-TASS]* 35

Regional Affairs

Russia: Yeltsin Orders Military Preparations Against Chechen Rebels *[INTERFAX]* 36
Russia: Chernomyrdin: Moscow Establishing Contact With Maskhadov *[INTERFAX]* 36
Russia: Chernomyrdin Denies Special Operation To Kill Dudayev *[Moscow NTV]* 36
Russia: Possible Successors to Dudayev Reviewed *[IZVESTIYA 25 Apr]* 37
Russia: Text of Dudayev's Last Telephone Interview With Borovoy *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 26 Apr]* 39
Russia: Special Services Search for Dudayev's Grave *[ITAR-TASS]* 39
Russia: Paper Views Motives for, Fallout From Targeting Dudayev *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 25 Apr]* 40
Russia: Dudayev's Death Seen Signaling End to Chechnya War *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 25 Apr]* 41
Russia: Dudayev Aftermath, 'Unpleasantness' for U.S. Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 26 Apr]* 41
Russia: Analyst Assesses Implications of Dudayev's Death *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Apr]* 43

Economic Issues

Russia: Financial Leasing To Broaden Investment in Russia *[ITAR-TASS]* 44
Russia: Employers' Leader Volskiy: Investment Risk 'Exaggerated' *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 Apr]* 45
Russia: Banker Examines Financial Market Issues *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 3 Apr]* 45
Russia: Bank Chairman on Election, Other Issues *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 3 Apr]* 47

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma Meets Polish Defense Minister, Confirms NATO Policy *[Kiev TV]* 51
Ukraine: Udovenko, Polish Defense Minister Hold Talks *[UNIAN]* 51
Ukraine: Polish Defense Minister Praises Kiev's Stand on NATO *[INTERFAX]* 51
Ukraine: Ministers Sign Defense Cooperation Protocol With Poland *[INTERFAX]* 51
Ukraine: Moroz, French Minister Discuss Economic Cooperation *[UNIAN]* 52
Ukraine: Kuchma Refutes Rumors About Plans To Join SSR *[VECHIRNIY KYYIV 23 Apr]* 52
Russia: Commander Kravchenko Praises Black Sea Fleet's Performance *[SLAVA SEVASTOPOLYA 20 Apr]* 52

Ukraine: Crimean Tatars Mourn Dudayev's Death *[UNIAN]* 53
Ukraine: Nationalist Predicts Nuclear Terrorism if Dudayev is Dead *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Apr]* 54
Ukraine: Policy Viewed in Light of Russian Events *[KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 11 Apr]* 54
Ukraine: Second Installment of Article on National Policy *[KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 12 Apr]* 56

National Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma Commemorates Chernobyl Disaster *[UNIAR]* 57
Ukraine: Official: '$3 Billion Not Enough' To Close Chernobyl *[INFOBANK]* 58
Ukraine: Commission Reports Abuse of Chernobyl Funds *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 20 Apr]* 58
Ukraine: Chernobyl Study Reportedly Includes 'Cardinally New Aspect' *[Minsk Radio]* 60
Ukraine: Scientists Skeptical About Chernobyl Dome *[ITAR-TASS]* 60
Ukraine: Scientists Concerned Over Chernobyl Cooling Pond *[INTELNEWS]* 61
Ukraine: UNIAN Reports 'Level 1' Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Incident 62
Ukraine: Radioactive Contamination at Chernobyl's Third Reactor *[INTERFAX]* 62
Ukraine: Research Links Radiation to Inherited Genetic Mutations *[London THE GUARDIAN 25 Apr]* 63
Ukraine: Radiation Level Said Unaffected by Chernobyl Fire *[Kiev TV]* 63
Ukraine: Fires Partially Extinguished in Chernobyl Zone *[ITAR-TASS]* 64

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Belarus: Lukashenka Declares Chernobyl Anniversary Day of Grief *[INTERFAX]* 65

Moldova

Moldova: Press Comments on Melescanu's Visit in Chisinau *[BASAPRESS]* 65
Moldova: Snegur, Smirnov Hold New Round of Talks on Dniester Status *[BASAPRESS]* 66
Moldova: President Snegur Sounds Warning on Internal Situation *[INTERFAX]* 67

CAUCASUS

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Aliyev Signs Cooperation Agreements in Norway *[Baku Radio]* 68
Azerbaijan: Aliyev Considers Oil Pipeline External to Russia, Georgia *[ITAR-TASS]* 68

Georgia

Georgia: Parliament Passes Decree on Political Solution in Abkhazia *[SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA 18 Apr]* 69
Georgia: Dudayev's Plans for Georgia Reported *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 25 Apr]* 70
Georgia: Opposition Parties Pledge Support to 'Heroic' Chechens *[ALIA 16-17 Apr]* 71

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Estonia: Foreign Minister Comments on Relations With Russia *[BNS]* 73
Estonia: Moscow Seeks To Involve Estonia in Its Sphere of Influence *[INTERFAX]* 73
Estonia: MP Appeals to CEPA To Influence Russia on Chechen Issue *[BNS]* 73

Russia: FBIS Presidential Election Report 25 Apr

WA2604041896

[FBIS Report] ***This is the second in a weekly series of reports FBIS will produce on Russian regional developments in the campaign for the 16 June presidential election. It is based solely on Russian media reporting from Moscow and provincial sources (see note 1).***

(Note 1) FBIS receipt of some Russian local media sources via mail accounts for the dated nature of certain items cited. This FBIS media note presents the local media in the timeliest manner possible, given procurement constraints.

Yeltsin Plans To Step Up Campaigning in Provinces in May During a campaign stop in Khabarovsk on 23 April en route to an official state visit to China, Russian President Boris Yeltsin told journalists that he will have 16 "business trips" in May. Commenting that May will be "very difficult for me," Yeltsin said he will "travel around half of Russia, at least" (RUSSIAN PUBLIC TELEVISION (ORT), ITAR-TASS, 23 April). While a full itinerary of Yeltsin's planned provincial visits has not been made public, Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Anatoliy Lisitsyn and Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Governor Boris Nemtsov told INTERFAX on 23 April that Yeltsin will make stops in their regions in "early May" and "early June," respectively. Since announcing his reelection bid in Yekaterinburg on 15 February, Yeltsin has made stops in only a handful of regions: Chelyabinsk (15-16 February); Belgorod (4-5 April); the town of Khimki outside of Moscow (11 April); Krasnodar (15-16 April); Stavropol (16-17 April); and Khabarovsk (23-24 April).

Prominent Krasnodar Group Backs Zyuganov Krasnodar's KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI reported on 5 March that the only issue the Otechestvo political bloc—the most influential movement in Krasnodar Kray (SEVERNIY KAVKAZ, 2 September 1995)—could agree on at its contentious March conference was its support for Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) leader and presidential candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov. Otechestvo's members—representatives from local communist and nationalist parties—reportedly argued heatedly over the movement's charter, program, election platform, and candidates for local legislative assembly elections. Although most of Otechestvo's leaders, including its chairman, Duma Deputy Sergey Glotov, belong to Sergey Baburin's Russia's Path party, Otechestvo's backing of Zyuganov preceded Baburin's belated declaration of support for the CPRF leader.

Otechestvo's decision to suppport and work for Zyuganov's campaign was not unanimous. Viktor Danyarov, the chairman of the kray's Russian Communist Workers Party, argued that several leftists should run in the first round, but his proposal "did not find support" at the conference. Danyarov has frequently criticized the movement's leaders and even ran against Glotov in the December 1995 State Duma elections, accusing him of betraying communism by joining an anti-communist right-wing group (KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI, 23 November 1995).

Zyuganov Snubbed in Voronezh Several proreform newspapers have reported that Zyuganov's recent campaign stop in Voronezh generated little enthusiasm in the region. MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS (11 April) proclaimed in a headline, "Voronezh Is Not Communist Turf Yet." The article noted that Zyuganov was greeted in Voronezh by deputy heads of administration, adding that the administration head in Voronezh, as in Smolensk (1 April) and Ryazan (4 April), "chose to stay at home." The daily claimed that despite the communists' strong showing in the parliamentary election in Voronezh, people were displaying more "curiosity" than "admiration" during Zyuganov's visit. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (13 April) claimed there was "no particular enthusiasm" for Zyuganov in Voronezh, and IZVESTIYA (12 April) reported that locals held placards reading, "Zyuganov Is No Lenin, He Will Not Trick Us a Second Time."

Nizhniy Novgorod Paper Outlines Region's Presidential Preferences A series of articles in the newspaper NIZHEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA appear to have revealed a split among the region's leftists, but also clear contempt for Yeltsin's second-term candidacy.

On 19 March two articles suggested that Zyuganov is being challenged by CPRF member and Federation Council deputy Aman Tuleyev. One article reported that during a conference of the local left-patriotic political parties and movements, Zyuganov received the lion's share of support from the oblast CPRF and Komsomol committees and from the local contingents of Aleksandr Rutskoy's "Derzhava" movement, the Socialist party, and the Agrarians. A second article reported that the oblast council of veterans and the Nizhniy Novgorod oblast officer's union will back Tuleyev, who also serves as Kemerovo Oblast legislative chairman. That article claimed that as of 1 April nearly 70,000 signatures had already been collected for Tuleyev's candidacy.

A 21 March letter from a factory manager appears to indicate that Yeltsin is not faring much better among the rank and file. The paper published a letter from Yuriy Yermolaev, chairman of the region's "Krasnoye Sormovo" factory, claiming that none of his employees approved of Yeltsin's nomination for a second term as

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

president." Yermolaev wrote that the employees feel that "those who have honestly labored and are laboring today are living in poverty" while "speculators and clever fellows" [lovkachi] are given the "green light." The letter concludes that although Yeltsin of late has "suddenly seen the light" and has begun to say the "proper words," it is "difficult" to believe him.

Volgograd "Democrats" Have Common Cause, But Not A Common Candidate VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA (20 March) reported that while "all [the region's] democrats" are "uniting in a general election bloc, directed against the communists," the democrats still cannot unite behind a single presidential candidate. According to Sergey Kuzmichev, co-chairman of the region's democratic election bloc, "out of 15 Volgograd democratic organizations" that gathered a month ago, "only seven came out in favor of Yeltsin's candidacy," and those appeared to be "forced."

Murmansk Paper Balances Coverage Between Yeltsin, Zyuganov MURMANSKIY VESTNIK (4 April), taking a balanced approach to its campaign coverage, published articles highlighting Yeltsin's support group in Murmansk as well as what appeared to be a communist response.

The paper published an open letter to Yeltsin from the Murmansk Oblast division of Yeltsin's support movement, which, according to the letter, comprises 59 persons from 16 cities and districts. The paper claimed that the movement is "coordinated" and "actively" canvassing surrounding cities and districts. While the group's letter expressed that they are "prepared" to promote Yeltsin, they also favor "strategic and tactical changes to present reforms," including an end to "bureaucratism," "corruption," and political extremism; and support for the development of local self-government, the rural Russian population, and military reform. The letter conceded that many of these problems will not be solved overnight, but called on Yeltsin to demonstrate that the "success of reforms is the business of each Russian."

On the same page MURMANSKIY VESTNIK also published a commentary by Mikhail Antropov, CPRF secretary for Murmansk Oblast, indicting Yeltsin's record. He charged the Yeltsin government with the "breakup of the single Eurasian state," "hurling Russia back toward its territorial makeup of 400 years ago," and "depriving" Russia of its "windows to Europe." Antropov called for the restoration of the Soviet Union, which he claimed is possible "with the dismissal from power of the culprits of destruction by way of elections." The commentary strongly endorsed Communist leader Zyuganov, asserted that the 16 June election is a very significant "milestone in the process of restoring the prestige of the Motherland," and declared that territorial "unity" is the "basis" for the country's "salvation and survival."

Irkutsk Poll Shows Yeltsin Holding Slim Lead, But Gorbachev Lauded in Press The Irkutsk newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH (6 April) reported that a March presidential preference poll of 1,312 persons in districts near Irkutsk by the oblast sociological center found the following data (in percent):

	January	March
Yeltsin	5.2	15.9
Zyuganov	5.3	14.5
Zhirinovskiy	6.3	10.4
Yavlinskiy	—	9.6
Fedorov	—	6.1
Lebed	—	5.3

While the newspaper lamented that one-third of those polled "still have difficulty" in voicing a preference, it noted that in January two-thirds could not answer definitively.

Despite his apparently poor showing in the regional poll, former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev enjoyed favorable coverage from the local press in Irkutsk during his 20 April campaign visit to the province. Both VOSTOCHNO-SIBIRSKAYA PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH published laudatory reports on the visit in their 23 April editions. In an article entitled "Gorbachev Warmly Welcomed," VOSTOCHNO-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

SIBIRSKAYA PRAVDA asserted that students at a local institute greeted him "enthusiastically" and that the "legendary person" was in "excellent form." The article said that his "emotional and sometimes witty" speech drew "applause and laughter" from "the overflowing auditorium." SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH also praised Gorbachev, saying that reporters feel that Gorbachev has "changed greatly. . . He has become much more decisive and also (and this is the main thing) attempts not to deliver a lengthy speech." The article also commended his "healthy sense of humor and irony."

Polls

Poll Tracks Support for Yeltsin, Zyuganov in Cities, Countryside According to a poll released by INTERFAX on 23 April, Yeltsin is far ahead of Zyuganov in the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and has a slight lead in other large- and medium-sized cities, while Zyuganov leads by a wide margin in small towns and villages. The poll, conducted by the "Public Opinion" Fund in conjunction with INTERFAX on 31 March and 7 April, asked 1,400 Russians who they would vote for in June (no further information on sampling techniques or margin of error was given). According to the INTERFAX report, the "situation" in Moscow and St. Petersburg "remained virtually the same" during the week with Yeltsin "outstripping" Zyuganov 33 percent to 10 percent. In other cities, Yeltsin reportedly had the support of 26 percent of potential voters and Zyuganov 22 percent, while the week before both had 19 percent. In small towns, support for Zyuganov reportedly jumped from 22 percent to 29 percent while Yeltsin's share dropped from 17 percent to 16 percent. In villages support for Zyuganov rose from 27 percent to 30 percent, while Yeltsin's support increased from 15 percent to 17 percent.

Moscow Poll Reveals What Muscovites Expect If Zyuganov Wins The Moscow weekly OBSHCHAYA GAZETA (11-17 April) published the results of a March poll in Moscow conducted by the "Public Opinion" fund. Asked to "give up to three" expectations of what will happen in Russia if a Communist candidate wins the 16 June election, 1,345 respondents answered as follows:

- Order will be imposed and peace restored in the country, 17 percent
- Empty shelves and mass shortages will resume, 16 percent
- Timely and regular wage payments will be guaranteed, 15 percent
- Low prices for staple foods and consumer goods, 14 percent
- Property that has of late passed into private hands will be restored to the working people, 14 percent
- Curtailment of democratic freedoms (e.g. censorship, exit restrictions, abolition of free elections), 14 percent
- International isolation for Russia, resumption of cold war, 12 percent
- The USSR will be restored, 11 percent
- Civil war in Russia, chaos and anarchy will ensue, 10 percent
- Military conflicts will arise between Russia and ex-USSR republics, 9 percent.

Russia: Impact of Dudayev's Death on June Election Viewed

MM2604093296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Otto Latsis: "Russian Elections Without Dudayev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been a great deal of conjecture as to whether things would be better for the federal side if Dudayev has disappeared from the scene. Is it better for military operations? Perhaps it is immaterial: The separatists have other military commanders, who were equally well trained in the Soviet Army. Will things be better for the peace talks? Things might even be worse: There will be no one to talk to since the enemy's united leadership will be weakened, and negotiations will have to be conducted with each field commander But the third question now seems to be the most important for Moscow: Will things be better in terms of the prospects for the presidential elections?

This depends on how most voters assess what is happening. But voters take a variety of views of events during the war. Needless to say, they advocate peace — who needs this war and the death of our people. But they do not favor peace at any price: Russia's territorial integrity must be preserved. But it was Dudayev who insisted on recognition of Chechnya's independence as a condition for peace. Will his successor be as uncompromising? That is the first question on which the assessment of Dudayev's elimination depends. The second question is: Will his successor be someone with whom it will be easier for Russia's leaders to hold direct talks? Dudayev was a hateful figure, Basayev is even more so. Meetings with such people are dangerous for Russian politicians' reputation. Matters will be eased if the new leader is someone who is unsullied by direct involvement in acts of terrorism.

But the voters' opinions are based not just on how successfully the president directs the negotiating process. In an ordinary war peace can be brought closer thanks to military success , but not everyone is aware that the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Chechen war is an unusual war, a war with no purely military solution. And regardless of that we have a situation where our commanders really needed a military success.

Moreover, the main election rival — Zyuganov — is criticizing the war from specific positions. He does not overly reproach the authorities for making insufficient use of opportunities for the peaceful resolution of the problem, he places more emphasis on the fact that the fight against Dudayev has been waged with insufficient determination. In terms of the confrontation with Zyuganov military success would be highly opportune. Might success in the war be more convincing than exterminating the commander in chief of the enemy's troops? The friends and relatives of our dead soldiers should certainly not regret the death of the main person responsible for the war. But only subsequent events will tell whether the separatists will carry out more successful operations before the elections, which will mute the effect of this military achievement.

Russia: Yeltsin: Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy Would Be 'Disaster'

LD2604091896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0858 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 26 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin is convinced that, if communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov or ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy come to power in the country at June 16 presidential elections, this would be a disaster for Russia.

"Both variants would bring disaster to Russia, the first (communist), maybe, with a short delay, the second — immediately", Yeltsin was quoted as saying by his press service on Friday in response to the answers of Russian regional correspondents submitted to him through the recently created Agency of the Regional Press.

The president refused to even think what might happen in the country in case of a Communist or nationalist victory and said he was determined to win.

"I do not want even to theoretically discuss the issue of 'what happens if', I intend to exert all efforts that such a supposition never becomes a reality. I hope most Russian citizens will support me in that", Yeltsin said according to his press service.

Yeltsin is sure of his victory because most Russians have already got used to market reforms, civic freedoms and private property and would hardly vote for a communist comeback.

"Many people, especially young ones, are already working in new spheres of activity, the Russians know not from hearsay what is a free personality, private property, market economy", Yeltsin was quoted as saying by his press service.

"To break the tendencies, even for the restoration of the (planned economy) command and administration system, to say nothing about the restoration of the rules of the Soviet system, it will be necessary to pay a very high price — up to a civil war, the collapse of the state, international isolation, the turning of Russia onto a scarecrow for the civilised world", Yeltsin said.

The president is sure that "the people will have enough wisdom to avert anything of the kind", the press service said adding that Yeltsin does not share the pessimism of those who predict the curbing of market reforms.

Yeltsin listed the fact that reforms continued in the country for five years despite a strong opposition as the major success of his policy.

"The main achievement of the Russian development since 1991 is that it was gradual, reformist despite attempts to turn the country backwards", he said.

Russia: Yeltsin's Reelection Chances Assessed

964F1835A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 5 Apr 96 p 3

[Dmitriy Badovskiy, Andrey Vinokurov, Dmitriy Yuryev analysis: "The 17 December Parliamentary Elections as Presidential 'Primaries'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [begin box] The article was prepared within the framework of a research project of the "Strategy" Humanities and Political Science Center. The results of the 17 December 1955 parliamentary elections are analyzed considerably more fully in the unclassified report of the "Strategy" Center "Formation of the New Russian Statehood" (edited by Gennadiy Burbulis), which came off the presses at the end of March 1996 and which is also being prepared for publication in a separate brochure. [end box]

The main inner drama of the 1995 parliamentary elections was the fact that the manifest politicization of the electorate and its increased exactingness toward the substantive aspect of politics encountered the trend of a depoliticization of the political establishment and its fragmentation and predilection for mystifying publicity-marketing activity. The results of the December 1995 parliamentary elections demonstrated not so much the advantage of the supporters of the "revanche party" as the revanche imposed on society of anachronistic sociopsychological electoral behavioral stereotypes.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The Magnificent Seven

The appreciable growth of the percentage participation of the population in the elections—approximately 65 percent of constituents (instead of the 1993 participation, which barely topped 50 percent)—is accompanied here by a deterioration in the degree of "representation" of the constituents by their "representatives."

Thus 29.2 percent of constituents who took part in the elections voted for candidates for deputy of the State Duma nominated in single-mandate constituencies and elected deputies (this figure had on 12 December 1993 constituted 31.4 percent). The 70.8 percent of constituents who voted for candidates who did not become deputies found themselves unrepresented in the Duma. These constituents had no opportunity to specify their choice in the course of the second round (68.8 percent respectively in 1993).

As far as the "representativeness" of the deputies elected by party slate is concerned, the situation in 1995 changed radically for the worse. Whereas there were 13 electoral blocs and associations on the ballot in 1993, and eight of them overcame the 5 percent barrier, what is more, for which 87 percent of the vote of the participants in the elections was cast altogether, in 1995 the barrier was surmounted by four associations out of 43, and they all together mustered 50.5 percent of the vote of the participants in the elections.

Understandably, there can be no question in this case of any "representativeness" of the representative authority which was formed. Nor is an analysis of the structure of the political positions of the corps of deputies of any essential significance (prior to 16 June 1996, in any event)—by virtue of the limitations that exist in the Constitution currently in effect for the activity of the lower house of the Federal Assembly.

But in the context of the upcoming presidential elections the results of the ballot on 16 December 1995 afford an opportunity to analyze the structure of the political preferences of the electorate and also to forecast the basic trends of the presidential election campaign.

Considering the content of the campaign programs and other details concerning the organizations and the persons of the candidates, we conditionally broke down the list of 43 electoral blocs and associations into seven groups. Attribution of the organizations to this group or the other was determined primarily by the actual content of the attitude of this organization toward the reforms in Russia and the ways in which they are being implemented (or suppressed). Account was taken first and foremost here of the image of the organization that has taken shape in the public mind as a result of its activity (which, possibly, does not always coincide with the actual intentions or aspirations of the corresponding leaders).

In the first group we included four electoral associations and blocs (with the provisional name of "communo-revanchists")—the part of the former "united opposition" oriented toward the comprehensive radical elimination of the "reform course" and binding itself to a continuation of the policy of the CPSU. The second group (provisional name of "national revanchists") unites five organizations, whose positions substantively coincide with those of the first group, but which distance themselves ideologically from communism and Marxism, putting the emphasis on nationalism (from aggressive fascism to moderate "national patriotism"). We assembled in the third group (provisional name of "social restorers") six organizations of a nomenklatura-socialist orientation moderately opposed to the "reforms," whose difference from the first group consists mainly of political style. The fourth group includes nine extra-political groupings and chimerical, frequently exotic structures with no political orientation in the traditional meaning of the word. There are in the fifth group (provisional name of "social reformers") five organizations of a socialist and social democratic persuasion oriented toward a "course correction" in the interests of the social sphere, but not supporting (officially, in any event) the ideology of revanche (we included a specific organization—Yabloko—in this group, although in the public mind it pertains rather to the seventh). Included in the sixth group (provisional name of "moderate reformers") were moderate reform forces oriented mainly toward the "power party" and representing the political interests of the current bureaucracy and part of the most "advanced" commercial outfits. Finally, the seventh group (provisional name of "liberal reformers") included the part of the political spectrum (seven organizations) which calls itself "democratic forces" more or less consistently propounding the ideology of economic and political liberalism and frequently declaring itself the opposition to the "power party."

The majority of candidates in single-mandate constituencies also were distributed on an expert basis in terms of the same groups.

The results of an analysis of the structure of the electorate's political preferences in the vote by party slate as of 16 December 1995 are represented beneath Subhead 1 [converted from pie chart to text]. Adduced in each case is the percentage vote cast for each of the seven above-mentioned groups and also the consolidated political structure (per the "revanche" type—first and second groups; the fluctuating type—groups three through five; and "reforms"—the sixth and seventh).

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

1. Results of the Voting by Federal Constituency ('Party Slate')

"Revanche Party" (51.6 percent): Group 1 (CPRF, Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union, Power to the People, Agrarian Party of Russia)—32.2 percent; Group 2 (National Republican Party of Russia, LDPR, Derzhava, Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc, Congress of Russian Communities)—19.4 percent.

"Fluctuating Groups" (24.9 percent): Group 3 (Union of Labor, For the Motherland!, My Fatherland, Workers Self-Management Party, Kedr, Women of Russia)—12.5 percent; Group 4 (30 Words Bloc, 38 Words Bloc, Russian National Movement, Nur, People's Union, Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov Bloc, Association of Lawyers, Frontier Generation, Interethnic Union)—2.2 percent; Group 5 (Social Democrats, Transformation of the Fatherland, Ivan Rybkin Bloc, Yabloko, Republican Party of the Russian Federation)—10.2 percent.

"Reforms Party" (18.6 percent): Group 6 (Duma-96, Stable Russia, Union of Housing and Municipal Service Employees, Independents Bloc, Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Russia Is Our Home)—11 percent; Group 7 (Economic Freedom Party, Christian Democratic Union, Federal Democratic Movement, Beer Lovers Party, Forward, Russia!, Russia's Democratic Choice, Common Cause)—7.6 percent.

Subhead 2 adduces the same results for the vote by single-mandate constituency [converted from pie chart to text].

2. Results of the Voting by Single-Mandate Constituency

"Reforms Party" (21.6 percent): Group 6 (Duma-96, Stable Russia, Union of Housing and Municipal Service Employees, Independents Bloc, Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Russia Is Our Home)—12.2 percent; Group 7 (Economic Freedom Party, Christian Democratic Union, Federal Democratic Movement, Beer Lovers Party, Forward, Russia!, Russia's Democratic Choice, Common Cause)—9.4 percent.

"Fluctuating Groups" (31 percent): Group 3 (Union of Labor, For the Motherland!, My Fatherland, Workers Self-Management Party, Kedr, Women of Russia)—5.7 percent; Group 4 (30 Words Bloc, 38 Words Bloc, Russian National Movement, Nur, People's Union, Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov Bloc, Association of Lawyers, Frontier Generation, Interethnic Union)—16.9 percent; Group 5 (Social Democrats, Transformation of the Fatherland, Ivan Rybkin Bloc, Yabloko, Republican Party of the Russian Federation)—8.4 percent.

"Revanche Party" (43.5 percent): Group 5 (Social Democrats, Transformation of the Fatherland, Ivan Rybkin Bloc, Yabloko, Republican Party of the Russian Federation)—31.4 percent; Group 2 (National Republican Party of Russia, LDPR, Derzhava, Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc, Congress of Russian Communities)—12.1 percent.

The total does not come to 100 percent inasmuch as the data on those who voted "none of the above" and also the spoiled ballots are not adduced.

A comparison of the results adduced in the first two tables leads to a conclusion concerning the common structure of voter preferences in federal and single-mandate constituencies—although, as was to have been expected, the political stratification is somewhat blurred in the single-mandate constituencies. But this is true only for part—albeit the greater part—of the single-mandate constituencies, in which representatives of political parties and individual groups with a regional or local level of celebrity operated and won.

The problem of the criterion of choice in single-mandate constituencies in which politicians of a federal level of celebrity ran is of separate interest. A group of "nontrivial candidates" who ran and won in single-mandate constituencies outside of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg, well-known figures of a moderate-reform orientation (Gennadiy Burbulis, Sergey Shakhray, Ella Pamfilova, Andrey Kozyrev, Mikhail Zadornov, Aleksandr Pochinok, and others), was selected to explain the situation. The results of the voting by party slate in Nizhegorod and Novgorod Oblasts, in which the current governors, typical representatives of the "new wave" in politics and well-known reformers, Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Prusak, were confident winners at the elections for chiefs of the oblast administrations, were appended here. Information on the parties which "overcame the 5-percent barrier" in all these regions put together confirm that in this artificially distinguished "region" victory went to the CPRF and the LDPR, as in Russia as a whole. In the "majority" constituencies 100 percent of the elected deputies are supporters of reforms, of considerable and long-standing celebrity included.

The results of the analysis confirm the supposition as to the dual nature of the factors shaping the structure of the voters' political preferences, factors that continue to operate and will have a decisive impact on the course and the results of the presidential election campaign.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Choice of Intelligible Answers on the Political Services Market

Granted the obvious preponderance on an all-Russia scale of the most aggressive opposition parties, it transpired that, given a personified choice, the voters mainly prefer to see in parliament "veterans of the political front"—former deputies of various levels and convocations. The aspiration to cardinal changes identified by the vote by party slate is not borne out by the social and occupational structure of the part of the corps of deputies elected by single-mandate constituency. In addition, there is reason to suppose that the "new draft" of the political elite which began at the end of the 1980's is coming to an end. It is not only the personnel composition of the corps of deputies that is stabilizing, the main preferences in regard to the parties also have been consolidated in the vast majority of regions. The bulk of the vote was cast for the "old" parties, what is more (particularly if it is considered that Russia Is Our Home-95 is practically Russia's Choice-93).

The regional party and political spectrum is not distinguished by particular diversity. With certain reservations, it usually represents a "democrats"-"communists"-"patriots" triad, above which towers the local "power party." And the "power party" is local, what is more, by no means necessarily an affiliate of Our Home. And these local "homes" by no means endeavored to put all their eggs in one basket—their aspiration to lobby for their own interests is entirely compatible with the diversity of opportunities for organizing this lobbying thanks to the most diverse party structures.

As a result, the election campaign in many regions was a kind of model of "party services market": the granting of regional political and economic groupings a place on the slate, the declaration of a particular economic course beneficial to a preponderance of the local elite, lobbying activity in the central institutions of power—and all this in exchange for the financial and organizational assistance of the local power structures.

If we note the structure of the preferences within the main political groups, a nontrivial conclusion may be drawn. The 1995 elections were not so much a "protest vote" as a "choice of intelligible answers." At the local level, in single-mandate constituencies, the candidates who by virtue of their political and professional authority and also organizational and financial support had the best chance of being heard proved intelligible. At the federal level, in the cacophony of the 43-party scuffle of depersonalized slates, the advantage was with the parties whose answers were the simplest.

This is why the unexpected success of the Anpilovites coincided, for example, with the surprising defeat of the "too-complicated" Congress of Russian Communities. At the same time the relative "audibility" of the maximally pragmatic, de-ideologized "party of complex answers"—Our Home—against the background of the failure of all the other liberal parties obviously confirmed that the two main political groups are fighting and winning alone, in entirely different "political military theaters": The "revanche party" is winning thanks to the simplicity of the solutions offered, the "power party," thanks to its political weight. But in both cases the basis of the choice the voter is making is the same—a desire to exert a real influence on the situation in the country.

It is obvious that it is this criterion that will prove decisive at the presidential elections. And then the main result of the parliamentary elections not accommodated in the vote-percentage columns will come to the fore.

Namely, the elections confirmed that Russia is slowly but surely becoming a country in which a new, gradually stabilizing system of the interregional division of socioeconomic interests is taking shape. The components of the Federation are becoming specific electoral and mobilizational structures.

In some regions the monopolism of the regional authorities is supplemented by its ideological coloration (Kemerovo Oblast, for example), but the local monopolist-power elite's real need here for party support (fraught with outside control and the "interference of the center") is declining sharply. Another type of region—the most general—is characterized by a certain "erosion" of power, the low degree of controllability of the electorate, the presence of a "regional opposition," and the strikingly expressed antagonism of different political and economic elite groups. It is of this type that the "party services market" is most characteristic, it is here that a "favorable investment climate" for the parties is formed. The local opposition, for example, is endeavoring to augment its administrative and political potential thanks to the conquest of power positions in the "center" by way of affiliation to federal party structures. An incumbent administration, on the other hand, increases thanks to such affiliation the possibilities of political and ideological support for its own power.

One way or another, the existence of a system of real political and economic interests is forcing both the "power party" and the "revanche party" to operate according to a double standard—for the streets and for the offices. The Communists cannot manage without "pragmatists," without objective bargaining with the regional elites—without this their candidate will not obtain the support of the administrative machinery, which he needs. And the incumbent president must

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

have emotional and ideological communication with the voters: It is they who have to vote.

But the situation is asymmetrical. Because "liberal democracy" and "conservative policy," generally, all that is connected with the arbitrary "reform course" concept, is increasingly being built into a new pragmatic system of a balancing of interests and appearing increasingly candidly in the form of "oil and gas policy," "military-industrial values," and such. And the entire propaganda background of the election campaign in this field is connected primarily with the popularization of the unfolding balance and its specific benefit for different social and occupational groups. And the election campaign of the other side is using specific interests as propaganda cover for the main political goal—to destroy the natural balance that is emerging in society and to restore the system of political and economic coercion.

The President as People's Tribune

The 1995 parliamentary elections are the sole form of a kind of "primary system" which could permit an analysis of some prospects of the presidential elections in June. But, as distinct from the United States, the connection between the outcome of the primary elections and the final result of the ballot is far more complex. This is predetermined by the actual specifics of the Russian presidency.

The introduction of the office of president of the RSFSR was brought about not least by the need for an increase in the possibilities of the reform of Russia under the conditions of its opposition to the conservative leadership of the USSR. In this sense the expression "first popularly elected president," which is well known and has been somewhat worn out by the bureaucracy, was not simply evidence of the application of democratic procedure but became the main principle, virtually, of the political functioning of Boris Yeltsin.

Namely, under the conditions of the concentration of real political power within the framework of union and party structures the Russian presidency became a legalized form of the existence of a special public figure reproducing at the modern stage in some respects the figure of "people's tribune" in Ancient Rome. Like the "tribune," the Russian president, while not possessing real power authority, acquired an opportunity to directly deputize in the "Senate" on behalf of the "people" and to block the decisions of the "Senate" which were directed against the "people." In some sense the president of the RSFSR brought to a logical conclusion up to 19 August 1991 the concept of popular representation which was born of the political reform of 1989 in the image of the "people's deputy of the USSR."

It was, incidentally, as a charismatic "people's defender" and principal intercessor in the face of supreme power that the president of the RSFSR was elected by voters who lived in another country—the Soviet Union—and who could not have imagined living outside of the Soviet Union.

With Russia's transition to a new quality and the discovery of entirely different functions of the Russian leadership the first president of the RSFSR paradoxically preserved continuity along "people's tribune" lines, having simultaneously come to head the supreme power, to oppose which he had even quite recently been elected. Until 2 September 1993 the Supreme Soviet had concentrated in itself the functions of this "iniquitous" and "antipopular" power, but after Edict No. 1400, the president really placed himself at the head of the Russian state.

Without going into details, it has to be affirmed that there has been no recognition of the fundamental difference between the two above-listed roles of the Russian president. The sum total of personal, professional, and social factors connected with the person of the current president here has engendered a most distinctive intermingling of these roles and their mutually negative influence.

On the one hand the official duties of head of the state mechanism have come to be discharged on an elective-amateurish basis, within the framework of the mentality of the "people's elect" of the 1989-1990 model. On the other, the representative, personal functions of the "popularly elected" intercessor have been maximally officialized, suppressed, and desiccated in the decisive participation of the all-penetrating state-bureaucratic stratum, against whom the fighter against bureaucratic privileges, Boris Yeltsin, once took it upon himself to "defend" his constituents.

This determines the unique role of today's president of Russia in the main collision of the approaching presidential elections.

If Boris Yeltsin manages to present himself to society as a personage of all-Russia level capable not only of channeling the public mood but also of realizing it in specific actions of the state, then he will have quite realistic chances of winning the elections, despite the negative emotional background and the dislike of him personally. If, on the other hand, a maximally ideologized clearing of the air in the language of primitive slogans and a struggle of aggressive political image-makers with total disregard for the substantive side of things prove to be at the center of the voters' attention, there is then no doubt that victory will go to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the spokesmen for the confused-negative public mood—the "revanche party" and its premier representative—the leader of the CPRF.

Russia: Zyuganov Support Depends on Local Leaders

964F1889A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Budberg: "The Communists Will Lose the Province—If Boris Nikolayevich Wins the Governors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems things are not going all that well for the Communists. Meeting in Voronezh—"capital of the red belt," according to the prevailing view—candidate G. Zyuganov surely was counting on a tumultuous reception. But things turned out far more modestly. Pickets asserting the obvious—that Zyuganov is no Lenin and that the Bolsheviks would find it more difficult the second time to deceive the country—accompanied him throughout his trip. Moreover, police had to push the picketers back from the station and escort Gennadiy Andreyevich to the Sports Palace through a back entrance, etc., etc. But the guardians of order received very strict instructions from the local leadership to organize a "cordial welcome" and forcibly removed a woman from the rally holding the poster "No—to Zyuganov and coupons!"

Clearly the Zyuganov team also understands the need to do something. About 30 percent of the electorate can actually be expected to support the CPRF [Russian Federation Communist Party] candidate in the election. It will be very difficult for him to collect more. But it would be quite simple to lose some portion of the voters prior to June. Whereas at the outset, the tactics of "refraining completely from addressing actions planned after the seizure of power" brought some success, today the spy-like secrecy only elicits ever increasing questions. In Voronezh, therefore, Gennadiy Andreyevich announced quite unexpectedly that by the end of April he would make his economic program public. Prior to this he had intended to divulge only the preelection platform. But the not so successful start of the election race probably made it necessary to urgently revise his tactics.

Yeltsin used this same period of time far more successfully. Starting from ground zero, he was able by mid-April to become a real, not just mythical, obstacle along the path of the Communists. In this regard, he distinctly detached himself from "the third force." For this reason, Yavlinskiy's proposal that the president withdraw his candidacy in favor of the Yabloko leader does more than elicit a smile—it makes one consider looking up psychiatric help in the phone book. The president's campaign organizers are no masters of elegance either. But taking into account the fact that Boris Nikolayevich himself is more distinctive and better composed than his main opponent, he is still able to squeeze out more from his trips.

Under conditions where major position-oriented battles are being fought, assistance from regional leaders to one candidate or another plays a special role. The moving concern shown Zyuganov by the Voronezh police was most certainly organized by the oblast leadership. While Gorbachev is openly impeded when he travels through the country, simply denied access to plants to meet with the workers, the demonstrations accompanying Gennadiy Andreyevich's visits are often conscientiously organized by the provincial nomenklatura.

Our MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS correspondent got hold of an analytical note received by the president's administration following the Duma elections in December. The note analyzes the activity of Arkhangelsk Governor Balakshin, who formally headed the Russia Is Our Home campaign during the previous elections. Russia Is Our Home suffered defeat in Arkhangelsk Oblast. Communists alone were elected to the State Duma, while just 15 percent of the oblast populace overall voted for the CPRF. The game of "playing for the other team" began back when the oblast electoral commission was formed. At that time, for some reason, the oblast administration failed to take advantage of its right to appoint 50 percent of the commission representatives. The commission was formed entirely from local deputies, among whom CPRF members enjoy a numerical advantage. Naturally it turned out that Communist representatives were not in the minority. Therefore, all (!) the main opponents of the Communists were forced to register through Moscow, the Arkhangelsk Electoral Commission refusing to register them for any and every reason. A leaflet containing biographical information about a candidate, for example, brought by young people who were collecting nomination signatures, was declared to be premature campaigning... Then endless financial audits with illegal publication of accounts in the newspapers tormented everybody except the CPRF candidates.

Wages that had been transferred from the center to the oblast were for some reason not paid immediately prior to the election. You can imagine the mood of people who are not paid their money on Friday, with no explanation. But it would be more accurate to say that there was an explanation—everything was blamed on Moscow. We need not even address the fact that the rayon and oblast press, which exist entirely on local-administration money, published open and free (!) propaganda for the Communist Party.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Here the governor himself was not ashamed to render support to oblast pension director Vasilyev (former first secretary of the rayon party committee), openly a pilferer and the individual to blame for half-year delays in people's receipt of pensions.

After the election, Balakshin was removed from the oblast leadership. But the situation is no better in many other localities. There exist effective administrative mechanisms in the president's hands for exerting pressure on the oblast nomenklatura. No democrats have such mechanisms at their disposal—they are therefore not competitive with the Communists. If Boris Nikolayevich manages to utilize these mechanisms and is able to "puncture" the rosy belt of heads of administrations, his chances will be good. But in order to "puncture" it, he will have to do more than bang his fist on the table. He will have to organize something of a "procession of emissaries from the center." So for the time being, Zyuganov continues to take his trips. And we need not doubt but that many officials will meet him with far greater hospitality than will the people.

Russia: Filatov Calls Zyuganov's Election Manifesto 'Retrogressive'

LD2504204996 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1520 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Artem Protasenko and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Apr (Itar-Tass) — "Zyuganov's election manifesto may be different from the program of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], but it is retrogressive and will lead to a fractured society," Sergey Filatov, chairman of the coordination committee for supporting Boris Yeltsin in the presidential elections, said at the third congress of Our Home is Russia movement. In view of this he said Yeltsin's course toward stability and accord in society "must become the main slogan in anticommunist propaganda."

The opposition, and the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] in particular, is very good at making use of our failure to work with the electorate in the provinces, Sergey Filatov said. "Its propaganda is based on lack of information and on intimidation. This underlines the importance of working with people." "We have no right to lose these elections. We must do all we can so that Russians are not faced with the question of what will happen to them if Yeltsin loses," Filatov said.

Russia: Seleznev Promises Freedom of Press Should Zyuganov Win

MK2604070496 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Seleznev Promised To Take Care of the Media"]

[FBIS Translated Text] State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev visited St. Petersburg and spoke at a scientific and practical conference "Journalism, the 20th Century: Evolution and Problems." Seleznev, who graduated from the Journalist Department of the Leningrad University, tried to prove that in his present capacity he still remained the truest friend of journalists. The audience was mainly interested to know what changes will there be in the state policy with respect to the media should Zyuganov win. Seleznev tried to reassure the participants by saying that "there will be no attack on openness [glasnost] and freedom of the press" and that he would counteract any encroachment of this kind. Should, however, this happen anyway, the State Duma speaker said that he would "resign or make something else publicly." Seleznev insisted that, if the Communists win, nothing threatens, for instance, the NTV [television channel], which, according to Seleznev, "has a head start over all state [television] channels, at least as regards news programs." "No one will infringe upon top-rating programs," he added. In addition, the speaker said yesterday that in the near future the lower house was going to consider the question of merging ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI into one newspaper.

Russia: Gorbachev Discusses Attack in Omsk, Campaign

LD2504203496 Moscow NTV in Russian 1535 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Summary] In a 25-minute live interview on the "Hero of the Day" program, presidential candidate Mikhail Gorbachev spoke to presenter Yevgeniy Kiselev about the recent attack on him in Omsk and his chances in the coming elections.

Gorbachev described the attack and noted that very little protection had been afforded him in Omsk compared with previous places on his tour of Siberia.

Gorbachev says: "In other regions, everything was arranged responsibly and seriously. Here one sees some sort of special, well not special but some sort of, well, deliberate or not deliberate, negligence. Knowing what the situation was, and they do know it, all of a sudden there was no-one with me from the administration or from the authorities in general, only two security

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

officers, no representatives of the militia, none at all. And then this incident occurs.

"Immediately after this happened and the correspondents — this all happened before the eyes of the many correspondents including local ones — immediately began to report that an assassination attempt had been made, the whole top leadership appeared, the leadership of the security service, the internal affairs directorate, the generals, three deputy prime ministers and so on and so on, and the prosecutor arrived.

"And the first thing that they were concerned about was not to get to the bottom of what had happened and what sort of situation needed to be calmed down; rather they were concerned about how to present this as just some act of hooliganism. They said things like — and I have already heard them — Gorbachev was walking about in a crowd and someone punched him; well, anyone could have punched him there.

"But no! Everything happened in a place where it should not have happened at all. So, it was a planned action. I would not want to swear that it was all directly linked to the local administration, but it is an indisputable fact that the local administration adopted an irresponsible attitude to holding a major event — and by law it is responsible for organizing these events.

"And I would like to say more about this. What I have observed — about how it was covered in the media, the information blockade on my tour, the way the tour was distorted in the mass media by the various correspondents, the fact that this incident occurred — I must say that all this gives me the impression that there is someone behind this. And I think that this is the present authorities."

Gorbachev recalled that he had now appealed to Yeltsin to ensure proper arrangements for all presidential candidates.

Kiselev asked whether the authorities would need to worry about him in view of his low ratings in the polls. Gorbachev recalled recent election results which contradicted poll predictions. Gorbachev says: "I travelled around Siberia, I have told you which regions I visited. I got a colossal impression. I received more support and the trip was more of a success than I ever expected even though from Novosibirsk and all the way round attempts were made to obstruct me. I am absolutely sure that I took the right decision and I shall now develop my campaign with even greater verve. And no attempts to terrorize or blackmail me or to blockade information — nothing will stop me."

Gorbachev said he was counting on the two-thirds of the electorate who had not yet made up their minds. Kiselev asked: "Would you regard as a victory for yourself the victory of some candidate from a coalition which many people are talking about at present, a coalition of say Lebed, Yavlinskiy, Fedorov, and Gorbachev?" Gorbachev replied: "I do not think that my junior partners will manage to cope with Yeltsin and Zyuganov. They will not manage it."

Kiselev then asked: "Do you wish to become the leader of this coalition," Gorbachev said: "I shall try to prove that this is what must be done. I want them to understand me."

Asked what he would do if Yeltsin and Zyuganov reached the second round of the elections, Gorbachev replied: "There could be only two options, either not vote at all or else vote against both of them."

Russia: Lebed Merely Venting 'Spleen' in Campaign Book

MM2604083296 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 24 Apr 96

[Review by Professor, Doctor of Economic Sciences Oleg Novikov, chairman of the Federal Democratic Movement: "General Lebed Takes Us To Cloud Cuckoo Land and Uses Alexander the Great as a Bogeyman. A Book as an Election Campaign Tool"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Anyone who picks up Aleksandr Lebed's book "Ashamed for the State" ("Za derzhavu obidno") will immediately be struck by the huge number of quotations in it. Some are relevant, but more often they are not. The majority of them are unattributed. It is difficult to work out when it is Aleksandr Ivanovich himself speaking and when he is quoting someone else. On the other hand sometimes doubts creep in: Is Aleksandr Ivanovich not stating his own ideas when he quotes the brilliant ideas of unnamed authors? Instead of concrete names what you get with Lebed more often is "History" in action. What we are dealing with here is an unsophisticated device: You identify yourself with well-known figures, pass their ideas off as your own, and attribute yours to them.

What, indeed, is the point of this "novel" idea, for example: "We are not going to depict all the details of our motherland's revolutionary shame. The eight months from February through October 1917 were a vile episode in our 1,000-year history. This unprecedented disgrace was later washed away by much bloodshed...." We are not going to challenge his assessment of the February Revolution in Russia, we are merely going to ask: Who washed away this "unprecedented disgrace" with "much bloodshed"? Is Mr. Lebed, in customarily distancing himself from the "Stalin era," not

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

vindicating that "bloodshed" by calling it a cleansing of the "revolutionary shame"?

The general refers to the cleansing by blood in his book more often than to any other method of remedying an ailment in society. Its main victim was democracy. Everyone who values true democracy can see the defects of the now fashionable veneer of democracy and the harm of "democratic" verbiage. But this word really makes Aleksandr Ivanovich shudder. It seems that he does not want to distinguish between the self-styled "democrats" and those whose ideal is true democracy, that is, a respect for human rights and the authority of the law. Seeking an apt quote from the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, he concludes: "It is just a short step from democracy to oligarchy" and the democratic way of life is called "intoxication with democracy in an excessively diluted form." But who decides what is "excessive" in the transition from totalitarianism to democracy? It is not hard to guess that it is General Lebed himself who presumes to do this. How does Aleksandr Ivanovich differ then from some other generals well known to us from history?

The nationalities question is dealt with next. According to the general, this question is "not closed" in Russia, people have "simply closed their eyes" to it. "The ostrich approach to the nationalities question could yet lead to much grief." So what should be done to resolve interethnic conflicts? How should the peoples of multinational Russia live in a single family, given that centuries of history have brought them together? What policy should replace the ostrich syndrome? The general does not answer a single one of these questions. Are two stock phrases really enough for such an acute problem?

The general promises the Russians: "The guiding star, our own Russian star, must rise above the horizon.... The going will be hard, it will be difficult, not everyone will make it, some will die along the way, some will fall behind, others will lose their way. But we know where we are going...." So where are you leading us, Aleksandr Ivanovich? To death along the way? Is it not enough for you that some people have already died under slogans such as these? You ask: "...Where is an Alexander the Great with his sword and his iron resolve to cut the Gordian knot?" Are you that Alexander? Had you been a diligent student of history you would have seen that Alexander the Great failed to create a strong state. It collapsed precisely because Alexander knew no method other than the sword.

To be fair, let us note that Gen. Lebed has sprinkled his book with a number of fairly realistic pictures of our current woes. But these pictures present nothing new. The newspapers write about the disorders and cancers every day, they are discussed on the radio and within the family circle. But when so much spleen and indignation are vented at your native country and your own people in one small book like this, you really do feel ashamed for the Russian state.

Russia: Martin Shakkum Tells Reporters of His Election Hopes

MK2604084696 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Semen Shatskoy: "'New Wave' Candidate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "If you think that Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin], having won the election, will follow the present course, I am here to disappoint you," candidate for the Russian presidency Martin Shakkum stated to journalists in Moscow yesterday. The just registered by the Central Electoral Commission first vice president of the Reforma fund is convinced that, even if President Yeltsin wins on 16 June, it will lead to a replacement of the cabinet of ministers, hence to a change in priorities of the government policy. Mr. Shakkum, who suffered a defeat in the 1995 Duma elections in a single-seat constituency, running on the "My Fatherland" bloc's ticket, is hastily reforming the bloc's regional structures into local organizations of the Socialist Peoples Party of Russia, he has created. He sees as his minimum task to clear personally the 5-percent hurdle in the first round of the presidential election. As for the outcome of the 16 June voting, the "only of the 'new wave' politicians registered as presidential candidate" (as Mr. Shakkum described himself) does not rule out that, faced with a "Yeltsin-Zyuganov" choice, he would go and vote against both in order that the second-round voting results be canceled [as published] and there emerge a prospect of a new election four months after. Mr. Shakkum, who is clearly in sympathy with the so-called Third Force, believes that it "may even win this election" should it manage to agree on a single candidacy a couple of days ahead of 16 June.

Russia: Penza Oblast Communists Said Pressuring Voters

MM2504154696 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Kislov under the "The Provinces, 53 Days from the Election" rubric: "Salesmen Sympathize With Yeltsin, but Their Customers Prefer Zyuganov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Penza Oblast — Until recently, the sympathies of voters in Penza Oblast's remote Bashmakovskiy Rayon depended entirely on the mood

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the leadership. When a reformer was at the helm, the rayon voted for the Constitution. The only one in the oblast. Then he was removed, and the local electorate voted with equal unanimity for the Communists in the State Duma elections. Now, however, the rural nomenklatura has fallen to thinking: Electing deputies is one thing, but choosing a social system is quite another.

Existence Determines Consciousness

The statement by Boris Zubkov, secretary of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] oblast committee, that he will take away all private homes and turn them into kindergartens if he gets into power is very serious cause for thought. It has plunged the rural authorities into panic, because the only thing they have done in recent years is build private homes for themselves. Rayon head Valeriy Loginov has also managed to erect a decent property. I found him talking gloomily to Yuriy Danov, chief of the main gas pipeline administration. The latter was threatening to cut off the rayon's gas supply unless it pays its debts.

"Things are bad," Valeriy Ivanovich said. "There is no state money. Whether we like it or not, we are going to have to treat land as a commodity. If I go to the bank and mortgage a thousand or so hectares, I will have money for the sowing campaign."

Hearing this from the head of the rayon was very pleasant. The inexorable logic of life has finally forced the rayon authorities to think in defiance of oblast instructions. It is now as clear as day that the land must be worked by independent owner-producers. Farms which, on paper, have joined the ranks of the joint-stock companies, the limited partnerships, and the mysterious KDP's [expansion unknown] but in reality are still kolkhozes and sovkhozes, have gone to rack and ruin. Their leaders have concentrated on their own personal affairs and the people have succumbed to drinking and stealing. Any hopes of state subsidies were smashed once and for all by Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha when he delivered a reformist speech at a conference of the oblast agro-industrial complex. He said that last year farms in Penza Oblast had been allocated 300 billion rubles [R] in state support. However, the value of output had amounted to only R697 billion. Agricultural subsidies accounted for as much as 12 percent of national budget expenditure. The United States, which our agricultural chiefs constantly cite, allocated one-third of this amount. Farms must rely on their own resources.

"I personally will be voting for Yeltsin," Yakov Kireyev, director of the Ulyanovskiy Sovkhoz, said with determination. "We have reached breaking point. We cannot go on living like this. We must have reforms."

[Kislov] "What about the people?"

[Kireyev] "The loafers, spongers, and drunkards are all in favor of Zyuganov. They account for 30-40 percent of the farm. They cannot live without the whip. Once the whip goes, they stop working. Their main idol now is Comrade Stalin. Some pensioners are also opposed to Yeltsin. But not all. My uncle, a war veteran, says: I have never seen life as it is under Yeltsin. I think the vote will split 60 percent for Zyuganov and 40 percent for Yeltsin. Because the rayon newspaper and radio are working very actively in the Communists' favor."

Vitaliy Marin, director of a meat combine, said that his collective does not know Zyuganov as a person, whereas everyone is familiar with Yeltsin's good points and bad points. In his opinion, sympathies will be split equally between the two.

A press survey of the population carried out on the market square right next to the administration building revealed that the majority of salesmen sympathize with Yeltsin, whereas their customers prefer Zyuganov. People simply had not heard of any of the other candidates. As far as Zhirinovskiy is concerned, voters saw through him a long time ago.

The Rayon Committee Acts, While Yeltsin's Support Team Bides Its Time

The news that a correspondent from a central newspaper was coming spread around Bashmakov amazingly quickly. Led by democrat Serafim Andreyev, head of the Boris Yeltsin support group, people opposed to the rayon authorities gathered outside the administration building. Tatyana Sindyashkina, mother of six and former director of the Marat Joint-Stock Company, stepped forward. She related how Nikolay Medvedev, secretary of the CPRF rayon committee, and Vasiliy Bokarev, former chairman of the rayon soviet executive committee, collected signatures for their candidate. They went around people's houses with a notebook, saying: "Sign here to show that you will vote for our man. We will check to make sure you do." They suggested that she join the party. She refused. Soon after that she lost her job and faced criminal charges.

Entrepreneur Aleksandr Loginov told how he used to be chairman of the rayon electoral commission. He oversaw the elections on the Constitution and for the State Duma. Then suddenly hordes of inspectors descended on his trade premises. Unable to withstand the attack, he was forced to rent out his stores. Soon after that he was relieved of his duties as head of the electoral commission with no explanation whatsoever.

Andreyev was incensed at this and said that all electoral commissions are now run by Communists; democrats

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

are not even allowed into elections as observers. But most of all he was outraged by the actions of Vladimir Umnov, editor of the rayon newspaper, who had turned the publication into "the organ of Medvedev's rayon committee." Three of his articles were lying in the editorial office, going nowhere, while Communist appeals insulting to the Russian authorities were printed in issue after issue.

Umnov was clearly displeased when Andreyev and I appeared. As soon as he crossed the threshold, Serafim Platonovich directed a hail of criticism at the editor and said that people would gather the next day to prevent Umnov from entering the editorial office. Why had he not published the presidential edict "On Implementing Citizens' Constitutional Right to Land" for a whole month? Where were the articles on the Olshanskoye and Belozerskoye partnerships?

While they were swearing at each other, I flicked through the file. Andreyev was right.

The council which coordinates support for Yeltsin is headed by Raisa Kushch, affairs administrator at the rayon administration. She complained that the Communists, led by Medvedev, have become terribly active. People who work on farms have not been paid for six months, so many are set against the current president. Consequently propaganda by the Communists, who are going from door to door, is striking home. Half of the people living in the rayon are pensioners. Nevertheless, they do understand that Zyuganov means poverty and civil war.

Strange. If they understand this, why do they want to cast themselves into the flames? To spite Yeltsin?

Although, the administrator of affairs is dissembling, of course. It is quite obvious that the rayon authorities have not yet made up their minds and keep looking to officials in Penza. Otherwise, propaganda work by the Yeltsin support group would be on a par with the Communists' efforts and editor Umnov would be endeavoring scrupulously to maintain proportion.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 26 Apr

LD2604053096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0346 GMT 26 Apr 96

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 26 (Itar-Tass) — Follows a review of Friday's Moscow-based Russian newspapers dated April 26.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to China, developments in Chechnya after reports about Dzhokhar Dudayev's death, and today's 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster are the principal topics.

IZVESTIYA on Yeltsin's visit to China.

The newspaper carries reports from Beijing under the headline "Boris Yeltsin, visiting China, has accomplished a special assignment from the Group of Seven.

"The spring-time thaw in relations between Moscow and Beijing, it seems, has been crowned with a small but 'glorious victory". The leaders of China deemed it necessary to announce precisely during Boris Yeltsin's visit their readiness to join an understanding reached and put on record at the G8 summit in Moscow to sign a treaty in autumn this year on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests."

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on Russo-Chinese talks.

"The talks between Boris Yeltsin and Chinese leaders and the package of documents signed at summit and intergovernmental levels — all indicate that Moscow and Beijing have finally consigned to the "archives" their erstwhile distrust of each other and have begun to base their relations on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and goodneighbourliness".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on some problems discussed during a meeting between Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and his Chinese counterpart Chi Haotian.

The newspaper writes that the two defence ministers have agreed to instruct experts to discuss the possibility of giving greater scope to military cooperatoin so that a new agreement could be signed during the forthcoming visit to Moscow by the Chinese army's Chief of the General Staff.

"The two sides are yet to do an important amount of work on an agreement on mutual reductions in military forces in the border area so that troops that would remain after cutbacks would have unambiguously defensive structure," the newspaper points out.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on Russian President's visit to China.

The newspaper notes that Yeltsin "has left his anti-Communism at home while the Chinese communists, in response, are making it clear that they would not like to change him for Marxist (Gennadiy) Zyuganov".

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the first 100 days of State Duma activities.

The lawmaking successes of the Lower House of the Russian parliament, in the newspaper's opinion, "are average while political ones are still lesser".

IZVESTIYA on developments in Chechnya after reports after Dudayev's death.

"To say that the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev has finally slurred the everyday picture and has confused to the utmost the roles in the Chechnya drama is to say nothing. Lack of understanding of what is happening, the confusion over forecasts have equally gripped both the local authorities in Groznyy and visiting journalists, who are racking their brains over yet another puzzle of the nonsensical war."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on military situation in Chechnya.

The newspaper reports that over the past 24 hours militants fired on the positions of Federal troops in Chechnya 18 times. Three Interior-Ministry servicemen were wounded when repulsing militants' attack in the area of Stary Achkhoy.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on the 10th anniversary of the disastrous breakdown at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

The newspaper carries the working notes of a special meeting of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, at which the first information on the state of affairs in the area of the Chernobyl nuclear power station was discussed a decade ago.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on Russia's bid to get integrated into the system of world culture.

The newspaper carries an article by Yevgeniy Sidorov, Russian Minister of Culture. "Russia, in our view, still can get integrated into the system of world culture as leader, not as a 'poor relation'", the Minister writes.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Russia: Yeltsin Views Need for New World Order

LD2504120496 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0700 GMT 25 Apr 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to China continues. Here is our special correspondent Petr Korovyakovskiy from Beijing:

[Korovyakovskiy] [passage omitted] However, the main outcome of today is the resolution of problems that are far more global.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] To cooperate in order to create a new world order, in which there is no place for anyone's claims to a monopoly in world affairs. We live in a multipolar world, and this is a new factor in world development.

We have agreed that the Chinese side will join the decision of the G-8 summit on nuclear security that took place in Moscow to hold talks this year and sign an agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear testing. [end recording]

[Korovyakovskiy] [passage omitted]

Russia: Yeltsin in China Praises Bilateral Relations

LD2504121896 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 25 Apr 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The scope of the second day of the Russian president's official visit to China ranges from history to the present day, from specific features of bilateral relations to global world problems, and from leaders to ordinary people. During talks with PRC President Jiang Zemin and in the joint political declaration, Boris Yeltsin confirmed the immutable nature of our country's policy of developing good-neighborly relations with China. The same topic dominated the president's address to the Beijing public.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] Russia has had, has, and will continue to have great interest in, and respect for, Chinese culture, traditions, and customs. Russia and China represent two worlds unto themselves, but at the same time they are parts of a single world civilization. They have been neighbors for centuries, thereby mutually enriching each other and creating a unique blend of Western and Eastern values. [end recording]

[Correspondent Korovyakovskiy] The words alliance and a union of two countries have been categorically excluded from the Sino-Russian vocabulary of negotiations. Both countries keep stressing their negative attitude to any policy of international blocs. Nevertheless, they are more and more often addressing international issues from joint positions. At today's talks, the Chinese side backed Russia's resistance to NATO's expansion and confirmed its readiness to join the decisions of the G-8 Moscow summit on nuclear security. At the same time, Russia showed unequivocal solidarity with China's concern about the United States's attempted diktat.

About 120 people listened to the Russian president's speech. The presence of the daughter of Deng Xiaoping, who has retired formally but in fact remains the chief spiritual leader of Chinese reforms, showed the prestigious nature of the gathering. The Chinese political tradition regards this fact as a sign of highest approval on Deng Xiaoping's part too.

Russia: Yeltsin: Russia Keen To Maintain Balance of Forces in Asia

LD2504125896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BEIJING, April 25 (Itar-Tass) — One of the corner stones of Russia's policy of military-technical cooperation with China is its desire not to upset the balance of forces in the region, an aide to the Russian President told journalists in Beijing today.

Asked about allegations that the Russian sale of submarines to Iran disturbed the balance of forces in the Middle East, the Russian presidential aide, Boris Kuzyk, replied that it was a clear case of application of double standards. He recalled that no one has described the sales of submarines to Pakistan by France as upsetting the balance of forces.

As concerns long-term perspectives for military-technical cooperation with China, the aide to the Russian President stressed that they were mainly connected with the sphere of high technologies.

Sino-Russian ties would largely develop along two lines — joint research and design, and direct supplies of equipment produced in series to troops, Kuzyk said.

He added that much attention is being paid to the modernisation of the military machinery and equipment which Russia supplies to the Chinese army. Servicing and updating various kinds of arms is also in focus.

Kuzyk said China, as well as Russia's other partners, could raise the effectiveness of the equipment in service with its armed forces by 2-2.5 times at a relatively low cost by cooperating with Russia.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Russia: Government 'Source' Sees 'Powerful' PRC Economic Alliance

LD2504140096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1201 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Interfax) — Russia and China are able to create a powerful economic alliance in Asia which will determine the climate on the market of the Asian-Pacific region in the future, a Russian government source knowledgable on the matter told Interfax Thursday.

The political situation favors creation of this alliance and Russia's growing role on the Chinese market in machinery and military-technical production.

According to the government expert, "supplies of arms and military equipment make up a large part of Russian export to China." The issues of further military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Beijing will be considered during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to China, he said.

A large step in this direction was made late last year when the state-run Rosvooruzhenie arms company signed a contract on sale of a license for production of SU-27 intercepters with China. The sum of this contract is about $2.2 billion to $2.5 billion, according to military experts.

Russian observers believe that this contract will help to link the Chinese aviation industry and many enterprises of Russia's military-industrial complex for several decades.

Russian cars and equipment are in stable demand on the Chinese market, according to Russia's Foreign Economic Relations Ministry. Sometimes they are more competitive than their Western analogues.

The ministry predicts an increase in supplies of Russian parts for assembly in China over 1996-2005 to $6 billion.

Supplies of equipment for construction of a nuclear power plant in the Liaoning province with a capacity of 2,000 megawatts built for a government credit worth $2.5 billion and granted to China by the Russian party in line with an intergovernmental agreement dated December 18, 1992, will make up most of this sum.

The volume of Russia's obligations on contracts providing for supplies of complete equipment to China in 1996 and next two to three years exceeds $2 billion, the ministry told Interfax.

One such project in which Russian producers and exporters may participate is construction of Asia's largest hydroelectric power station, San Sia (Three Canyons), which will consist of 26 power generating units, each generating up to 700 megawatts.

The volume of bilateral trade between Russia and China reached $5.46 billion in 1995 having increased by 7.6 percent compared with 1994. Experts predict that the turnover between Russia and China may exceed $10 billion by 2000.

Russia: Yeltsin Hails Russo-Chinese 'Partnership'

LD2504140796 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1300 GMT 25 Apr 96

[Correspondent Petr Korovyakovskiy recorded video report; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Speaking about this part of his visit, the Russian president said:

[Yeltsin] Russo-Chinese partnership grows stronger from year to year, from meeting to meeting. After all, it is not the fruit of theories drawn up in offices, but the natural, historical result of lengthy contact between the two countries and peoples, and the proximity and, in large measure, the community of their interests. [passage omitted]

Russia: Russia, PRC Sign Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation

LD2504165196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1451 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BEIJING, April 25 (Interfax) — Russia and China signed 16 agreements Thursday on the first day of President Boris Yeltsin's visit, an Interfax correspondent reports.

Yeltsin said China agreed to hold talks this year on ceasing nuclear explosions, Yeltsin told journalists.

China is proposing to put its nuclear explosions conducted for "peaceful purposes" under international control, but is not ready to halt them completely, unofficial sources told Interfax.

The two countries also focused at length on their military-technological cooperation. Partnership ties between the two governments are now spreading to nearly all fields of the armed forces, presidential aide on military-technological issues Boris Kuzyk told journalists. But this will not disrupt the strategic military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, he said. The latter principle is one of the cornerstones of Russian policy, he said.

Long-term military cooperation will develop in three directions, Kuzyk said, those being construction development, modernization of weapons earlier sold to China,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

and possible sales of new weapons. Both countries assign significance to modernizing their defense technology and maintenancing their arsenals, he said.

China can raise the effectiveness of its arms technology in this way by 2.5 times, and relatively cheaply, experts say.

Talks on strengthening trust in the military sphere near the Sino-Russian border were friendly but complicated, Interfax learned. China's proposal to move troops 200 kilometers away from the border poses technical difficulties for Russia, a top military official in the Russian delegation said, as it would have to withdraw its troops beyond the railroad connecting its center to the Far East and into wild, unsettled areas, spending a great deal of money building new military towns.

The agreements signed as a result of talks include the creation of a direct, secret telephone line, cooperation in exploring space and the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as well as cooperation in the spheres of nuclear safety, energy, and the battle against drugs.

The document on peaceful use of atomic energy is the first of its kind Russia has signed with China, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov told Interfax. Sino-Russian cooperation in this area is developing in 30 different directions, he said, adding that this agreement created a legal basis for further development.

"We never before defined the framework of our joint efforts in double application technology," he said.

Russia's building of nuclear power plants in China will be especially significant for the Chinese, Mikhaylov said. Today's agreement evolved from an earlier agreement signed during Yeltsin's last visit to China in 1992, under which Russia was to build a nuclear power plant and a uranium-enriching plant in China, he said.

Specifically, Russia will provide China with $2.5 billion in directed loans, with which China will pay for Russian equipment and engineers. The first of two 1 million kilowatt reactors is almost completed, with five planned overall. The plant will be completed in ten years.

Mikhaylov stressed the importance of cooperation in the conversion of nuclear weapons, and said that the two sides discussed a guarantee that China would not use Russian nuclear technology in its own weapons development.

Early Friday morning Yeltsin will fly out to Shanghai, where he expects to sign an agreement with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China on building confidence in the military sphere in border regions.

"If such an agreement is signed, it will be unique and the first of its kind in Asia," presidential aide on international issues Dmitriy Ryurikov told Interfax.

Russia: Yeltsin Gains Credit for China's N-Test Ban Support

MM2504185896 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Vladimir Mikheyev: "Boris Yeltsin Carries Out Special G-7 Mission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The spring thaw in relations between Moscow and Beijing has apparently culminated in a small but "glorious victory," which as usual has many "godfathers." The Chinese leaders deemed it necessary precisely during Boris Yeltsin's visit to announce that they are ready to join the accord of the heads of the "G-8" recorded at the Moscow summit meeting — to sign a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty this fall.

Since Yeltsin raised this delicate subject in Beijing, both on his own initiative and on behalf of the G-7, he will get a substantial proportion of the credit, although the Chinese leaders have repeatedly and publicly displayed complaisance, coming out in favor of scrapping regular tests of their own military atom's combat readiness — true, only after a general and complete test ban treaty comes into force.

Here Beijing added significantly that it will sign the treaty but not before the end of 1996. From which foreign experts concluded that the PRC has firm intentions to carry out at least another two test explosions this year, but these labor- and capital-intensive measures are, as usual, scheduled for the most climatically favorable seasons — May-June and September-October. Nobody knows whether these plans will be shelved forever.

In the first years after the PRC's formation, to take the chronological approach, the leadership in Beijing believed that the key to military victory lay in endless tidal waves of infantry and regarded the idea of a nuclear shield with extreme skepticism. Mao Zedong's comment at that time is well known: "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger with which American reactionaries are frightening the people. It looks terrible but in reality it is not." But as early as 1956 Mao corrected the aim of military organizational development: "We must have not only even bigger aircraft and guns but also an atomic bomb. We cannot do without it."

The chronology of China's nuclear tests begins 16 October 1964 — on that day China's first nuclear device with a force of 20 kilotons was exploded in the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Since then at a major test site in the Lopnor Lake area in the southeast part of Xinjiang various weapons types and weapons components have been run in — both the hydrogen bomb and its sister the neutron bomb, and the thunderous reverberations from 1-2 megaton underground explosions have echoed here. On 15 May 1995 in the Takla Makan Desert they tested the quality of an item destined for the new generation of sea-launched ballistic missiles. This year, the experts surmise, China would like to use these nuclear explosions to satisfy itself that its development of lighter and more powerful nuclear warheads has been going in the right direction.

Bearing in mind the foregoing, it makes sense to familiarize ourselves with Bejing's official statement on its readiness to become a signatory to a complete and general test ban treaty and satisfy ourselves that there are no variant readings in the interpretation of terms and concepts. Strictly speaking, as Yeltsin announced to journalists after his meeting with Jiang Zemin, his kind hosts have joined the "G-8" accord to hold "talks and conclude a treaty," which prompts a number of questions.

Who can guarantee that the talks will lead to the desired and required result? Will it not be necessary to wait until September-October, when the weather conditions will give China the chance to complete its program of nuclear tests with a flourish, but at the same time the deadline for signing their death warrant will be extended? Will this not affect the position of the United States and France, which could use this as a convenient pretext either to resume explosions or for new bargaining?

One way or another, as of today it is a double success: Beijing said "yes" and the credit for this belongs to Moscow. It is another matter that sometimes, given a more scrupulous translation, an affirmative answer sounds less convincing: "Yes, but...."

Russia: Mood in Beijing 'Unusually Harmonious' During Yeltsin Trip

MM2504190696 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Platkovskiy: "Political Duet in Beijing Sounds Unusually Harmonious"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing — The telephone rang in the night at the IZVESTIYA correspondents' center: "Is it true that some Chinese pioneers put a red necktie around Yeltsin's neck?"

The colleague from a Western agency was hoping to obtain further weighty confirmation of a Russian-Chinese alliance appearing on the Asian horizon.

On the eve of Boris Yeltsin's arrival in Beijing, analysts were discussing enthusiastically who would be playing which card and why: Yeltsin — the "Chinese" card, or Jiang Zemin the "Russian" one? The Cold War has ended, but once again something is wrong in the Washington-Beijing-Moscow triangle. How close together will the neighboring powers move, and what consequences will this have for the current fragile world order? These questions, which were firing the imagination of the journalistic fraternity, were hanging over Tiananmen Square where the red carpet was laid out for the important guest. PRC President Jiang Zemin and President Yeltsin embraced each other and exchanged three kisses in front of the guard of honor. On the north side of the square Chairman Mao looked down imperturbably on the two leaders from his portrait.

"Well, it's begun!" The journalists began to stir and to throw themselves into looking for intriguing new topics.

Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin went off to a meeting behind closed doors. You could spend a long time wondering what the confidential conversation was about. Only one thing was clear: The conversation would end in a dinner given by the Chinese leader in honor of the Russian president in the People's Assemblies Center. Dinner in Beijing is not simply a formal meal, but a special ceremony, whose main element is its atmosphere.

Connoisseurs of Chinese cuisine gave a high assessment of the sweet and sour soup with two delicacies (one was determined as turtle's eggs, while opinion was divided over the other). Stewed shark fins were followed by roast meat with mushrooms. The dessert, made with melon seeds and black sesame seeds, was greeted with particular enthusiasm.

The meal was accompanied by a concert by the massed army choir. Soloists in white dress uniform performed the famous Chinese songs "Step by Step" and "Swallow." When "Oh, the Guelder Rose Is in Bloom," and then "Moscow Nights," rang out under the high arches, the animation in the hall grew into spiritual unity. At that moment Chairman Jiang Zemin rose and asked for silence. The audience was astounded when it heard the song "Oh, Mists, My Mists," performed by the Chinese leader. It was sung in perfect Russian and confirmed the outstanding musical talent of the soloist.

Boris Yeltsin did not reciprocate.

The closest entourage informed Yeltsin that the PRC president likes Borodin and Mussorgskiy, and also the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Russian popular saying "Things are moving, the office is writing" [said jokingly in reference to frantic activity].

Judging by the comments, the evening had nostalgic overtones. The hosts did not conceal their warm recollections of old times spent studying or training in Moscow.

The two leaders held talks both in private and on a larger scale, with the participation of vice premiers and ministers. As a result, a Russian-Chinese declaration was signed, as well as a package of agreements made up of 15 documents. The declaration contained the most sensational thing. The sides stated the need to construct "strategic partnership oriented toward the 21st century." As Boris Yeltsin reported, "this is a completely different way of phrasing the question and a new rise in the level of interaction between the two powers." According to available reports, this provision was included in the declaration literally at the last moment. Before that, the Chinese side had preferred to avoid any allusion to "special mutual relations."

Boris Yeltsin also stated that there are no contentious issues between Russia and China, and he is glad about that.

Russia: Yeltsin, Li Peng Vow To Strengthen Ties

LD2504201796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2009 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beijing, April 25 (Itar-Tass) — Russia wants to build up its relations with China on the basis of trustful partnership, President Boris Yeltsin said today during his meeting with Chinese State Council Premier Li Peng.

Yeltsin praised China's efforts to strengthen the ties with Russia. He called for more contacts and meetings between the two states' leaders.

Li Peng said Russia and China, two great powers, are constantly developing friendship and cooperation.

Yeltsin and Li Peng expressed the motivation of the two states to build up trade.

Russia: Yeltsin in Shanghai Says Russian, Chinese Communists Differ

LD2604073996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0658 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SHANGHAI April 26 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin praised economic reforms in communist China, but said on Friday that Russian communists of Gennadiy Zyuganov differed from their Chinese counterparts thus hinting that they would hardly ensure a similar economic breakthrough if they come to power.

"Our communists, like Zyuganov, are fanatics, while here there are pragmatics", Yeltsin told reporters in Shanghai where he acquainted himself with the Chinese experience of economic reforms.

"Each country has its own specifics. Our reform is carried out not like in China. But the experience of Shanghai should be thoroughly examined. What I saw today is very impressing", Yeltsin said after visiting the new economic region of the city.

The president, who is running for reelection at June 16 polls and faces Zyuganov as the main contender, stressed that Russia "was not copying capitalism. It creates its market economy with Russian specifics".

"I have come to Shanghai not only to acquaint myself with the reform. This is my official visit to China. Taking into consideration that I have been only in Beijing and nowhere else, it was proposed that I visit yet another city. And, surely, such a big city as Shanghai", the president said.

Russia: 'Powerful New Boost' to Relations With PRC

MM2604080396 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Pavel Shinkarenko: "Partnership Geared to 21st Century"]

[FBIS Translated Text] That was the description of Russian-Chinese relations made by Boris Yeltsin on the eve of his trip to Beijing. And the truth of those words was confirmed on the first day of the Russian Federation president's visit to the PRC.

The talks between the Russian head of state and PRC President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng, the meeting with Qiao Shi, chairman of the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee, and the package of documents signed at top and intergovernmental levels all show that Moscow and Beijing have finally consigned their former mistrust to the "archives" and have started to build their relationship on the principles of equality, mutual advantage, and good neighborliness.

The current summit is the third since 27 December 1991, when the PRC recognized the Russian Federation. I witnessed the previous summit talks, and I can attest how relations between the leaders have improved from meeting to meeting. This time Jiang Zemin started the conversation with his Moscow guest in a rather unusual way. "We are having a warm spring in Beijing," he said. "And although it was windy yesterday, the weather

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

today is clear and fine — it is a kind of omen for the visit to our country by an old friend of the Chinese people — Russian President Boris Yeltsin." Our leader was not left wanting, saying that he was "very glad to be among friends." And he immediately presented his Chinese colleague with two Russian-published books in Russian — "Reform, Development, and Stability," which includes 28 articles by the PRC president, as well as "My Father Deng Xiaoping" written by the Chinese patriarch's daughter Xiao Rong.

One of the main topics which the two heads of state then touched upon was nuclear safety. The Russian president briefed Jiang Zemin on the Moscow summit on this problem and on the desire of the G-8 to sign a nuclear test ban treaty this September. In order for it to be comprehensive, it is necessary to have the consent of the fifth member of the "nuclear club" — China. And that consent was obtained. "We agreed," Boris Yeltsin told journalists, commenting on the progress of talks with the head of the PRC, "that the Chinese side would accede to the G-8 decision."

Needless to say, the warming in political relations does not mean that Russia and China would like to return to the "Moscow-Beijing" axis. There was no question of that, nor will there be — that conclusion follows from the declaration signed by the two leaders. And the fact that this factor creates the conditions for full-fledged businesslike ties is of considerable importance. This is eloquently demonstrated by the figures.

In 1995 Russian-Chinese trade turnover reached $5.48 billion — 7.6 percent up on the 1994 level. And commercial deals transacted in convertible currency predominate. Whereas in January-November 1994 barter accounted for 49.4 percent, in the same 11 months of last year this indicator had dropped to 29.3 percent. Russia's leading exports to China are fertilizer, nonferrous and ferrous metals, machinery and equipment, and chemical goods — accounting for almost 84 percent of the total. With Russian help the Chinese are building, modernizing, and operating 16 facilities. These include eight heat and electric power stations with a total capacity of 6,100 megawatts, a plant in Shanghai, and a pulp and paper combine in the city of Jiamusi.

We have to think that the agreements signed yesterday will give a powerful new boost to Russian-Chinese partnership. By the start of the 21st century it is planned to increase trade turnover fourfold — to $20 billion. "We want relations between Russia and China, as they become more mature, to be capable of withstanding any changes and of working with the greatest possible returns for the benefit of both countries' peoples and in the interests of maintaining international peace and stability," Boris Yeltsin stressed.

A Chinese proverb says: "Trees planted by forefathers provide shade for their descendants." That "shade" could, I think, be the joint implementation of the program for the peaceful utilization of nuclear power. As Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy, reported, the project will take 10 years and cost $3 billion. In particular, Russia will pledge to build in China a nuclear power station and a uranium enrichment plant to meet the needs of nuclear power generation. It was also stipulated that contacts will be developed in the sphere of the conversion of the nuclear weapons complex. Russia, according to the minister, will implement shipments of nuclear equipment [kompleks] for the nuclear power station built by France in Shenzhen.

Boris Yeltsin flies today to Shanghai, where he plans to sign a treaty on confidence-building measures in the border region with the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Russia: Foreign Ministry Hails Border Accord Between Five States

LD2604105296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1028 GMT 26 Apr 96

[By Andrey Kirillov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian Foreign Ministry described as "unique" an Agreement on confidence-building measures in the military sphere concerning the border between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and China to be concluded on Friday.

Speaking in an interview with Itar-Tass here today, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry representative said that the document to be signed in Shanghai by the heads of these states is "pivotal" for relations between the five countries.

"The agreement means a new level of understanding and mutual confidence in a such sensitive area as military one," he stressed.

The diplomat said that the document is "unique for the entire Asia-Pacific region", since several countries in this part of the world assume, for the first time, a set of specific obligations in the military-political sphere.

The peculiar feature of the agreement is its aim to strengthen peace, stability and quietude between the five states, he continued. "It is not spearheaded against anybody," the diplomat added.

He explained that its basic provisions are non-use of force or threat of force against one another, refusal to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

gain unilateral military superiority, non-use of troops (stationed in the area of the border) for an attack on another side.

The unique nature of the agreement lies also in its format: four states sign it with a single country.

The diplomat said that the signing of the agreement will stimulate ongoing work on the next basic document — an Agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces in the area of the border.

Under the document which will be signed in Shanghai today, "troops will not be withdrawn": this move needs additional understandings between the sides, the diplomat stressed.

He expressed amazement at some press reports that Russian troops are allegedly about to be pulled out from the Chinese border.

Russia: Seleznev on Yeltsin Chechnya Policy, NATO Expansion

LD2504151496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1201 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STRASBOURG, April 25 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin's plan for a peace settlement in Chechnya "creates necessary political preconditions to stop the bloodshed and search for a compromise solution," speaker of Russia's State Duma Gennadiy Seleznev told the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Thursday.

"Of course, the matter concerns preservance of Russia's territorial integrity and rejection of terrorism in any form, irrespective of how it is justified," he said.

Speaking about Russia's membership in the Council of Europe, Seleznev said that the State Duma plans to present documents signed during Russia's entering this organization on February 28 by the beginning of the next year for ratification. There exists a "hopeful mutual understanding" regarding activity of the Council of Europe in Russian society. "This is a good sign" given the presence of numerous political parties and movements, Seleznev said.

Having pointed to a significant role of the Council of Europe "in forming an all-continental system of democratic security," Seleznev condemned "the attempts to breath new life" into NATO, which he characterized as a product of the Cold War. In particular, the idea of NATO's expansion to the East "cannot be perceived in any other way but as a growing spirit of non-confidence and suspicion, hindering creation of a new Europe," Seleznev said.

Russia: Zhirinovskiy Warns E. Europe States Against Joining NATO

AU2504164296 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 22 Apr 96 p 15

["Exclusive" interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, by Cornel Feruta; place and date not given: "NATO Will Turn East European Countries into Brothels for its Soldiers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another major candidate for the presidential elections in Russia, together with communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, is the ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. For the first time in the Romanian press, JURNALUL NATIONAL is today carrying an interview with the person who has made the world accustomed to his explosive declarations.

[Feruta] Mr. Zhirinovskiy, of whom are you most afraid among your rivals in the struggle to become Russia's president?

[Zhirinovskiy] I have never been afraid of anybody. If I were afraid, I would not be involved in politics and would not be participating in the presidential elections. Currently, only four candidates have registered for Russia's presidency: the current president of the Federation Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev, the former USSR president and secretary general of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], Gennadiy Zyuganov, president of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and myself, president of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR]. I can already predict who is going to vote for Gorbachev. However, the other two rivals are fairly strong. Boris Yeltsin is president, so he has the possibility to rely on the support of state structures. Gennadiy Zyuganov relies on the support of the remaining CPSU party structures and on the communist press. But we do not have the possibilities available that my rivals have, because we have never been in power. We are not responsible in any way for the poverty of the country and the population brought about by the communists and democrats. We are the cleanest possible party. People have confidence in us, while the enemies of the people are afraid of us. It is noteworthy that such destructive democrats as Egor Gaydar and Grigoriy Yavliskiy have announced that they are ready to support not only Yeltsin but also Zyuganov, just to avoid having Zhirinovskiy come to power.

[Feruta] If you become Russia's president and NATO is to expand, do you intend to sanction the new members of the alliance? If so, in what way?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Zhirinovskiy] These new NATO members will already be punished by themselves by joining the alliance. NATO soldiers will be fooling around on their territory, like the case of the American soldiers who raped a Japanese schoolgirl (the Okinawa affair — editor's note). They will turn countries with a high level of culture into soldiers' brothels. Apart from this, in the event of any military confrontation between NATO and Russia, it would be precisely on the territory of the new members of the alliance that the the military operations would be launched, because these countries are in Russia's immediate neighborhood. I used to warn and I continue to warn those governments about this, governments that, just like prostitutes, crave to fall on their backs under NATO soldiers to improve their material situation.

[Feruta] Mr. Zhirinovskiy, how well do you know Romania and to what extent will this country be of interest to you if you become Russia's president?

[Zhirinovskiy] The Romanians, just like us, are Orthodox Christians. The Romanians' forefathers were Slavs. Many Slav words and roots have been preserved in the Romanian language, in spite of the Latin imposed by the Romans. Even our word "da" [yes] in Romanian is also "da". This is already enough for the Russians and Romanians to be brothers. Russia always supported in every way the struggle of the Romanians for liberation from the Ottoman yoke. Then, Romania, freed together with Russia, helped the brotherly Bulgarian people. Russian armies and military transport crossed Romania to Bulgaria. During World War I, Romania and Russia were allies. In World War II, Hitler first of all took Transylvania from Romania and then pushed Romania into a war against the Soviet Union. However, in 1944, Romania broke with Germany and declared war on it. Again we became allied states. After World War II, both states belonged to the Warsaw Pact and now the Russians and the Romanians together are helping their Serbian brothers. History has taught us that there is no better ally for Romania than Russia. No departure from the alliance with Russia has ever been beneficial for Romania and it has only brought harm to Romania. That is how it was under Antonescu [Romania's fascist leader during World War II] and Ceausescu. I have always fought for the re-establishment of the community of East European countries and for a durable alliance with Romania.

Russia: Primakov To Attend Bucharest Black Sea Economic Meeting

LD2504193496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1612 GMT 25 Apr 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Apr 25 (Interfax) — Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov will attend the seventh meeting of foreign ministers of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Group in Bucharest Saturday, a Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told Interfax Thursday.

He said at the coming meeting chairmanship in the organization will be transferred from Rumania to Russia.

"During the next six months Russia will coordinate group activities and bear responsibility for organizing key steps in the framework of the group," Karasin said.

In Bucharest Primakov also plans to hold bilateral meetings with his counterparts.

According to Karasin, the meeting should discuss a program of action following from the declaration of the 1995 Bucharest summit, the implementation of the decisions of the sixth meeting of foreign ministers held last winter in Chisinau and map out future steps.

Besides, the forum should focus on an upcoming conference of the group's transport ministers and a meeting of interior ministers.

The spokesman said foreign ministers plan to take part in an international business forum due in Bucharest the same day.

Russia: Primakov's Near East Visit Seen as 'Failure'

MM2604084596 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Konstantin Eggert: "Russia Wants To Be the United States' Equal in the Near East, But Poverty Prevents It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Israeli-Russian relations are far worse today than just a couple of months ago." This was said by a high-ranking diplomat, who conveys — perhaps better than most — the atmosphere prevailing at the Moscow International Trade Center, where the Israeli Embassy held a reception to mark the 48th anniversary of the Jewish state.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Members of the Russian Presidential Staff (a possible reason was Yeltsin's visit to China) and high-ranking government representatives (save Culture Minister Yevgeniy Sidorov) were noticeable by their absence. The appearance of First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov could not ease the suspicion and mistrust that have arisen between the two countries' representatives over the last few days.

The shelling of northern Israel — now into its third week — by Islamic fundamentalists from the Iran-backed Lebanese organization Hizballah and the Israelis' retaliatory actions have not only resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians (mainly Lebanese) but have also caused tension in the "Jerusalem-Washington-Moscow" diplomatic triangle.

Smolenskaya Square and the Kremlin followed France in deciding to make their own efforts in the hope of settling the crisis. People in Moscow believe that they have sufficient influence to do so. At the same time the Americans and Israelis think that the only person capable of breaking the Lebanese deadlock is U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He has spent seven days in the region in an attempt to work out the terms of a cease-fire that would suit Israeli Prime Minister Shim'on Peres and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad — the real master of the situation in Lebanon, where Damascus keeps a 35,000-strong troop contingent.

Since the behavior of Hizballah guerrillas depends on Syria and Iran rather than on the helpless government in Beirut, Russian diplomats are hoping to avail themselves of their ties with the Syrian elite that have survived from the Soviet era, as well as of existing communications channels with Tehran, in order to try to influence the situation. "We are returning to the Near East," Foreign Ministry personnel said.

But Foreign Ministry Chief Yevgeniy Primakov's lightning tour of the region, on which many people pinned their hopes for galvanizing Russia's Near East policy, brought no results. People in Tehran and Damascus gave him a courteous reception but promised nothing specific. As for the visit to Israel, it would be no exaggeration to describe it as a failure.

According to available information, Primakov had an extremely tough conversation with Shim'on Peres. The minister tried to explain to the premier that there are various approaches in Iran toward support for fundamentalist organizations abroad, but he was unable to persuade his interlocutor, who considers the Tehran regime's foreign policy quite definite and lacking in subtlety, at least as far as Israel is concerned. There is every indication that the talks were ended when Yevgeniy Maksimovich voiced the view that the shelling of Lebanese territory primarily constitutes an attempt to win voters' support in the coming 29 May Knesset elections. Peres really took umbrage. He faces a battle for the post of head of the Cabinet (the Israelis will be choosing a prime minister separately from parliamentary deputies for the first time ever) and he took the minister's words as tactlessness.

People at the Israeli Embassy think that Primakov is not entirely free of the negative stereotypes toward their country that held sway back in the Soviet era. "We hope that Yevgeniy Maksimovich will pay us a full-fledged official visit and then the atmosphere will change," one diplomat said.

Russian Foreign Ministry staff in turn consider Israel's one-sided orientation toward U.S. mediation counterproductive. According to them, Washington is trying to preserve the diplomatic monopoly in the Near East. One interlocutor told your correspondent that during a telephone conversation Warren Christopher hinted to Primakov that they would handle things without us.

The Israelis explain the situation as they see it. "Egypt and Jordan have been paid for the peace treaties with us. Cairo annually receives U.S. aid of $7 billion and Amman has had its debts written off," a high-ranking Israeli Foreign Ministry staffer said. "Al-Asad will only agree to take back the occupied Golan Heights and conclude peace if he is paid well. A settlement costs a great deal of money, something that only the United States has."

Be that as it may, Moscow is not abandoning its attempts to go solo in the Near East performance. Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk, that astute connoisseur of local political intrigue, is to tour the capitals of the region. However, there will be no more funds for active work in this area of the world in the near future.

Russia: Spokesman Cites 'Insulting' Behavior by European Parliament

LD2504133596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1201 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Interfax) — Moscow has paid attention to "rather strange behavior" of several members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CEPA) due to the information on the death of Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told Interfax.

"Several parliamentarians, not great in number, rose in memory of the Chechen separatist who brought

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

innumerable misfortunes to his people and to Russia's other peoples," Karasin said.

Ex-speaker of the Lithuanian parliament Vitautas Landsbergis was the organizer of this action, according to information from Strasbourg.

"We firmly believe that this is a lamentable demonstration of hypocrisy and dual standards with respect to Russia and its problems," Karasin said.

"This show of respect to a functionary who directly encouraged and organized numerous terroristic actions, threatened to spread them not only throughout Russian territory but throughout other states as well, directly contradicts the coordinated efforts of the world community to fight terrorism," Karasin said.

"We assess behavior of several members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as unfriendly and insulting," he said.

Russia: U.S. Satellites, Agents Credited With Finding Urals Bunker

MK2504112196 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Igor Korotchenko under the "Special Services" rubric: "Satellites and Spies. They Complement One Another When It Is Necessary To Get Important Information for the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is well known that reports about the construction of a secret underground facility in Bashkortostan, which were carried by the American press last week, and which asserted this to be the key element of the automatic system of delivering a nuclear missile strike at U.S. territory, were immediately refuted by the Russian side. In particular, a statement to that effect was made by Colonel General Viktor Yesin, chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, who told ITAR-TASS that "the Russian Strategic Missile Forces have not built, expanded, or modernized any facilities on the Urals territory." The fact remains, however, that citing informed sources in the U.S. secret services, THE NEW YORK TIMES reported not only the approximate coordinates of the construction site, but also specified the tentative purpose of the cyclopean underground facility currently under construction.

If we admit that said construction work is actually under way, a fully logical question arises: How has this become known? In the view of space intelligence experts, the United States could have received the first information back in 1985, when it started launching on a regular basis optical electronic intelligence satellites of the "Keyhole" series, which are capable of taking photographs of the surface of the Earth with a definition of 0.15 m. The construction of any secret defense facilities both in the United States and other countries, as a rule, calls for cover measures; that is, measures designed to impress false information on the eventual enemy regarding their actual status and purpose. Underground defense structures, for instance, are usually passed off as civilian facilities, such as mines. But the identification of revealing signs (if the space satellite photos are deciphered by competent specialists) sometimes brings to naught all the efforts to create a cover story.

In all likelihood, this is what has happened to the facility in Bashkortostan. The United States could draw accurate conclusions from space intelligence data and subsequently focused its efforts on obtaining more detailed information, employing their available agent resources for that purpose.

Recently, a high-ranking U.S. diplomat, who professionally monitors the situation in the Russian Armed Forces, said fairly straightforwardly in a conversation with your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA observer that one of the key spheres of interest for the U.S. intelligence service in Russia is the country's Strategic Missile Forces, because they are capable of assuredly destroying the United States in the event of a nuclear war between Moscow and Washington. For this reason, the Americans pay considerable attention to the gathering of data from original Russian military sources. "If need be, we can approach a man in uniform who holds interest for us even in a Moscow trolley," the diplomat said, adding, however, that he is talking about an exchange of views, not recruitment. In his words, the creation of a market economy in Russia has not brought about an increase in the number of uniformed secret-bearers who turn up at the CIA and DIA sections of the U.S. Embassy with offers of cooperation. Yet there are grounds to suggest that the agencies linked to the Pentagon and Langley that operate in Moscow have been making energetic efforts to infiltrate their agents into the key directorates of the General Staff, the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, and the corresponding science and research institutes subordinated directly to the Defense Ministry, whose area of expertise directly involves U.S. national security interests. The information sources the Americans obtain there can do immense damage regardless of their rank or status. For this reason, by analogy with the much-invoked case of the exposed agent Aldrich Ames, an abrupt increase in the well-being of certain Russian servicemen should, logically, come under close scrutiny by the counterintelligence agencies. But, in reality, this is not always the case.

It is well known that in 1994, upon receiving documented information to the effect that several officers

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

from a directorate under his supervision, who knew the location of strategic underground facilities, suddenly became "rich," an officer of the General Staff's military counterintelligence department chose to turn a blind eye to the report and did not advise his superiors on Lubyanka Square of that fact. After similar lapses that enabled Ames to go on spying for nearly 10 years without hindrance, John Deutsch, the new CIA director, carried out a sweeping purge of his subordinates, firing several hundred operatives.

Russia: Special Services 'Never Heard' of Arrested U.S. Sailor

MM2504144096 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by Gennadiy Charodeyev: "He Mistook His Own for Russians and Ended Up in Handcuffs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The FBI has arrested Kurt Lessenthien, a former mechanic on a USN nuclear submarine in Orlando, Fla. He is accused of spying for Russia.

In Washington a U.S. Administration spokesman stated that the story began after the special services intercepted a phone call between Kurt Lessenthien and staffers at the Russian Embassy. The 29-year-old Lessenthien allegedly offered to sell valuable secret information to Russian intelligence. The FBI immediately decided to turn the tables on the unmasked traitor — a phony agent pretending to be a staffer at the Russian diplomatic mission contacted the ex- sailor. At a secret rendezvous the entirely unsuspecting Kurt offered the "Russian station chief" a package of documents stamped "Secret." FBI agents immediately slapped the cuffs on him. This happened at an Orlando motel....

Official spokesmen for the Russian special services with whom this IZVESTIYA correspondent spoke had never heard anything about the failed American spy. For their part, the diplomats said: "All kinds of nuts ring our Washington embassy."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Political Issues

Russia: Yeltsin's Far East Visit Prompts Feelings of Deja-Vu

MM2404153296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Boris Reznik: "President Offers Promises. Far East Falls For It Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been a long time since the residents of Khabarovsk last tidied their city with such enthusiasm and dedication. During the pleasant sunny days, merry and noisy people with brooms and shovels in hand poured into the streets from offices, university lecture rooms, school buildings and plant shops, many of which are standing idle. Wits from the Pedagogical University painted on banners an old slogan with new meaning: "All Out — for Yeltsin's Capitalist Subbotnik!"

The city was expecting the president, and this time the news about his arrival proved to be more than just wishful thinking, as had happened in the past.

The illustrious visitors spend an entire half-day here on the eve of their visit to China. The main political task, for the sake of which Yeltsin made this brief stopover, is clear and obvious: To prove to residents of the outlying Russian regions on the eve of the presidential election that Moscow has finally heeded the "lamentation" of its far-flung regions and has decided to give them support on a scale of which they had not dared to even dream. To the accompaniment of applause from those present at the kray administration's conference hall, Boris Nikolayevich signed an edict giving the recently adopted government program for the development of the Far East region the status of presidential program. The cost of everything included in this momentous document is mind-boggling — 371 trillion (!) rubles.

I joined all the others in that hall and applauded the prospects of unprecedented prosperity for my native vast spaces but, looking around me, I caught myself thinking that this was already and at least the fourth time I was doing exactly the same thing, on an identical occasion, and with exactly the same people around me. It was simply that the first two programs had different titles and had appeared as CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolutions "On the Accelerated Development of Productive Forces in the Far East and Transbaykal Regions." The first in a series of truly ambitious programs, which inspired great hopes among the Far East's residents, was adopted later on, at the very beginning of the Gorbachev era. Not a single kopeck materialized under any of these programs.

What will happen this time? The new, this time Yeltsin's, "Far East" program incorporates 68 autonomous programs previously adopted in the region's republics, krays, and oblasts, not a single one of which is being actually implemented.

Heads of administrations from all territories in the Far East gathered for a meeting with the president in Khabarovsk. And, in the same way as it happened whenever promises were made at regular intervals in the past, they again complained to the head of state that the region is being suffocated by unreasonable taxes and humiliated by the unfair distribution of budget resources. The majority of enterprises in the defense industry, machine building, metal processing, and shipbuilding are standing idle because their output has become uncompetitive in the domestic market.

The citizens of Khabarovsk were surprised by the signing of a Treaty on the Demarcation of Powers Between Organs of Power in Russia and Khabarovsk Kray as a Federation Component. This is the first time that such a document has been signed not in Moscow but in the provinces. I was told by Governor Viktor Ishayev that the kray administration pins great hopes on it as regards getting rid of petty tutelage by Moscow functionaries and being able to resolve by itself the fundamental questions of organizing the kray's economy and social policy.

The president managed to see a lot during the half day he spent in Khabarovsk. In the morning he visited the reconstruction site of the unique bridge across the Amur River which was commissioned exactly 80 years ago and proved superior to all construction norms in the last 20 years. Its reconstruction started four years ago. By now 55 of its 57 piers have already been restored and 10 highway-bearing spans have already been installed. All the work on the bridge's reconstruction is planned to end in a year's time with the opening of the bridge to railroad traffic.

People in the Far East are used to the fact that throughout history — with the possible exception of Stolypin's time — Russian and Union leaders have said a lot about the Far East's great importance for our state, but have done little to consolidate and improve their far-flung regions. Boris Nikolayevich also uttered prophetic words, and let us hope they do not remain just words: "We will never be a great country if Russia's Far East is neglected."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Russia: Chernomyrdin Against Turning Movement Into Political Party

LD2504215396 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1547 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Gennadiy Yezhov and Artem Protasenko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Apr (Itar-Tass) — Viktor Chernomyrdin, leader of the All-Russia social and political movement Our Home is Russia, today warned against "hastily turning Our Home is Russia into a political party". Speaking at the 3rd congress of the movement, he warned against "forcing the pace of natural processes". "Any haste will do nothing but damage the cause," Chernomyrdin said.

He said the main task was now to "consolidate a new political culture in society". In this environment it would be possible to found "a major political party of a new democratic type". A broad social and political movement in support of the president's course of reforms is "an optimal tool" to achieve this goal, Chernomyrdin said.

He also said that "maintaining and consolidating the union of supporters of Yeltsin's course will be the most urgent task after the presidential elections." "As for creating a new party, I think, it should grow from this union." "In this work Our Home is Russia is bound to be one of the pillars of economic and political stability necessary to continue reforms."

Russia: 'National Security Policy' Seen Reviving Bureaucratic Past

MK2504141596 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Tretyakov, chief editor: "A Citizen or a Bureaucrat? Regarding Draft 'Russian National Security Policy'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The staff of Yuriy Baturin, national security adviser to the Russian president, has drawn up a draft document entitled "The National Security Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period From 1996 to the Year 2000." Today, this document will be critically viewed for the first time in a wide "narrow circle" of persons other than its authors. Any serious critic should say at least three things about any noteworthy text: point out its key shortcomings and key merits, as well as note its difference from or likeness to other similar texts. This is what I am going to do. SIMILARITY. I would point out three key similarities. The draft National Security Doctrine — let us call it "the NSD" for the sake of brevity — reminds me simultaneously of:

— the U.S. national security strategy (the NSD singles out "three units" of Russian long-term interests: "the preservation and prosperity of the people; the protection and amelioration of their territory of residence; and the preservation and development of the national way of life");

— Communist and patriotic manifestos of recent times (the NSD: "From the ideological point of view, Russia is the upholder of an age-long spiritual tradition based on the desire to achieve the loftiest ideals of justice, morality, and brotherhood");

— traditional CPSU tenets of the Soviet era (the NSD: "The history of the Russian state is a history of a political union of a multiethnic population, with the Russian people playing the integrating role").

In short, Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov would subscribe virtually to any page of the NSD.

MERITS. This is precisely the main merit of the draft NSD, because it does not divide Russian history into bright and black periods (the NSD: "Russia is a successor to Ancient Rus, the czardom of Moscow, the Russian Empire, and the Union of the SSR" [Soviet Socialist Republics]; nor does it divide Russian society into good guys ("democrats," "reformers") and bad guys ("nondemocrats," "antireformers"). The draft NSD is free from ideology in the partisan sense of this word.

The second merit of the text is that it proclaims the individual to be the key element in its system of values; human rights and freedoms, to be the utmost value; and deserving living standards and quality of life for every individual and every family, to be the national goal from 1996 to the year 2000. As used to be in the Soviet era: Everything for the sake of man, for the benefit of man. Correspondingly, here the NSD also renounces "gaps in the fabric of time" for the sake of historical continuity. Obviously, another merit of the text under consideration is, on one hand, its explicit commitment to the ideals of democracy and a free economy (here it is, its sole difference from authentic communist texts, both traditional and modernist) and the recognition of "the stern realities" (numerous crises) and realistic threats (the most revealing example from the NSD: "energetic efforts by foreign firms to buy Russian enterprises manufacturing high-technology and defense production; as a rule, to do so at artificially low prices"), on the other.

It is the latter part that distinguishes the text from declarations dating to the period of unquestioning pro-Western liberal reform-mindedness.

SHORTCOMINGS. It is common knowledge that one's shortcomings are the extension of one's merits. Yet it

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

is not always the case. There can also be shortcomings not matched by any merits, something that I would call inherent flaws. The draft NSD includes both types of shortcomings.

As regards the shortcomings of the first type, I would assign to them failure to take second steps along the path on which correct first steps have already been taken. For instance, if we take the triad including the protection of the people, territory, and way of life, which has been borrowed from the Americans (not only by the NSD, but also by Zyuganov), I would like to know at least the following things:

1) How specifically and, in particular, from whom will the Russian people be protected?

2) What does the NSD regard as Russian territory?

3) What is the national way of life in Russia, populated by Christians, Moslems, and simply nonbelievers, diverse and multitudinous ethnic groups, and so forth?

The NSD's analysis is extremely weak as far as the CIS is concerned. The feeling is that everything that may be hidden behind these three letters, that appear to be sacral for the authors of the text, is the strictest taboo for the Baturin group. Yet, the NSD should not be confused with a diplomatic document or an international treaty.

But the text's inherent (or original) flaw is elsewhere. The NSD says: "...currently, Russia's national idea is the restoration of the Russian state..."

These "state," "statehood," and everything relating to them literally crowd everything else out of the document — naturally, all things human in the first place. I can readily believe that precisely this goal will be achieved: A state in Russia will be restored yet another time and will turn out stronger than the previous one. For this is the invariable way of Russian evolution: The state swells, while the people wither.

The way of thinking characteristic of all Russian leaders — great dukes, czars, general secretaries, presidents — has been flawed as far as one thing is concerned: They all started with building a formidable state with a view to getting down to addressing popular problems afterward. As a result, the objective has inevitably been achieved by half. The state would grow, like a mushroom cloud, devouring everything that was alive underneath it, including the people. In the meantime, it would bring to life only one thing, albeit in huge quantities: bureaucrats. The self-devouring state of Moscow, Rus, Russia, the Soviet Union, again Russia is resuscitating its immortal — for itself — ideology in the text of the NSD. No decisive breakthrough was achieved in the text because it contains no goals formulated with uncompromising forthrightness:

— a complaint by a citizen about a bureaucrat destroys the bureaucrat;

— a citizen's property and fate is outside the power of bureaucrats or the state;

— the state is a watchdog defending the citizen from bureaucrats.

It is the bureaucrat who is the actual master of Russia from times immemorial to the present democratic day. For this reason Russia's genuine national idea could be only one thing: a struggle with the bureaucrats. Therefore, the Russian national goal for the period from 1996 to the year 2000 can only be as follows: to bring the state down from the pedestal to which it has clambered yet again and to reduce bureaucrats to the sole exploited class of society. Just that, and no other goals or ideas.

Russia: Democratic Choice Party Split on Preferences

964F1912A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Olga Churakova: "Russia's Democratic Choice Has Attempted To Determine Where It Stands: Party Congress Scheduled for 18 May"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A closed meeting of the Political Council of the Russia's Democratic Choice party was held yesterday. Two topics figured as the first points on the meeting's agenda—the attitude toward the recently formed Russian-Belarusian community and the concept of the party's development. In addition, a most important question discussed in the Political Council was the date of the party congress. Approximately 40 members of the Political Council took part in the meeting.

Under the conditions of the serious political struggle that has been mounted in the country on the threshold of the presidential elections, the agenda appeared unduly academic—it is known that both the supporters and the opponents of Yegor Gaydar and political analysts are excited most by the question of the preferences of the radical democrats: On which of the actual presidential candidates will they bestow their affections and the votes of their fellow thinkers.

It was expected, perfectly naturally, that, as usual, the discussion would quite rapidly go beyond the framework of the designated agenda and would turn mainly around the collision connected with determination of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"their" candidate for 16 June. Especially since the opinion of the party leadership as regards the Russian-Belarusian community would, most likely, be identical to the opinion of Yegor Gaydar that had already been expressed: to welcome the rapprochement but to express misgivings over the assurance of Russia's national interests, economic primarily.

As far as the concept of the development of the DVR [Russia's Democratic Choice] is concerned, the framing of the issue betrays the historical optimism of the Russ-Choicers—they intend to grow and develop after 16 June, whatever happens. Nonetheless, there are strong doubts that in the middle of April, 64 days before the presidential elections, party figures are seriously prepared to debate some concept—if only because it has to a considerable extent to depend on who wins on 16 June.

Until recently party leader Yegor Gaydar had employed delaying tactics: He had procrastinated over the election, explaining this by the fact that, inter alia, the candidate, having obtained the party's support, would immediately forget about its demands and conditions and rush to seduce other groups of the population.

In actual fact, the policy of procrastination is explained additionally by the absence of a definite and single opinion as to which candidate to support—Yeltsin or Yavlinskiy. This uncertainty was clearly irksome to part of the party masses—it is not fortuitous that two leaders of the DVR, Sergey Kovalev and Arkadiy Murashev, became the organizers not so long since of a public committee in support of the candidacy of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. It cannot be ruled out that the two politicians were attempting by this action to bring some pressure to bear on Yegor Gaydar, confronting him with the fact that the DVR had already tied its "trade name" to that of Yavlinskiy.

The leadership of the democratic party attempted to take disciplinary action against the two "free-thinkers": It demanded that they recall their signatures prior to the DVR congress.

The results of the meeting produced no sensations: Yegor Gaydar declared that Sergey Kovalev supports Yavlinskiy, Anatoliy Chubays, Boris Yeltsin. Gaydar himself, like the bulk of party members, is suited by neither candidacy. The party congress is scheduled for 18 May, and it is proposed that the regional organizations hold their congresses and determine their position at the presidential elections prior to this.

In response to journalists' question as to whether "any action will be taken in respect to the members of the DVR who supported Yavlinskiy," Gaydar said that no action would be taken. Sergey Kovalev declared in the lobbies that Yavlinskiy had thanked him for his support and had said word for word: "You will never regret it."

Russia: Anpilov Removed as RCWP Head at Party Congress

MK2604112296 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Aleksey Zverev: "Anpilov Removed From Position"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is no secret that many admirers of extreme left Communist parties were nonplused when Viktor Anpilov signed, on behalf of "Working Russia," an "agreement on actions" in favor of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]" general secretary [Zyuganov]. Responding to such an act of arbitrariness, the radicals began talking about the tribune of the people's betrayal and double dealing. Comrade Gunko, for example, stated that "Viktor Ivanovich [Anpilov] has ended up on the political bottom and he is trying to surface by snatching at whatever floats up first...." [This is a scatological allusion]

It was in just such an atmosphere that the fifth congress of the RCWP [Russian Communist Workers Party] was held in Chelyabinsk; the RCWP is the country's second, after the CPRF, most numerous and important communist party. Delegates of this radical communist party had been awaiting their congress with both anxiety and hope in order to receive the final answer to the question: "Should the RCWP become part of Comrade Zyuganov's People's-Patriotic bloc or not?"

Much as had been expected, Anpilov was accused by the delegates of "undermining the leading role of the party," because he had stated more than once on the pages of the party's newspaper that working people's soviets are more important than the party. Responding to these accusations, Viktor Anpilov shouted from the platform of the congress: "This is a lie, a vile lie. I am ready to lay my party card on the table [surrender membership] if this is true!" Alas, the proof was presented right away, following which Viktor Ivanovich was asked -- in accordance with his stated readiness — "to lay his party card on the table." But the chief "Working Russia" member backtracked, promising to take it up with "comrades in Moscow."

As a matter of fact, Anpilov's expulsion could have provoked a split within the RCWP, where there are already many advocates of an alliance with Zyuganov. It is logical to assume, therefore, that it is for just this reason that Viktor Ivanovich was "only" removed from his position as secretary of the Central Committee. As

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

for Anpilov's MOLNIYA, it was denied the financial backing of the party, as well as its status as the printed organ of the RCWP Central Committee.

The congress also became incensed by the fact that Comrade Anpilov's new benefactor, Comrade Zyuganov, had been nominated for the presidency by the "Spiritual Heritage [Dukhovnoye Naslediye]" movement, which exists on support from the Russian-American University Corporation. That is to say, think the radicals, "on the money of the American imperialists." Having criticized the Zyuganovites, the Tyulkinites agreed after all to mend fences with the "single candidate," [Zyuganov] but only in the event of the signing of an "equal bilateral inter-party treaty" between the CPRF and the RCWP. Many delegates considered, however, that Zyuganov had once ignored the RCWP during the elections for the State Duma, and now that he has rallied more than 100 organizations to his banner, an alliance with him is totally unrealistic.

Media Issues

Russia: Media's Coverage of Grachev Speech Attacked

MM2504142296 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Leonidov: "If There Are No Sensations, They Have To Be Invented"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This very cynical idea has long been held by a certain section of the reporting fraternity. As a rule, by those who work for the gutter press. Such an approach is, of course, impermissible for quality, respectable publications and television programs. Solidity and respectability imply undoubted accuracy — the cult of facts, as it were....

Incidentally, it seems as though the concept of respectability is still very relative for us Russian journalists. That is the immediate reaction to the way in which a number of television programs and print publications covered and commented on the recent speech in the State Duma by Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister, on the Dudayevite gunmen's bandit-like attack on a convoy of federal forces.

Working under the slogan "the news is our profession," Yevgeniy Kiselev on NTV's "Itogi" show devoted a good dozen expensive minutes worth many dollars to this subject. But the factual part of the piece was made up of some very fragmentary pictures from the State Duma that had already been used by other news reports. The remainder of the time was taken up by long and telling philosophizing by Kiselev himself on the relationship between Yeltsin and Grachev. It all ended with nothing more or less than a conclusion that the "defense minister is disloyal to the president" and, moreover, that Grachev had allegedly "betrayed the president" at the State Duma.

After such verbal pirouettes, viewers who are used to trusting "Itogi" will undoubtedly have gotten the impression that something extraordinary happened in the Duma. Viewers unable to familiarize themselves with the full text of the minister's speech and his replies to deputies' questions will find it hard to imagine that a commentator who is always so impressive, well informed, and influential had simply taken certain phrases out of context and very professionally concocted not a news story, not a political commentary, but...a basic piece of gossip.

Yet even a very biased reading of the stenographic record of the minister's speech and his replies to deputies' questions contains nothing specific that would point to disloyalty, a reluctance to follow orders, and so forth. Moreover, there was quite a clear phrase: "I can report, esteemed deputies, that the Army is unquestioningly subordinate to the supreme commander in chief." Why did you leave that out, Mr. Kiselev? Because it would bring your entire fabricated structure crashing down?

The sensational story about the "disloyal minister" was so tasty that it was picked up by several other respected publications.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, for instance, wrote: "It seems as though the general is openly attacking the president.... " Of course, anything you like can seem to be something. But why were there no specific references to the text of the speech?

VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, under the headline "Pavel Grachev's Major Maneuvers," believes that "nobody has provided a clear answer to the question of where the convoy of federal forces was headed." Just look at the text of the minister's speech, colleagues! It spells out everything virtually hour-by-hour and minute-by-minute!

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI used the banner headline "President Loses Military Friend." "The incumbent defense minister," the newspaper says, "has taken the liberty to publicly disagree with the president's policy".... Once again, an accusation with no proof and one that was not backed up by any references to the text of the speech....

IZVESTIYA gave the "sensation" prime coverage — front-paging it and using the headline "The President

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Had a Loyal Minister...." "It is not enough," the newspaper writes, "that Army Gen. Grachev voiced disagreement with the plan for a peace settlement in Chechnya, he also pinned responsibility for what is happening in the mutinous republic on the president." But what does the stenographic record say? "I did not say that I disagree with the peace plan," the minister explained, "I said that as a result of the peace plan, in my view, the enemy will be able to organize himself...." In other words, the minister drew deputies' attention to military aspects of the possible development of events during implementation of the peace plan, and to the potential problems which may have to be anticipated. Is this impermissible? It turns out that a loyal minister is allowed only to thoughtlessly repeat "long live the peace plan!"

Incidentally, IZVESTIYA published under the headline "Chronicles of Dismissals That Never Happened" a list of situations, beginning in 1992, when the press made a fuss about replacing the defense minister. It would have been fair to call this the "Chronicle of Journalists' Nine-Day Wonders." How much airtime and newsprint has been wasted on it, and for what?

These "nine-day wonders" are also reminiscent of the endless publication of lists of the "candidates" for ministerial positions. Most probably there will soon not be any more or less famous general left who has not been marked down for a ministry. The latest lists — based on God knows what — were published once again by IZVESTIYA and by Nikolay Svanidze on the latest ZERKALO show. The show is not bad and could probably, in time, overhaul Kiselev's "Itogi." But Nikolay Svanidze looked so serious when reading out such a non- serious list of hypothetical candidates for the post of defense minister that you get the impression that someone was simply playing a joke on him.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA does not plan to teach anyone any lessons — everyone has to earn their journalistic crust any way they can. But whether some people like it or not, respectable journalism is nonetheless all about the level of accuracy of your information, not about the level of fabrication. Much less can it be achieved through a primitive imitation of some kind of access to Kremlin secrets. After all, it very soon transpires that there is no access or inside track. There may perhaps be an inside track on lobby gossip and rumor. But that is a whole different ball game.

As for the defense minister's Duma speech, we want to draw attention to the fact that it was published in full in the 23 April edition of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. A detailed account of the answers to deputies' questions was also provided. Go to the original sources and you will see that there was no sensation. And there is absolutely no reason to invent one.

Military & Nuclear Issues

Russia: Draft Message Defines National Security, Military Policy

MK2604050396 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE Supplement No. 8) in Russian 25 Apr 96 pp 1, 3

[Section from a draft presidential national security message: "Military Policy of the Russian Federation. From the Document 'Russia's National Security Policy'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Said document has been drafted by the analytical group under Yuriy Baturin, the Russian president's national security adviser. Based on this document and a discussion thereof, which will take place on 25 April 1996, the authors are planning to prepare a presidential national security message. "Military Policy" is one of the seven sections in the 47-page paper.

Military policy defines the basic objectives and lines of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and the maintenance of its interests by military means. Russia's defense capability is determined by the country's economic, scientific and technical, and demographic capabilities, and it should not exceed the level sufficient for countering existing or potential military threats to Russia's security. The Russian Federation abandons the principle of military-strategic parity with the United States in its former interpretation and adheres to the principle of realistic containment based on the recognition of the existence of military danger and the possibility of its growing into a military threat. It condemns military confrontation in any form and will follow the principle of the containment of concrete military threats predominantly within the framework of collective security systems at the regional and global level. Russia seeks to optimize its defense efforts, which should be equal to the danger of direct military confrontation, and which has substantially diminished.

The Russian Federation is committed to the idea of creating a collective security system in the CIS unified military-strategic area that is based on the Collective Security Treaty of 15 May 1992 as well as on bilateral agreements with CIS countries. The military policy of the Russian Federation is of a peaceful character. It conforms with the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1975 and 1992 Helsinki Accords, the 1990 Paris Charter, and other international treaties, agreements, and accords.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

In the foreseeable future the Russian Federation will preserve the status of a nuclear power in the interest of averting a nuclear attack or a large-scale aggression with the use of conventional forces and weapons against it, and/or its allies, as well as of providing the newly independent Commonwealth states with nuclear guarantees as one element of the agreements on military matters.

At the same time the Russian Federation is ready for the continuation of a drastic reduction of its nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis with the United States, as well as on a multilateral basis, while maintaining the general balance of forces of the leading nuclear states at a level responding to the needs of strategic stability. Russia favors further limitation of conventional armed forces and armaments, adhering to the principle of defense sufficiency in the development of its military force.

A priority task of Russian Federation military policy is across-the-board military reform (the document has a corresponding addendum. — NVO). Force development in Russia should be so organized that the armed forces, other troops, and the defense industry of the Russian Federation could ensure the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, create conditions for Russia's peaceful evolution as a democratic, rule-of-law, federative state, and also enable it to implement its international obligations, including in the sphere of peacekeeping. In the context of the economic difficulties confronting Russia, it is vital to concentrate its limited resources on maintaining the combat readiness of its armed forces, on equipping them with effective models of weapons and military hardware, and on maintaining a military-industrial capability corresponding to this objective. Russia strives to institute democratic civilian control of its armed forces and other state power institutions on the legislative, executive, and judicial levels of state power. In organizing its armed forces, Russia proceeds from the interests of putting in place regional security systems and an international global security system, in which process it aspires to take an active part.

Russia: Yeltsin Address Marks 10th Anniversary of Chernobyl

LD2604054796 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0400 GMT 26 Apr 96

[Speech "to the citizens of Russia" by Russian President Boris Yeltsin marking the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident; place and date not given — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Respected citizens of Russia: Today is a sad date in the history of not only Russia, but of the whole of mankind. Ten years ago on warm spring days like these an accident occurred at the Chernobyl atomic power station. The echo of Chernobyl resounded across many areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. The misfortune affected the fate of millions of people. Mankind had not experienced a bigger catastrophe in the extent of the disaster, in the seriousness of its consequences, and in the complexity of eliminating them.

The nuclear disaster caused an enormous loss, but it would have been even greater had it not been for the resolute action, the selflessness and courage of those whom the people called the "eliminators". They were the first to stand in the path of the nuclear energy which had gone out of control. They did everything they could to curb the disaster, to protect their native land and people from the destructive radiation. But that feat was not without consequences for their own lives and health. Some of them have already lost their lives. Many of them became invalids. Today, yet again, we express our most profound gratitude to all those who selflessly eliminated the consequences of the Chernobyl accident in those extremely difficult days. We grieve immensely for all those who have perished.

Many states, a variety of experts and ordinary citizens expressed solidarity with us and rendered us active support immediately after the accident. We are grateful to them all for the help at a difficult time. The most important lesson to be learned from Chernobyl is the need for boosting safety in operating atomic power stations. We must unite the efforts of experts from different countries to create reliable equipment. Extremely stringent measures are needed to ensure that the tragedy of Chernobyl will not recur under any circumstances.

This was precisely the subject dealt with at the recent summit meeting in Moscow, which was convened on the initiative of Russia. It was completely devoted to the problems of ensuring nuclear safety. The leaders of eight leading countries in the world adopted a decision that is important for the whole of mankind. Ukraine confirmed its decision to the participants in the meeting to close down the Chernobyl nuclear power station by the year 2000.

The wounds inflicted by Chernobyl are healing with difficulty. They will not let us forget them for a long time to come. It is the direct duty of the state to help as quickly as possible those who were exposed to radiation, the eliminators and the population living on contaminated territory even at the current time. Constant attention is being paid to these problems.

In March, the government adopted yet another decision on the Chernobylers [people affected by the Chernobyl

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

accident]. Purpose-orientated finance has been allocated for one-time payments to help invalids who have lost their breadwinners, to pay for medical treatment and medicines for citizens who have been exposed to the effects of radiation, for organizing holidays and treatment for children during the school vacations, for providing material assistance to citizens living in dangerous areas.

On 18 April, a decree was signed on the purchase of imported medicines for a sum of $30 million for those who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The government has been instructed to improve the living conditions of the families of Chernobyl invalids.

On this day I want to assure you yet again, dear Chernobylers, that you are not alone in your misfortune. Your misfortunes pain Russia, pain the president. I am appealing to the bodies of state power, to all political parties and public organizations, to entrepreneurs, and to all citizens. It is our sacred duty to help all those who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl accident. It is a vital necessity for them. We need it, too. Such a law of conscience should be our moral position.

With all my heart I wish all those who took part in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident health and vital and spiritual strength. A huge thank you to you for the feat you carried out for the sake of life, for the sake of people.

Russia: Official Says $100 Million Yearly Spent on Reactor Safety

LD2604111496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0951 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Interfax) — Russia spends nearly $100 million a year to modernize the protection systems in nuclear reactors of the type used in the Chernobyl station, a Nuclear Energy Ministry official told Interfax.

The Chernobyl disaster occurred on April 26, 1986 during an experimental check. The power unit's thermal power was reduced to 20 percent of the rated value. Because the reactor was brought to a condition which did not meet standards while its performance was unsatisfactory, the power increased in an uncontrolled way to far above the rated value.

As a result, numerous fuel elements in the active zone were seriously damaged. Because there was no protecting hull on the power unit, radioactive substances were released into the environment.

The disaster hit the Bryansk, Kaluga, Tula and Orel regions of Russia the hardest. The Russian government allocated nearly 10 trillion rubles in 1995 prices to deal with the consequences of the disaster.

Aleksey Yablokov, head of the Ecological Safety Commission reporting to the Russian Security Council, regretted that nuclear power stations are still operational in Russia and plans are made to build new ones while there are no safe nuclear technologies and nuclear power stations are likely to cause new large-scale disasters.

Nuclear Energy Ministry and State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate officials disagree. The inspectorate reports that no serious accidents have occurred in Russian nuclear power stations over the past 12 to 18 months.

Two new light water reactors, VVER-1000 and VVER-640, will be developed in two years, First Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister Lev Ryabev told Interfax. Even if their power supply is cut off and the active protection systems fail, new reactors will bring the processes in them back to normal "by passive techniques without human interference."

"The safety system will operate fully automatically so as to avoid human errors in a critical situation," Ryabev said. His ministry is doing its best to prevent anything even remotely resembling the Chernobyl disaster, he added.

According to Ryabev, the power of nine Russian nuclear power stations totals 21.2 million kilowatts. By the year 2000 their power will reach 24 million kilowatts and be brought to 30 million-35 million kilowatts by 2010.

Yablokov is deeply worried over the condition of the concrete cap, known as the sarcophagus, over the reactor destroyed by the Chernobyl disaster. He believes that the sarcophagus will deteriorate in about five years and this will result in a new release of radioactive matter. Ecologists say that the construction of another sarcophagus would cost $1.6 billion to $2.25 billion.

Federal Assembly

Russia: New 'Defense' Law Seen Meeting All Sides' Interests

MM2504134496 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Yermolin: "Law 'On Defense' Adopted Taking President's Amendments Into Account"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday [24 April] the Russian Federation State Duma adopted the Law "On Defense." It is well known that the Law "On Defense" adopted by the previous Duma was sent back by the president with a number of comments. A commission

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

was set up to coordinate positions, comprising representatives of the power departments, the upper and lower chambers of parliament, the government, and the presidential apparatus.

State Secretary Andrey Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister, who represented the Russian Federation Defense Ministry during the discussion of the law, believes that this law is a cornerstone of Russian defense and security legislation. Initially adopted back in 1992, the new version contains a number of fundamentally new points. In particular, it restores to a certain extent the coordinating role played by the Defense Ministry and the General Staff on a whole series of highly important matters pertaining to the organizational development and operation of the Armed Forces and other Russian Federation troops. Namely in the sphere of defense.

The Conciliation Commission concluded that all troop formations in the Russian Federation regardless of departmental affiliation should be enlisted in armed defense under a single command. And peacetime training should be carried out as planned by and under the supervision of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff.

Yevgeniy Zelenov, a member of the Committee for Defense, who submitted the law at this session, told our correspondent that the Conciliation Commission had also managed to find a common legal wording on the question of the use of the Armed Forces for other than their proper function. The law allows the president to adopt such a decision, but only with the consent of the Federation Council.

The adopted law, Yevgeniy Zelenov said, will be further developed in laws on a state of emergency and on martial law, which will set out everything in greater detail.

The fact that the interests of the sides involved in the Conciliation Commission have been taken into consideration as far as possible inspires hope that the law will "operate smoothly."

The draft federal law "On Mobilization Training and Mobilization in the Russian Federation," on addenda to the Russian Federation law "On Military Service Obligation and Military Service," and on the situation as regards food and clothing supplies in the Armed Forces were also among the "military" issues on the State Duma agenda. The Duma was due to consider the aforementioned issues during the afternoon when this issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA would already have been written. We will therefore provide more details on these draft laws in other issues. The State Duma has decided to continue its work during a plenary session Thursday.

Russia: Deputies Urged To Review Budget Spending on Armed Forces

LD2504163596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1128 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Itar-Tass) — Deputy Defence Minister Vladimir Churanov urged Russian lawmakers today to review budget spending on the armed forces and increase it.

Colonel-General Churanov was addressing today's emergency session of the lower house of parliament called to consider 'food and materiel supplies to armed forces of the Russian Federation."

Churanov said the funds received by the country's armed forces from 1993 to 1995 were barely enough to meet 50 percent of their needs. The other half was paid from the extra-budgetary sources, the General said, making it plain that in most cases the army had to borrow goods from suppliers with a promise to pay some time in the future. It also dipped into its own emergency supplies which were thus depleted by 40 percent. This year, the situation is no different.

Churanov said budget spending on the upkeep of the armed forces must increase by at least two trillion roubles, and more than eight trillion roubles were needed to provide new uniforms and other apparel.

The General called for identification of specific suppliers of the army's needs. He rejected allegations of communist lawmakers that "the army is starving." Food supplies to both soldiers and officers are never below the standard established by law, even where the army has to live on credit and has to consume some of its emergency supplies, the General said.

The lower house of Russian parliament responded to the General's call by adopting recommendations to the government to make special efforts to mobilise required resources to increase spending on food supplies to the armed forces by four trillion roubles and on other material supplies by 6.3 trillion roubles this year.

The lower house will again consider the draft resolution approved today as the basis at its plenary session on April 26 after today's remarks and proposals are incorporated in its official document.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Regional Affairs

Russia: Yeltsin Orders Military Preparations Against Chechen Rebels

LD2504125496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1201 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beijing April 25 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin has ordered the military to do everything possible to prevent another outbreak of militancy by Chechen separatists.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev told an Interfax correspondent that separatists might step up activity in seeking revenge for their slain leader Dzhokhar Dudayev.

The Interior Ministry will have difficulty solving this problem by themselves, Grachev said. Federal Security Service forces and special military units, including air-borne troops with experience in fighting terrorism, should also be used, he said.

The increase in separatist activity in the past days shows the need for firm action, Grachev said, adding that federal troop positions came under fire 38 times Tuesday night, and 47 times Wednesday night.

Separatist military commander Aslan Maskhadov and acting president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev would be leaders who could keep the peace process going if they came to power, Grachev said, esecially since Maskhadov has experience in military negotiations.

But if the Basayev brothers come to the fore, "we cannot expect anything good to come of it," Grachev said. "They are real bandits to the core. We would inevitably have to step up forceful action in this case."

Grachev pointed out that he did not mean "military operations," but rather "forceful action" meant to destroy Basayev's intransigent militants.

Yeltsin, meanwhile, is keeping apprised of the situation, listening to reports from the military command on the situation in Chechnya and outlying regions every two-to-three hours. Thursday morning, Yeltsin listened to Grachev's thirty-minute report after a long conversation with Federal Security Service chief Mikhail Barsukov.

Russia: Chernomyrdin: Moscow Establishing Contact With Maskhadov

LD2504191896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1809 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Interfax) — The federal center is now establishing contact with Aslan Maskhadov, the chief of staff of the Chechen separatists, and is prepared to talk with Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the successor of Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, and other people in Chechnya "who are capable of influencing the political situation in the republic," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said at a briefing in Moscow Thursday.

Chernomyrdin said that military commanders and Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov are establishing contacts with Maskhadov.

Chernomyrdin made it clear that he is prepared to attend talks with separatists in order to stop the war. He said, however, that Russia's territorial integrity is not negotiable.

The government intends to use all available political, economic and negotiating tools and, if militant acts are to be suppressed, military means to work for peace in Chechnya, Chernomyrdin said.

Dudayev's death has destabilized Chechnya, he feels, and the chances for talks have deteriorated.

Chernomyrdin said he could not say whether it was federal forces that killed Dudayev. According to reports made by the Defense and Interior ministries, no offensive action was underway at the time of Dudayev's death, he said.

Chernomyrdin emphasized that on that day the Russian State Commission on Peace Settlement in Chechnya, chaired by him, had decided to establish contacts with Dudayev and his entourage.

Russia: Chernomyrdin Denies Special Operation To Kill Dudayev

LD2504204196 Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Apr 96

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The third congress of the Russia Is Our Home [NDR] public movement ended in Moscow by adopting an appeal to citizens of Russia to vote for Boris Yeltsin. [passage omitted]

For his part, Viktor Chernomyrdin has no doubt that the president's supporters will manage to create a broad coalition.

[begin Chernomyrdin recording] That is why there is discussion of consolidation and of negotiations with everybody, including the communists. With everybody, and here, too. [end recording]

But at his news conference, journalists asked the prime minister more about Chechnya. The prime minister made a revelation which came as a surprise to many.

[begin Chernomyrdin recording] Regarding the involvement of the federal forces [in Dudayev's death], I think

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that both the Defense Ministry, or more precisely the Defense Ministry spokesman, and the Russian internal affairs minister in a report today announced that no active operations were carried out there. I cannot assert today that there was some sort of targeted action. This is not the case. [end recording]

Viktor Chernomyrdin deemed it possible to disclose the content of the recent conversation in the White House.

[begin Chernomyrdin recording] On the day the announcement of General Dudayev's death was made, in fact, we held a sitting of the state commission — I chaired it, as the chairman — and we had a very long and complex debate on one of the issues, the conducting of negotiations, including with Dudayev, too. And on that very day we took the decision to embark on these negotiations — and with Dudayev, too. [end recording]

But the prime minister is convinced that the negotiating process will not be broken off with the death of Dudayev.

[begin Chernomyrdin recording] Regarding the field commanders, talks have already been held. I cannot name them now. And I think you would want to advertise straightaway that [Aslan] Maskhadov is one of those who is in contact at the moment. [end recording]

The question remains open as to who in Chechnya now who would venture to lift the receiver of a satellite telephone to get in contact with Moscow.

Russia: Possible Successors to Dudayev Reviewed

MM2404202496 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Apr 96 pp 1,2

[Report by Igor Rotar: "Successors and Forecasts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the fact that officials are categorically refusing to make any predictions before documentary confirmation of Dzhokhar Dudayev's death is available, the disappearance from the political arena of the leader of the Chechen separatists is generating a feeling of alarm rather than relief among Russian politicians. Moscow has no firm certainty that the new Chechen leader will turn out to be more amenable than his predecessor.

"I am not sure I believe the report about Dzhokhar Dudayev's death. But even if we assume that the ITAR-TASS report is not a fabrication, this will not in any circumstances affect the implementation of the plan for the settlement of the Chechen crisis, because it is not geared to specific individuals, but reflects a general political thrust. At the same time, if Dzhokhar Dudayev's post has really been occupied by Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, this testifies to the strengthening of the radicals' position among supporters of Chechen independence," Vladimir Zorin, chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee for Nationalities' Affairs, told IZVESTIYA.

From IZVESTIYA's file.

Writer Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev started getting actively involved in political activity in 1990. At that time he was one of the leaders of the non-parliamentary radical opposition to the party-soviet leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In 1990-1991 he was deputy chairman of the National Congress of the Chechen People executive committee, which was striving for Chechnya's independence from the USSR. In September 1991 he was one of the organizers of the attack on the Groznyy House of Political Enlightenment, which led to Doku Zavgayev's renunciation of power. Between 1991 and the presumed death of Dzhokhar Dudayev, he was vice president of the Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeria. Yandarbiyev is considered to be one of the most radical politicians in Dudayev's entourage.

However, it can be said with confidence that Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev is only the interim leader of the Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeria, and that other candidates will lay claim to this post in the near future.

"Dzhokhar Dudayev's most likely successors are Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev. Their popularity ratings are comparable with Dudayev's," Arkadiy Volskiy believes.

From IZVESTIYA's file.

Aslan Maskhadov, division general, chief of the Chechnya-Ichkeria Armed Forces Main Staff. He was born in Kazakhstan in 1951. In 1957 he returned to his homeland with his parents. In 1972 he graduated from the higher artillery school. He started service as commander of a platoon in the Far East. He served in Hungary in the post of commander of a regiment. In 1990, as commander of a rocket forces and artillery division, he took part in the seizure of the Vilnius television center. Since 1992 he has been serving in the Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeria armed forces. He is married, and has a son and a daughter.

Thirty-one year old Shamil Basayev is perhaps one of the most brilliant and at the same time repellent figures among the leaders of the Chechen resistance movement. He has an incomplete secondary education, and he studied at the Land Use Institute in Moscow. In 1992 he was made commander of the troops of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus. He has fought against the Georgian Army in Abkhazia. He was commander on the Gagra front and deputy defense minister of Abkhazia.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"I was preparing for war with Russia a long time before the aggression against Chechnya began. Together with fighters from my Abkhazian battalion, I paid three visits to Afghan Mojahedin camps, where I learned the tactics of guerrilla warfare," Shamil Basayev told IZVESTIYA.

Following the introduction of Russian troops into Chechnya Shamil Basayev's "Abkhazian" battalion has been fighting on the most dangerous sections of the front. One of the most audacious terrorist acts in modern history was committed in June 1995 under Shamil Basayev's leadership. Basayev's detachment seized a hospital full of hostages in the Russian town of Budennovsk. In March 1996 Basayev and his gunmen seized a large part of the city of Groznyy for 24 hours. In April Basayev attacked a column of federal troops and killed around 100 servicemen.

Shamil Basayev is one of the most radical politicians in Dudayev's entourage. He believes that for the war to end it is not enough to withdraw Russian troops from Chechnya: "Russia should pay us compensation for the damage done." He advocates the withdrawal from Russia of all the North Caucasus republics and the creation of a single mountain state. "I will strive for this aim by peaceful methods," Shamil Basayev stresses.

"If Maskhadov becomes Dudayev's successor, this will greatly increase the chances of reestablishing peace in Chechnya, but if Basayev does, then the situation will become even more unpredictable!" Arkadiy Volskiy believes.

There is another fairly "digestible" politician for Moscow who should not be completely ruled out.

Akhmed Zakayev, the former minister of culture of the Dudayev' government and graduate of the Moscow theatrical institute, appeared for the first time in big-time politics during the summer talks between the Russian delegation and Dudayev's delegation. The president of Chechnya-Ichkeria then included Field Commander Zakayev in the delegation. In the opinion of the Russian side, Zakayev belongs to the moderate supporters of Chechen independence, that is, the people with whom there is a realistic possibility of conducting talks and even finding points of contact. At present Akhmed Zakayev is a member of the field commanders staff of the southwestern front of Dudayev's troops and enjoys high prestige in his region.

However, even if the new leader of the supporters of Chechen independence turns out to be more amenable than his predecessor, this does not insure Moscow against nasty surprises.

"Dzhokhar Dudayev represents no more than the banner of the supporters of independence. It cannot be ruled out that specific decisions are adopted not just by him (and maybe even not so much by him), but also by individuals from his closest entourage. It is quite likely that Moscow could theoretically physically destroy Dudayev, but it is not doing so for fear of anarchy among the gunmen. If Dudayev dies, the war in Chechnya may become even more chaotic and unpredictable: Small detachments of gunmen not controlled by anyone are far more dangerous for the Russian leadership than forces of resistance under a single command (with whom you can try to hold talks!)," Arkadiy Volskiy said to IZVESTIYA during the summer talks.

It is noteworthy that there was no realistic unity of command among the gunmen even when Dudayev was alive (if you acknowledge the fact of his death). The war in Chechnya has been conducted purely by methods of guerrilla warfare. The so-called fronts of Dudayev's army in reality frequently constitute groups of several hundred gunmen isolated from each other and operating practically as they like. For example, for over a year now the federal troops have been blockading the resistance fighters in Bamut (the so-called western front of Dudayev's troops), and the Groznyy armed underground is pretty well isolated from its accomplices — there are many examples.

It is easy to explain this anarchy among the resistance fighters: This war is typical guerrilla warfare. It was not on Dudayev's orders that many (if not most) of the volunteer fighters took up arms, and they are defending the independence of their homeland without consideration for any authorities. "Who is Maskhadov?! Who is Dudayev?! I obey only Allah!" Shamil Basayev said at a press conference in Novogroznenskiy not long before this village was taken by the federal troops.

And it is obvious that following Dzhokhar Dudayev's death, anarchy among Dudayev's men will increase even more.

"Even if the new leader of the separatists is not radical, then he may not be recognized by Shamil Basayev, and an imposing military force stands behind him. At the same time, we must not forget that Dzhokhar Dudayev said repeatedly that "in the event of his violent death, a plan of revenge will be launched to make Russia shudder." At the same time, terrorist acts will not necessarily be organized from a particular center, ordinary Chechens may start taking revenge," Arkadiy Volskiy believes.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Russia: Text of Dudayev's Last Telephone Interview With Borovoy

MK2604112496 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 26 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Yuliya Kalinina on telephone conversation between Dzhokhar Dudayev and Konstantin Borovoy: "Dudayev's Last Words: 'Russia Must Regret....' After That the Conversation Broke Off"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] We have managed to find out that Dudayev in fact called Konstantin Borovoy at approximately 2000 on Sunday. The timing of the telephone communications session was not agreed upon in advance. The whole conversation lasted for three minutes and then terminated. Yet, according to Borovoy, his conversations with Dudayev fairly often ended in this fashion. Dudayev complained that the line was unreliable and called mostly in the nighttime, when communications were somewhat more "sustainable." Below is the recorded text of the conversation. It is very likely that the words pronounced by Dudayev were the last words in his life...

[Dudayev] Good evening, Konstantin Natanovich. How are you?

[Borovoy] Thank you. I am currently very much concerned by the situation over the start of peace talks.

[Dudayev] I must tell you that the National Congress of the Chechen People ended yesterday. It deemed it impossible to hold talks with those who have committed crimes against humanity on the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

[Borovoy] Whom do you mean in particular?

[Dudayev] The lists of these criminals will shortly be made public.

[Borovoy] What was the mood at the congress?

[Dudayev] It was very radical. A large number of young people joined forces to form the "Jihad" organization and are gearing up for revenge, for executing the sentences passed on the war criminals.

[Borovoy] This seems very dangerous to me. Currently, ways of resolving the crisis and starting talks have emerged. Mikhaylov [nationalities minister] is currently in Groznyy, he is attending to this matter.

[Dudayev] I have told you many times that this is not a Chechen crisis, but a Russian-Chechen war. By the way, tell Mikhaylov and Zorin that they had better stay away from Chechen territory. This is dangerous for them.

[Borovoy] Is it possible that a dialogue with those you call national traitors might begin? These people are ready for civilized contact.

[Dudayev] I know that. They are already seeking direct contacts with me. Zavgayev, Khadzhiyev, and Avturkhanov are already crawling around.... Incidentally, it may be very hot in Moscow shortly. Do you yourself live in downtown?

[Borovoy] Yes, in downtown. Moreover, in a house next to the Internal Affairs Ministry.

[Dudayev] You had better change you place of residence for a time.

[Borovoy] This is unacceptable for me, Dzhokhar Musayevich.

[Dudayev] Russia must regret what it is doing....

At this point the conversation was broken off. Dudayev never called again.

Russia: Special Services Search for Dudayev's Grave

LD2604101096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0926 GMT 26 Apr 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SHANGHAI April 26 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Defence minister Pavel Grachev said on Friday that special services had been searching for the grave of Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev to identify the body, but to no avail so far.

"We have not found so far the true grave of Dudayev", Grachev, who accompanies President Boris Yeltsin on his Chinese visit, told Tass adding that "corresponding tasks have been set before the army intelligence".

"If the grave is found and the body of Dzhokhar Dudayev is identified, then it will be possible to say that he had died, while so far no suppositions should be made", the minister said.

Grachev was evasive on how Dudayev had been killed. "I cannot give precise data on how Dudayev died because there are various suppositions, including such that he was killed by his own men in a showdown. But there is a supposition that Dudayev died as a result of a special operation. In other words, it is clear as mud", Grachev said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Russia: Paper Views Motives for, Fallout From Targeting Dudayev

MK2604050796 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by policy desk: "Who Killed Dzhokhar? What Next: Peace, War, or Terror?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Assuming that Dudayev was really killed, the circumstances create many questions. First of all, who killed him, how, and why?

Stray Aircraft

It took no aim, but suddenly hit the target. Under the theory of probability there is a very small chance that this was what, in effect, happened. Even so, today this is the official theory.

Russian Special Services

There are two sub-theories here. Either the long-stumbling punitive machine (remember the four commando groups sent to eliminate Dudayev that were immediately neutralized) finally worked, or Dudayev's death was scheduled exactly for that moment.

Yeltsin announced his plan three weeks ago. During these three weeks the Russian side has not taken a single step to get in touch with Dudayev, to establish contacts, or to elicit his position — as though they knew that all that was unnecessary. If anything, negotiations will have to be conducted not with Dudayev, but with somebody else. Especially since Mintimer Shaymiyev, the sole mediator that suited Russia, stated after a vacation in the Arab Emirates that he believes direct negotiations between Yeltsin and Dudayev are vital. In the preelection context such negotiations would have been suicidal for Yeltsin. Remember how long Chernomyrdin's phrase: "Shamil Basayev, speak up!" was held against him? Of course, to achieve an election victory, Yeltsin needs to stop the war, but this is not enough. He must also show his "presidential" power to the people, and the elimination of Dudayev is the best demonstration of it.

Conspiracy

If this was an assassination, but one that was not carried out by the Russian special services, then there is another theory: This was the work of "his own." In this context the report of the death of Military Prosecutor Dzhaniyev, which came a day earlier, appears rather symptomatic, because Dudayev certainly had several very close associates who simply had to die along with him.

In the last few months Dzhaniyev may have been the "closest." He was, in effect, always with Dudayev; his house in Gekhi-Chu served as a venue for me?tings and sessions, and sometimes Dudayev even spent several days there.

Dzhaniyev himself had a strong aversion to traitors to the nation, war criminals, and FSB [Federal Security Service] spies, whom he saw literally everywhere; he initiated criminal proceedings against them with maniacal zeal. To all appearances Dzhaniyev did not have the adequate professional skills required of a prosecutor, but he played his part very well. Ninety-six criminal cases were opened against war criminals (including Yeltsin), and maybe several hundred against journalists and Chechens — both their "own" and "members of the opposition" (mostly on suspicion of links with the FSB). On political matters, Dzhaniyev held an extremely firm position: "War to the victorious end" and "no negotiations until [Russian] troops are withdrawn."

It is known, however, that the majority of "Dudayevite" figures do not share such extreme views, aware that this can lead to deadlock. For instance, Maskhadov said recently that for negotiations to start, it is enough to restore the joint observer commission that worked last summer.

There were also other serious contradictions in the Dudayev inner circle, which in principle could have resulted in his physical elimination by one of the sides. But even if that was the case, we shall never know for sure. Moreover, any suppositions on this count can be perceived by the Chechen people as "humiliating to the honor and dignity of the nation."

Dudayev Is Alive

It is quite possible that Dudayev simply disappeared on mutual agreement, maybe to reappear later or never to reappear at all. Such instances are known in Chechen history.

Thus, Imam Shamil miraculously rose from the dead at the very height of "that" Caucasian war — in 1839. During the siege of his residence in the aul [village] of Akhulgo by Russian troops he was presumed dead: The only question concerned the finding of his body. Meanwhile, the "body" — quite alive, although wounded — spent three days hiding under a cliff. And then it successfully reemerged and continued the struggle for another 20 years; that is, until 1859, up to the capitulation in the aul of Gunib. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Russia: Dudayev's Death Seen Signaling End to Chechnya War

MK2604050696 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Budberg: "A Sniper Playing the Part of Providence. The Proximity of the Election Killed Dudayev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even at first glance the announced theories into what occurred appear fairly strange. To straddle a field with missiles in the dark, and furthermore, in so doing, to accurately hit General Dzhokhar and his closest entourage — this is simply a miracle! All the more so because Dudayev's wife, whom he allegedly moved away from during his conversation with a middleman in his talks with Moscow — this is not a woman's business — turned out to be absolutely unharmed. To all appearances, this is more reminiscent of a surgical commando operation than it is of bringing fire onto a vast territory on some off chance.

Indirect evidence of that is the fact that the sabotage operations of the Russian power structures in Chechnya have quietly begun gathering momentum recently. MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has learned from fairly reliable sources that Salman Raduyev, for instance, was not killed in a shoot-out in his home village (as was officially reported), but was shot dead while visiting the grave site of his father, who was killed recently. Naturally, Russian commandos were already lying in wait there, their ambush plan proceeding from a simple but accurate assumption that the Chechen commander could not but come to this place.

For this reason it can be suggested that the "missile attack" that ended the career of General Dzhokhar was planned in advance. All the more so because the timing of the talks was certainly known to those "who should know." Nor can one discard the possibility that the military intelligence service had established contact with someone from Dudayev's closest entourage. In any case, an experienced Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU] officer said in an interview for MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS that such opportunities certainly existed, and that this was the shortest route to "neutralization."

For understandable reasons Moscow, which does not want to be accused of combating terrorism by terrorist methods and simply wants to avoid an "action of retaliation," is unlikely to explicitly acknowledge its involvement in the strange deaths of the Chechen commanders, including General Dzhokhar. Be that as it may, one cannot but recognize that, on the whole, Dudayev's death plays into the Kremlin's hands. It is Dudayev who is to blame for unleashing the war more than anyone else. Naturally, he could not accept any peaceful conclusion of the conflict. In this case "the leader of the war for independence" would have become redundant. After all, the old saying to the effect that wars are not ended by those who started them, has never yet been disproved. Furthermore, too many people — not only in Chechnya, but also in Moscow — were interested in the death of the extremely knowledgeable Dzhokhar Musayevich.

Now that Dudayev has been killed, a fierce struggle for power is set to break out between the Chechen commanders — there is no doubt about it. First, funds reached the separatists through their leader, who virtually let no one come close to money matters. Meanwhile, much money is at stake. Second, Yandarbiyev, Dudayev's vice president — who was responsible for ideology — is unlikely to enjoy particular authority among the rebels. All the more so because General Staff Chief Aslan Maskhadov and the same Shamil Basayev, who have "quietly" fallen out with each other on more than one occasion, are ready to announce their own claims to leadership. This struggle for power can be exploited. It is also evident that many rebels for whom Dudayev was the symbol of independence will not be able to accept anyone else in such a role. Of course, this does not apply to the people for whom war has turned into routine work. But in the absence of the arguably legitimate Chechen president, it will be easier to reach agreement even with them. This will also entail fewer moral costs for the Kremlin. For this reason Dudayev's death, in a sense, means an end to the war. If pure chance — and not a special operation — is behind it, then providence itself chose to put an end to the bloodshed.

Russia: Dudayev Aftermath, 'Unpleasantness' for U.S. Viewed

MM2504184096 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Report by special correspondent Boris Vinogradov: "Chechnya: Anxiously Expecting the Worst"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy — To say that Dzhokhar Dudayev's death has finally smudged the map of everyday life and utterly confused roles in the Chechen drama is to say nothing. In Groznyy, incomprehension of what is happening and confusion when it comes to making predictions have equally overpowered the local authorities, the inhabitants, and visiting journalists, who are racking their brains over yet another enigma in this absurd war.

The incumbents of Chechen offices in Government House cannot say anything definite on the substance

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the questions being asked and, it seemed to me, are eager instead to learn something new from us, the representatives of the press. Vice Premier Abdulla Bugayev, in a conversation with me, emphasized the absence of "official proof," having in mind either the findings of a judicial expert report or evidence of death. Without this, he said, it is impossible to construct future policy.

People arriving from Roshni-Chu, Urus-Martan, and Shali report that mourning processions, prayers, and sacrifices are taking place there within the framework of the "mekk-tezet" [as transliterated; mourning period] that has been declared, which will apparently last not three days, but much longer. At all events, in Groznyy, at No.6 Shakespeare Street in Staropromyslovskiy Rayon, where Dzhokhar Dudayev's elder brother Baslan Dudayev lives, from morning to night you can see lines of people arriving, they say, to "honor the memory of the president who was killed." Judging by their faces, Hamlet's question about the nature of being does not trouble them. A time of remembrance, a time of prayer. The 55-year-old Baslan said that the pilgrimage will go on for two or three weeks, or even a month.

In a big room in the house, which has only just been restored after a fire, old men and youths dance the ritual "ziker" [as transliterated] — the dance goes on without stopping, those who tire are replaced by others, the mullah's incantations are taken up in chorus, and the song of lament, like a prayer and a war cry at the same time, is carried around the neighborhood. The meat of a ram slaughtered in sacrifice to the gods is cooking in a cauldron. The master of the house says that Dzhokhar was the youngest of the family. Five sisters and three brothers are still alive. The eldest, Mokharbi, is close by; neighbors and acquaintances are embracing him in condolence.

Many Dudayevs and close relatives of theirs live in the district. Dzhokhar's house is not far away, on Yaltinskaya Street. He left it, Mokharbi said, on 4 January 1995 and never came back. The house as such is not there. It was blown up by Russian spetsnaz troops when they took Groznyy, eyewitnesses say. On the warped gates you can still make out the words someone has written: "Russia is behind us," and right next to that, "Allah Akbar."

The rumors and conjectures about Dzhokhar Dudayev's death are not dying down. Some give rise to legends, others turn into political declarations and statements. I have heard more than once that the general is still uncatchable, that he is traveling from place to place, freely changing blockhouses, and Russian soldiers are paying him honor. The shade of Dudayev, like the shade of Zviad Gamsakhurdia or Martin Boormann, disturbs many people's imagination. However, nobody takes seriously the talk of how Dudayev is alive and is hiding somewhere, watching to see who will do what, and what the reaction will be. If you have been at the mourning ceremonies involving relatives and members of the Dudayev government, you lose all doubts about the sincerity of their tears and grief.

"This is not the kind of case in which a political show could be put on," I was told by Dik Altemirov, chairman of the assembly of parties and movements for the independence of Ichkeria. (He simultaneously held, and probably still holds, the post of head of the tourism department in the Dudayev government.) "This is not a game. That would not be permissible in Chechen tradition and Muslim custom."

I asked how he could be sure of Dzhokhar's death if he himself did not see the funeral and does not know the exact circumstances of death. Dik Altemirov said that he trusts his own leadership. A couple of days ago he was in Roshni-Chu at the funeral of Khamid Kurbanov, former representative of Chechnya in Russia, and Magomed Zhakiyev, former military prosecutor. They were killed the previous day, also in unexplained circumstances. It was there in Roshni-Chu, after the funeral, that he learned from his friends that Dudayev was dead. A council was then held, attended by all the representatives of the former Dudayev leadership except Aslan Maskhadov. At the council they adopted a statement on the president's death, appointed Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in his place, and dispatched the text to the television studio in Urus-Martan. From there the report went to all the agencies. On the same day Shamil Basayev spoke on television. He confirmed the fact of the death and called on all Chechens to be brave.

There is much that is not clear about the burial of Dudayev's body. Dik Altemirov says that they buried him secretly, that nobody except a small group of people knows the burial place. The time will come, he said, when we will bury Dzhokhar with full honors, as national heroes should be buried. An appeal adopted by the assembly of parties and movements says that Dudayev was "perfidiously killed during the talks on a peaceful settlement." The appeal was directed, with the help of the fax link of the agency AP and the Red Cross, to the League of Islamic States and the world media.

It appears that Dudayev was killed by a rocket burst, targeted on his radio signal during a space communications session. It is not known who he was trying to call. But his people assert that he was contacting intermediaries for talks with Russia. This story is now being

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

worked on vigorously by the Dudayevites and is getting into the Western media as the only authentic story.

My colleague Joseph Albright, American correspondent for the Cox Newspapers agency, told me that for some time he has preferred not to use satellite communications, because he observed last year that after each session, the area from where he had transmitted his report would be hit five or 10 minutes later by a rocket strike from "Grad" launchers. The same link between a space communications session and the accuracy of "pinpoint firing" was identified by a REUTER correspondent who, like Albright, has permanently abandoned the services of modern technology in Chechnya. Joseph Albright believes that Bill Clinton, who recently assured Boris Yeltsin of his support for his plan for a settlement of the Chechen problem, could now face major unpleasantnesses in this connection in the United States.

Be that as it may, one thing is clear: The Dudayevites are again seizing the propaganda initiative and trying to turn their leader into a peacemaker and a martyr who laid down his life in the struggle against the "perfidious plans of imperial Russia." All this is taking place against the background of continuing silence about the real circumstances of Dudayev's death from official Russian sources.

The question of where the process will go next and how it will all end is not only rhetorical, it is as much a dead end as the situation itself is. In Groznyy I did not meet a single person who knew the answer. The most categorical of all were the Dudayevite officers who were present at the prayers for the dead, dressed in civilian clothes. Two of them said that the war will now flare up with three times the force. Whereas Dzhokhar was actually restraining the fiercest fighters who are wild to attack Russian cities with terrorism and sabotage — they declared threateningly — now there is nobody to stop them.

It is hard to say which this is most likely to be — the emotion and nervous agitation that is typical of people in such situations, or the real prospects for the future. But for the time being no signs of changes in the direction of a stabilization of the situation can be unequivocally perceived.

Our military at headquarters at Khankala are far from claiming to have achieved some kind of victory, and they are afraid to say anything at all about the arrival of a "turning point" in the Chechnya campaign. On the contrary, they are preparing for new battles and expecting the gunmen to step up their operations. At the approach to Groznyy, which has become even more wretched and crushed, and in the city center the federals are digging more deeply into the ground and reinforcing their dugouts and pillboxes. There is something sinister about the sense of anxious expectation that has set in. Night firing, the thunder of guns rattling the hotel windows — these are the sole signs of dialogue between the warring parties. They are as yet unable to find any other language of communication.

Russia: Analyst Assesses Implications of Dudayev's Death

MK2504132296 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Alan Kasayev under the general headline: "Change in Chechnya's Leadership Capable of Qualitatively Changing the Situation in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, reports of Dzhokhar Dudayev's death received additional confirmation. And, for the moment, one should regard as the most weighty evidence the words of a highly placed man in the Russian General Staff to the effect that an air-to-surface missile strike was delivered against the site where Dudayev was located. Military specialists argue that such a strike could be made during a satellite phone call, with the missile being launched from a modern-type plane (MiG-29 or Su-27) and homed in on the mirror antenna of the satellite phone. At press time, there was still no word on which of the Russian representatives was killed together with Dudayev.

If it is confirmed that Dudayev died while meeting with some Russian officials, two versions of what happened are possible: the first one may amount to an assumption — unpleasant for the Kremlin — that the Russian who died served as a living beacon; that is, a kamikaze; the second — also not a very pleasant version — is that the official who was meeting with Dudayev did so at his own peril and died by accident.

The death of the political leader of the advocates for the independence of Chechnya will, without a doubt, lead to a change in the situation in the circle of the Chechen separatist leadership, as well as in its military-political standoff with Russia. And it will also tell on the situation in the Russian "top echelons" as well as on society's electoral mood. Without a doubt, Dudayev did not think of appointing a successor, because he was consistently weeding out from his entourage the more or less popular figures. In a meeting of the Military Council of Ichkeria, Vice President Yandarbiyev has been appointed acting president for the time being. But clearly the struggle for Dudayev's post, in one form or other, is only beginning. In addition to Yandarbiyev, those who in all probability could take part in it are Aslan Maskhadov, the chief of staff of the armed formations; Khozh-Akhmet Yarikhanov, the former head of the Chechen

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

delegation at last summer's talks; and Movladi Udugov, the minister of press and information. Nor is the possibility ruled out that Usman Imayev could be yet another candidate. He is the former prosecutor of the Dudayev government who retired from affairs in the wake of the disruption of last year's talks, but who still enjoys great authority with the moderate part of the supporters of the now dead Dudayev.

Dudayev's death will hardly lead to a sharp upswing in military operations in Chechnya proper, because both the fighters and the federal forces have virtually decided on their tactics during the spring-summer campaign, and it is the only correct one — at least for the Chechen side. The Russian tactic might get amended, but not radically. This was indirectly indicated yesterday by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who stressed that the presidential settlement plan would be carried out despite personnel changes among the separatists.

Now, one should expect certain changes with regard to the balance of forces among the Russian leadership. They will primarily affect the position of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who almost lost the president's confidence after the debacle outside the village of Yaryshmardy and the death there of dozens of servicemen. Considering Boris Yeltsin's personal liking for Grachev, the success scored by the subunits in his charge will necessarily raise his efficiency rating in the eyes of the president. At the same time it is not ruled out that the FSB [Federal Security Service] and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] heads, whose subordinates had not been able to neutralize the Chechen leader, will be reprimanded.

Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin, who many times stated that direct talks with Dudayev were impossible, now have a fine chance to have such talks with Dudayev's successor. This is, of course, possible if he does not turn out to be Yandarbiyev or Udugov. (I would not like to seriously consider the chances of the top leadership's passing into the hands of Basayev, or the other commander of the fighters who has consolidated his positions of late, Gelayev.)

Should the official Russian propaganda machine work this time around the way it is accepted that it acts in similar cases in the rest of the world; that is, to immediately circulate the president's version of Dudayev's death as the direct consequence of Yeltsin's own orders and of his personal control over their execution, and should the special services be able to prevent any other possible terrorist acts by Chechen fighters in Russia proper, Boris Yeltsin would garner a considerable number of votes in the upcoming presidential elections. Moreover, this could significantly reduce the electoral chances of his chief contenders, Gennadiy Zyuganov and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, who favored compromises with Dudayev.

As for the answer to the main question that many people are asking following Dzhokhar Dudayev's death; that is, whether his death may lead to peace: Such an answer can hardly be positive. It would do good for everybody involved in the conflict if this new fact makes Moscow and the post-Dudayev leadership wish for some more decisive compromises, jump-starting at long last a normal — and still possible — process of negotiation. When and in what way it will end is the secondary question.

If only there is no war, and that this is not irony.

Economic Issues

Russia: Financial Leasing To Broaden Investment in Russia

LD2504192196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1637 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By Aleksandr Samozhnev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Itar-Tass) — The financial leasing is expected to account for 20 per cent of total investment in the Russian economy by 2000, Russian Deputy Economics Minister Vladimir Kossov told a news conference today.

Financial leasing is an intermediary operation which accumulates funds for buying the machinery and equipment from producers for leasing to corporate bodies and individuals for a rent.

Kossov said the broadening of the leasing operations is to boost the industrial production and re-launch idle capacities in the agricultural and defence sectors.

Small and medium-size businesses have shown a keen interest in the financial leasing as it offers modern equipment and technologies without requiring loans.

Some 20 active leasing companies have been in place in early 1996, and other 40 firms were considering the leasing operations, Kossov said.

The leasing is extensively used by now in the Russian aviation industry, with foreign partnerships, and in the agricultural sector.

The Russian Economics Ministry is going to submit to the government, late in May, a draft law on the leasing to be approved by the State Duma.

A first international conference on the leasing is to be held in Moscow on May 14-15, 1996. Russian and foreign leader leasing companies and delegates of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

banking sector and business are expected to attend, Kossov said.

Russia: Employers' Leader Volskiy: Investment Risk 'Exaggerated'

MM2604085696 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Mikhalchenko: "Arkadiy Volskiy: In Business, Who Dares Wins"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reform of the Russian economy cannot be reversed under any circumstances, and the problem of increased risk for foreign investments in Russia that has been actively put about by some people in the West recently is considerably exaggerated, to put it mildly, Arkadiy Volskiy, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, stated at the conference "U.S.-Finnish-Russian Collaboration" in Moscow 23-24 April. For us in Russia delays and disruptions in the investment sphere are all the more annoying now that, unlike the situation in past years, we have hundreds of well planned and researched projects linked to foreign investors but many of those projects are currently inactive, A. Volskiy stated.

Russia: Banker Examines Financial Market Issues

964F1763B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Apr 96 No 14, p 10

[Article by M. Mneyan: "Twists and Turns of the Russian Market"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In its brief history, the Russian financial market has already managed to go through periods of growth and periods of decline.

There is nothing unexpected, least of all amazing, about this really. What is interesting is something else: the qualitative characteristics of the market's stage of development today. If we talk about the investment climate, then it is not getting better. With its highly capacious domestic market and rich resources, Russia is not losing all the elements of investment attractiveness. The investment crisis in Russia is obvious to everyone, but strange though it seems, it does not keep the authorities, or at least the legislative authorities, from favoring foreign investments. It is time to ask whether Russia needs foreign investments at all, and if so, how can it attract them?

Whence and in What Number

Russian banking capital prefers to finance branches with a high rate of monetary turnover. Moreover, bank credit, as a rule, is short-term and expensive. Meanwhile, most enterprises and branches on the whole need investments that would allow them to restore their solvency, modernize equipment, revive production, and diversify their activities. Under these conditions, it is essential to make active use of such a source of accumulations as direct foreign investments, which have long been a regularity of the world economy and have been used actively by many states to develop their economy.

The basic form in which direct foreign investments are made in the Russian market is enterprises with foreign capital. These kinds of enterprises are actively involved in foreign trade activities and, according to their results, as of today enjoy a positive foreign trade balance.

Analysis of the structure of foreign investments in the Russian economy shows that the number of enterprises with foreign capital is growing. Growing, too, is the number of countries whose capital is participating in the creation of enterprises with foreign investments. Thus, if in 1990, enterprises were created with foreign investments from 50 countries, then in 1995 this number had increased by about a factor of three.

Recently, the number of enterprises created with capital from Eastern European countries has started to grow. One of the main reasons for this is the desire to restore former economic ties between the former member nations of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon) and economic and scientific-technical cooperation, but on other foundations—those of a market economy.

One might draw the conclusion, of course, that the number of enterprises with foreign investments in the Russian economy is growing. However, the rates of their growth, the scale of their attraction of foreign investments, and their branch and regional structure are unsatisfactory. The accumulated volume of investments and their annual increase attest to Russia's very modest place among the world importers of capital.

The Investment Climate: Warm, But Not Very

Most pressing in connection with the formation of a favorable investment climate is the factor of legal instability. World experience attests that allowing enterprises with foreign investments national management regulation is effective only in politically and economically stable countries.

The instability of the normative legal base in Russia has become the talk of the town. Naturally, in this kind of situation investors are bound to take a time out. There is no choice but to wait while investors, at their own initiative, suddenly wander into Russia, or else to agree to the creation of conditions that are attractive for foreign investors. No matter what you do, there's no way out of the investment pit.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The government, in carrying out its role, has naturally shown its concern for future economic revival. We have for this step all the preconditions (true, as yet still only in draft), legal conditions, and even complex program directives for stimulating native and foreign investments, prepared by the Ministry of Economics. An encouraging innovation in the program is above all its reliance on insuring and guaranteeing investors and on developing a competitive system for allocating centralized and investment resources. On this level, which is connected with changes in the legal environment and investments—above all foreign—the expectation of a revival is quite justified.

A notion of how a mechanism for mortgage insurance might look in practice is given, for example, by a scheme for credit-barter operations that includes offering loans using oil exported from the Russian side as collateral. According to this scheme, money for the oil being exported goes into a special account in the investor's bank as collateral. The investor's bank, in turn, gives the Russian side a five-year loan of six times the amount of the collateral. The latest technology and equipment are purchased with the allocated funds. In principle, it is variations on this theme that must form the base for insuring and guaranteeing the investor. As for investment bidding, according to the program, several government resolutions on stimulating private investments should be adopted. Here there is a new idea—certification of the investment plan. Plan certification will attest to its quality and determine the amount of state support. In this way, the attractiveness of making investment bids will increase and allow plans to appear that will enjoy the greater confidence of foreign investors.

For now the influx of direct foreign investments is not increasing, and the volume of foreign capital being attracted remains insignificant. Foreign investors are limiting themselves to "portfolio investments."

With a Glance at Politics

One can nonetheless connect one's actions with the Russian political vector's inclination toward foreign investors. Naturally, political risk is far from the only factor holding back investments, but it is the fly in the ointment of the Russian economy. In any case, forcing foreign investors to reconcile themselves to political instability and the closely related instability of economic strategy is not all that easy. Therefore, it would hardly be a great exaggeration to say that the further development of the Russian market and the attitude toward it of foreign funds will depend largely on the political course followed by the new parliament.

Of course, the temptation to obtain the high profits promised by the Russian market is very great, but will it be overcome and will investors agree, given the high political risk, to operate actively in the prospective Russian market? In the opinion of columnists, there is every reason for saying that the scale is tipping toward the Russian market.

Whence this optimism? Setting aside discussions of the rule of alternation between periods of falling and rising in the market, and the fact that the change of governments in several countries of Eastern Europe did not have a serious influence on correcting their economic course, then the reason for this optimism lies in the indisputable advantages that distinguish the Russian market from all others. Among these advantages, according to authoritative experts, is the fact that by the volume of its gross domestic product, Russia takes up one-fourth of the entire "risk market," and for number of shares, Russia occupies second place (after the United States) in the world. Of course, we should not forget Russia's natural resource reserves so that Russia has all the foundations for the formation in the country of a favorable investment climate.

What Makes Russia Attractive

Investment in Russian securities is, in essence, the deepest source of the influx of foreign investments. According to several authoritative experts, including American ones practicing in the Russian securities market, by the second half of 1992, the situation in the stock market will change in a major way, and its growth will take on an avalanche-like quality. Actually, here there is still an entire set of problems connected both with strengthening protection for shareholders' rights, and the responsible safekeeping of securities, as well as issues of taxation, yet to be resolved.

As is clear from recent statements, the government intends to take up seriously the coordination of the activities of federal organs of power on issues of cooperation with investors, including the creation of free economic zones, organizations, and the holding of international investment tenders; and the preparation of concession agreements and accords on the division of output.

Basically, everything that now interests investors in Russia lies within the spheres of the fuel and energy complex, telecommunications, and ferrous metallurgy. These are the basic branches where the main demand is concentrated, either in the form of shares, which have to be sold, or else in the form of blocks reinforced in federal property.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

One of the most stable segments of the corporate securities market remains the market for oil-producing and oil-refining enterprises. The list of "oil" shares is constantly growing.

The rather protracted growth in quotes for shares in energy companies has declined somewhat, but analysis shows that for long-term investments in these securities, right now is quite a favorable period.

Activity in the market for shares in ferrous metallurgy enterprises is increasing. Here a steady dynamic has been observed, and according to experts this market is the most promising segment of the corporate securities market for the foreseeable future. Demand for shares of ferrous metallurgy enterprises is rising. Actually, this market, in our view, remains under appreciated.

Among the more profitable and promising areas of the stock market is the market in shares of communications enterprises. The leader in demand is "Rostelekom." Securities in the timber and timber-processing industry are enjoying a steady rate increase. There is also a new investment priority, transportation enterprises: ocean, river, and air.

On the whole, one can say that the new wave of rising quotes for shares on the Russian market is over. Here we have both our leaders and our outsiders. Everything happened according to the well-known scheme: speedy growth with subsequent consolidation and transition to a state of equilibrium. The stormy invasion of venture capital, which became a reason for the growth in value of Russian shares, is over. Now it is time for capital incomparable to what has already been invested in the Russian economy to enter the arena.

Russia: Bank Chairman on Election, Other Issues

964F1763A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Apr 96 No 14, p 10

[Interview with M. Mneyan, chairman of the Board of the Investments and Technology Bank, by Yu. Solomonov; place and date not given: "In the Land of the Soviets, It Was Hard To Be Born a Banker"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Miran Mneyan, chairman of the board of the Investments and Technology Bank, answers the questions of our correspondent and offers an article devoted to the problems of the financial market for our readers' attention.

[Solomonov] Miran Georgiyevich, for me personally, banking is one of the most puzzling professions. We all lived in the Soviet era and read all kinds of things about the financial sharks of capitalism, and now what do you have: you walk through Moscow and you see spots from all the names of commercial banks, and they're being run by former Soviet citizens. One was a theatrical director who joined the bankers, and another was a Komsomol worker. How did you wind up here, Miran Georgiyevich?

[Mneyan] By my basic education I'm a physicist, a senior lecturer, a doctoral candidate. For many years I taught at the Moscow Institute of Electronic Machine Building. Before 1988, I worked in science and wrote several books and even became a member of the Union of Writers.

Perestroyka and my long-standing attraction to economics and mathematical modeling are to blame for everything.

In 1989, the first Armenian Cultural Society was formed. I was one of its directors. Later, a commercial structure arose inside the society. I headed it up. For a while I worked with the Red Cross and dealt with financial issues. I participated in the work of authorized banks. And here I am, if one can put it that way, a banker.

[Solomonov] How was the bank formed?

[Mneyan] That happened before me. When I came here, the bank was in a very difficult position, at its last gasp, so to speak, with huge debts. We had to flog it out.

[Solomonov] What does that mean, "flog it out"?

[Mneyan] Seek out the most diverse funds—legal funds, of course. A complicated situation had arisen, not only in our bank, but in the country. Simply, all Russia's financial problems were reflected here as if in a mirror.... We came into contact with one of the Moscow banks, Novikombank. We invited our colleagues to join us as cofounders. In general, we did everything so as not to deceive our clients. Of course, our cofounders helped a great deal. Novikombank proved a reliable and faithful partner. Thanks to them, we were able to save the bank. Now we work together quite successfully.

[Solomonov] Was your modest experience as a financier really enough for that market?

[Mneyan] My experience was somewhat greater, naturally. I participated in the organization and later in the work of banks in Moscow and Kharkov. I studied at Edward College in the United States. I organized a branch of Tekhnobank and worked in contact with the excellent specialist Tosunyan. I must say that I have rather good business ties with banking circles in the United States and France. In particular, I was in San Francisco recently and got acquainted with banking operations there. A very interesting and remarkable man named Garry Orbelyan works there. This man has received a medal in

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the United States for his active assistance to American business. Orbelyan has very close ties to Russia and to representatives of power structures.

[Solomonov] And you, as someone living in Moscow but with Armenian roots as well, do you maintain contact with your fellow Armenians?

[Mneyan] Today, for example, I received a letter from the dean of the Armenian Foreign Language Education Institute. They are holding "Bryusov Days" there. My fellow countrymen were turning to our bank for help in organizing this celebration of Russian poetry. In short, I am less connected to Armenian business than, shall we say, culture.

[Solomonov] I would like to go back to the beginning of our conversation. Your initial education was as a physicist. The president of "Most-bank," V. Gusinskiy, is a theatrical director. There are many other examples of people from nonbanking spheres of activity achieving a great deal in this field. Is there a division in the banking world between "pure" and "impure" financiers? Or does the volume of capital solve everything?

[Mneyan] Someone worked it out that a rather high percentage of bankers are people whose first specialty was mathematics or physics. The fact of the matter is that these disciplines organize a person's brain, and modern economics requires mathematical knowledge. Banks also need good organizers. Actually, many people are going to school in finance for a second degree. I have studied economics by correspondence course as well. However, as one writer I respect said, education is what you have left when you've forgotten everything you learned.

Therefore, there is nothing more important than practical experience. And in Russian business, as nowhere else, people learn primarily from their own mistakes, getting to be big shots. Analogies to our path of development would be nearly impossible to find.

[Solomonov] There is a very primitive explanation which says that a bank is a store that trades in money.

[Mneyan] I would suggest a different one. A bank is an instrument used to resolve financial issues in various spheres of activity. The essence of bank work is very deep and complex. After all, you have to know how to use your instrument skillfully. So that you get the most profit possible. That is the basic issue.

[Solomonov] In Russian society, people have various attitudes toward banks, which is quite explainable. "Investments and Technology Bank" sounds very promising and does not offend patriotic feelings, but what stands behind it?

[Mneyan] This name existed before me, but I like it very much. I have studied and continue to study issues of investment. After the bank resolves its crisis, we are expecting to expand our investment projects. For example, I have in my portfolio an investment program for the construction of an "Ararat" plant in Moscow. We have plans for electronics plants. I am counting on my purely amicable ties to enterprises in petrochemicals, which are now going through a critical period. After all, in the former Union these factories were the price of the country. Today they are in a woeful condition.

Unfortunately, so far we do not possess the kinds of funds that banks have. Therefore we have to choose our projects more carefully. I consider a great success our choice of a project connected with the museums of the Moscow Kremlin. Above all, this involves the construction of a cultural restoration and hotel center in the neighborhood of Borovitskaya Square.... This very important job is aimed at preserving Russian history and culture. Collected in the museums of the Moscow Kremlin are immense treasures of our national culture. That kind of work cannot help but bring moral gratification.

[Solomonov] At what stage is all this right now?

[Mneyan] Work will soon begin.

[Solomonov] Might the political situation influence these and other of your plans?

[Mneyan] You know, I had an article on the topic of the influence of politics on investments. It was published in the United States and Canada....

Imagine some extraneous disturbance interfering in the working system. How the system will behave is hard to say. All those "black Tuesdays" and "Thursdays" represent of course not natural disturbances but the specific and conscious incursion of politics into the banking sphere.

[Solomonov] But if Russia's economy is in such a complex transitional state and powerfully dependent on political fighting, then banks must have worked up a special immunity, right?

[Mneyan] Certainly. We do not have what they do in a stable England. We require great stability and capacity to resist. I, for example, like the modern young people working in business very much. They are picking up everything very quickly. Literate, educated kids. Just take my son. Like me, he studied science, graduated from chemical technology institute, and went to graduate school. Then he went into business.

[Solomonov] That's how the scientific laboratories are emptying out.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Mneyan] Why they are emptying out is a separate and extremely serious subject. Right now I'm talking about something else. About the fact that there are young people who are simply thoughtless and stupid, who do God knows what, and there are others who give us hope that Russia will not perish.

[Solomonov] But despite this, everything's not all that rosy. You are placing great hopes in young people, in business and banking activity flourishing, while at this time Anatoliy Kulikov is proposing nationalizing a segment of the commercial banks.

[Mneyan] This statement is not as simple as it might seem. It has its own logic and touches on some very important points.

[Solomonov] But what about the word "nationalization"? That, it seems to me, is what scared people.

[Mneyan] Yes, it was forcefully stated. But if you look calmly, what is nationalization? It is when the state takes on a specific portion of the capital of banks or even a controlling block. In the process it also takes on the banks' debts. How else could it be?

[Solomonov] But what if "nationalize" means "confiscate"?

[Mneyan] That would mean a step backward. We love shocking the world. Take a look, we'll shock you again.

. . .

[Solomonov] You are a creative person. If you were doing physics right now, you would probably be living in expectation of the joy of discovery. Literature is creativity in and of itself, but the banking business is always associated with routine and boring workdays.

[Mneyan] Don't say that! The theory and practice of banking transactions conceals much that is interesting and at times affords genuine satisfaction. I would happily take up finance mathematics.

But for the most part it is simply very complicated and very hard work. This burden is dictated by our Russian situation: political, economic, and of course criminal.

[Solomonov] The criminal situation is so awful one doesn't even want to bring it up, but tell me, does a banker's ethic, a financier's morality, exist in Russia now? Based on what can you say that you can do business with this person but not with that?

[Mneyan] One can speak of a few attempts at such an ethics. How does businessmen's trust in each other multiply in civilized countries? So that you can call your partner on the telephone, come to an agreement, and that's it. The rest is a technical matter. Everyone knows that it is much worse to lose authority than money. That kind of morality is being conceived here, too. I can sense it. The problem is that in the beginning, a great many random people got into the banks. As they did in all business.

[Solomonov] Right now a lot is being said about how businessmen are concerned over the instability of the situation in the country and are trying to send their capital to the West. Is this amoral?

[Mneyan] This is not a simple question. A person has earned the money and wants to invest it in business but is afraid of losing it. In general, he is afraid of a return to the old ways, which for many is a deadly scenario, but if you step back and look at it, he should be bringing money here, not bleeding it out.

I was a candidate for the State Duma from the Federal Democratic Movement. We talked with the voters about all kinds of things. Hardly anyone wants to go back to the old days. Life and history have proven that you can't solve or get anything in economics by pure will. Every science, physics, economics, obeys its own laws. So that changing course, as the opposition now dreams of doing, is ruinous. Correction is another matter; it is needed in any matter. This affects finance and Chubays' privatization. We seemed to start out fine, but we should have kept correcting our course as we went. Did we have to privatize the ports, say? Or the giant factories? Maybe the state should keep something? Not for the sake of having it but to carry out the functions that are vitally important for every citizen—this is if you're serious about reforms and if you feel that everything around you is not alien.

[Solomonov] What is your attitude toward reliability ratings for banks?

[Mneyan] Unconcerned. You know that there are banks that don't participate in the ratings at all? Professionals do not judge by the ratings. For me another rating is much more important: when the client can say about us, "This is my bank." That means he trusts the bank.

[Solomonov] I agree, but 16 June is getting closer and closer. What will you do in the event... Well, you understand me....

[Mneyan] In any event we need to work for this country. I was born here. Thank God, I've lived a fairly long life here. I don't know what would happen if I were 20-30 years old now, but my son and my daughter—by the way, they work in the banking sphere too—live and work in Russia.

[Solomonov] Mine is still just studying, but she says we should vote.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Mneyan] She's right. Maybe your vote will be the decisive one that stops the dumbbells. Have you noticed that there are getting to be more and more of them?

[Solomonov] Does that mean a situation is possible in which the most patriotic bankers leave?

[Mneyan] Well, if the country is saddled with dumbbells...

[Solomonov] It would be a pity for the nation.

[Mneyan] It's been a pity for a long time.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

International Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma Meets Polish Defense Minister, Confirms NATO Policy

LD2604102696 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 0900 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma met Polish National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski this morning. National Security Council Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin and Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov also attended the meeting, at which the state of cooperation between the Ukrainian and Polish Defense Ministries was discussed. Mutual satisfaction with its development and prospects was expressed. In particular, the Ukrainian president noted the noticeable increase in goods turnover between our states, although he expressed the opinion that the development of economic relations could be improved. Leonid Kuchma also confirmed Ukraine's stance on the nonexpansion of NATO to the East.

Ukraine: Udovenko, Polish Defense Minister Hold Talks

LD2504211296 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1750 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Ukraine gives priority to the development of relations with Poland and regards the visit by Stanislaw Dobrzanski, the minister of national defense of Poland, as the continuation of intensive contacts between the two countries, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko has said at a meeting with Poland's defense minister.

Udovenko said they had discussed military, trade, and economic cooperation and issues of the European security architecture.

Udovenko said Ukraine's stance on NATO's expansion, namely the fact that Ukraine does not object to other countries, Poland in particular, joining that organization, promotes cooperation between the two countries.

Dobrzanski said that some new initiatives in the sphere of military cooperation between the two countries had been agreed during his visit to Ukraine.

Ukraine: Polish Defense Minister Praises Kiev's Stand on NATO

LD2504184996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1451 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 25 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine's position on a gradual, evolutionary NATO enlargement "contributes" to Poland's intention to join the Alliance, Polish Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, currently on an official visit to Ukraine, told a news conference in Kiev Thursday.

He said that Poland is developing "good non-conflicting relations with neighboring countries," which meets NATO's requirements for its new members. Such requirements serve to strengthen European security and are a very important peace factor, Dobrzanski said.

Another principal stand taken by Warsaw is "the need to broaden the nuclear-free zone in Europe.

"Polish foreign policy will contribute to this process," he said.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov recalled at the news conference that NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana had ruled out the moving of nuclear weapons to follow NATO eastward enlargement.

During their meeting in Kiev the two foreign ministers also discussed their countries' participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program, signed a protocol on cooperation in the training of military personnel, agreed to cooperate in air traffic control and to complete preparations for the creation of a Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion.

Ukraine: Ministers Sign Defense Cooperation Protocol With Poland

LD2504195996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1631 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kyev, April 25 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukrainian Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov and his Polish counterpart Stanislaw Dobrzanski have signed in Kyev Thursday a protocol on cooperation in the field of training military personnel.

Polish Defence Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski is currently on an official visit in Ukraine.

According to an IF-U correspondent, the two defence Ministers have also discussed issues pertaining to European and regional security, NATO's expansion eastward, the participation of Ukraine and Poland in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, in the peacemaking activities and bilateral relations.

The two defence Ministers have reached agreement on cooperation in air traffic control. Work is to be completed this year to form a Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion, V. Shmarov told newsmen.

S. Dobrzanski has invited Shmarov to pay an official visit to Poland In September-October this year.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Ukraine: Moroz, French Minister Discuss Economic Cooperation

LD2504192596 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1250 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris — Oleksandr Moroz, chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council, met Franck Borotra, French minister of industry, post, and telecommunications today. The two men said that the level of French investments in Ukraine was low — as little as $8 million were invested in Ukraine in 1995.

A UNIAN special correspondent reports that Moroz pointed out the need to step up economic relations, primarily in the fields of power engineering and communications. Moroz said French entrepreneurs could be interested in the existing possibilities for placing orders for the production of the means of automation, communication, and protective relaying, with Ukrainian enterprises that belong to the military-industrial and rocket-space complexes. The sides stated that the ecological and economic program, which was signed by the relevant departments of the two countries in 1994, did not work and that it should be intensified and that a proper legal basis should be established for that purpose.

Heorhiy Filipchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council's Commission for Ecological Policy, proposed that French enterprises be involved in joint Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan and Ukrainian- Polish ecological programs; in particular, those dealing with nature protection, ecological tourism, and utilization and processing of industrial waste. Filipchuk believes that cooperation in the Black Sea region has good prospects for the future.

Ukraine: Kuchma Refutes Rumors About Plans To Join SSR

WS2504135796 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 23 Apr 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Leonid Kuchma: 'Ukraine Is Not Going To Join the SSR'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma yesterday left for Strasbourg, where he is to address today's meeting of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, presenting Ukraine as one of the important factors of stability in Europe. As we have learned, for the first time a live relay of the meeting will be carried.

Before leaving for Strasbourg, the Ukrainian president made a special statement for our newspaper in connection with VECHIRNIY KYYIV's question concerning information that the Ukrainian and Russian Governments are intensively drafting a treaty on Ukraine's accession to the Community of Sovereign Republics (SSR), which was recently established by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. This statement was received by our editorial board from confidential sources.

Following is an excerpt of what the president told us by telephone:

"This is untrue. There have been no talks on this topic except for those on mutually advantageous cooperation. Nobody is drafting such a treaty in Ukraine. I have already made an official statement on this issue, and my position is firm in this regard."

And now, briefly about the essence of the information we obtained:

As we were told, the signing of this treaty is "attached" to the presidential elections in Russia. The argument which the reformist majority of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers will present will be that Ukraine will thus provide a decisive contribution to Boris Yeltsin's re-election — which is essential to continue the economic reforms in Ukraine.

As our source believes, because our state's accession to the SSR is possible only after adopting a new constitution for an independent Ukraine, relevant representatives of the Presidential Administration, the government, and the propresidential factions in the Ukrainian Supreme Council are coming out with statements on the need to pass a new constitution by the Supreme Council and the inexpediency of holding a referendum on this issue.

Should the draft constitution be put to a nationwide referendum, it will be impossible to pass it before the presidential elections in Russia.

This version of Ukraine's possible entanglement in the new Soviet Union did not have to be made public, all the more so since the Ukrainian president himself clearly expressed his firm position on this issue. There is no doubt, however, that one way or another, there will be attempts to use Ukraine as one of the trump cards in the presidential campaign in Russia.

Russia: Commander Kravchenko Praises Black Sea Fleet's Performance

WS2504143696 Sevastopol SLAVA SEVASTOPOLYA in Russian 20 Apr 96 p 1

[Interview with Black Sea Fleet Commander Viktor Kravchenko by G. Andreyev; place and date not given: "Combat Warm-Up of the Fleet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A training cruise of the Black Sea Fleet, which became not only a verification of its

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

combat readiness, but also a political act, has ended. According to Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, Black Sea Fleet commander, the fleet forces that participated in the training cruise displayed good skills and an ability to perform their tasks.

One of the main episodes of the exercises was a landing of navy and air force assault troops on unequipped shores. Approximately 1,000 men and 100 pieces of military equipment took part in the landing.

The Main Staff of the Russian Navy has decided to double the fuel limit for the Black Sea Fleet. This makes it possible to assess the conducted exercises as a combat warm-up of the fleet's forces.

Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, Black Sea Fleet commander, has preliminary summed up the results of the training cruise.

Admiral Kravchenko arrived in Sevastopol and assumed his office nearly two months ago, on 28 February this year. Our correspondent discussed the current situation of the Black Sea Fleet and prospects for its development with Admiral Viktor Kravchenko.

[Andreyev] Viktor Andreyevich, everybody knows that you served all your time as an officer of the Black Sea Fleet, except for the last four years, and you know the Fleet well enough. This means that you are able to objectively assess the current situation of the Fleet, as well...

[Kravchenko] We have recently taken a number of organizational and personnel measures connected with the division of the Fleet. In accordance with international agreements, a part of the Fleet's infrastructure, ships, planes, and helicopters have been handed over to Ukraine. I am not inclined to assess the current reforms as something unnatural for the Black Sea Fleet. I want to emphasize that the Fleet still has enough forces and means to successfully perform its tasks in accordance with Russia's current military doctrine. In terms of both quantity and quality, the Black Sea Fleet continues to be a very important military formation in the southern theater of war, and any competent expert can confirm this. As the Fleet receives new ships next year, I think its role in this theater will increase even further.

[Andreyev] You cannot deny, however, that the Black Sea Fleet has been considerably weakened by the current reform.

[Kravchenko] One cannot deny that over the past few years the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and its main base — Sevastopol — has become an element of big politics. While viewing the problem through this prism, one should not forget about the purely military aspect of the issue. In the heat of emotions, we often throw out the baby with the bath water. The Fleet is not an abstract figure, island, or detail, but a component of the Russian Armed Forces, which, in turn, are developing according to state policy and its priorities, as well as the country's economic possibilities. I would like to say that the Black Sea Fleet is becoming what it wants to be, and most importantly — Russia can build it as a component of its Armed Forces.

I am confident that the Black Sea Fleet will remain, just as I am convinced that Sevastopol is a city of Russia's maritime glory. The following words voiced by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin quite illustratively reflect this truth: "Without the Black Sea Fleet, Russia is not Russia." Russia needs a navy on the Black Sea to defend the Black Sea coast and the North Caucasus, and ensure strategic security as a whole. To put it briefly, it needs a navy to protect Russia's national interests, primarily in regions threatened by conflicts.

[Andreyev] How do you assess the results of the recent exercises?

[Kravchenko] It is still too early to speak about the final results. We will sum them up and assess everything according to objective data concerning each combat exercise. Then, I, as commander will be able to draw a full and clear picture of the efficiency of every subunit of the Fleet.

However, the following conclusions can already be drawn:

First, the combat core of the Fleet not only has been preserved, but it is also ready to perform its tasks.

Second, the people have sensed that they are doing a real job, and that intensive training has improved the servicemen's morale. I saw a twinkle in the eyes of sailors performing unexpected tasks introduced during the exercises. Political games only annoyed people.

Third, I have understood that despite these achievements, there is still a lot to be done to improve the Black Sea Fleet forces' teamwork and increase the level of combat skills and training. In this regard, the Fleet will not mark time either. It will move forward.

Ukraine: Crimean Tatars Mourn Dudayev's Death

LD2504122996 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0900 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol — "The killing of Dzhokhar Dudayev, president of the Chechen republic of Ichkeria, will be a stain of shame on the present leadership of Russia, a country that has ranked terrorism as state policy," says a statement adopted at an emergency

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

sitting of the Crimean Tatar people's Majlis presidium. "For the Crimean Tatars, just as for our Chechen brothers, the name of Dzhokhar Dudayev will always be the symbol of a staunch fighter, a Shiite champion, an individual who has given his life for his people," the document notes.

The Crimean Tatar people's Majlis presidium expressed condolences to the Chechen people and support for their "courageous struggle."

The Majlis presidium declared 26 April a day of mourning, and appealed to Muslims and believers of other faiths to remember Dzhokhar Dudayev and other victims of the Chechen war in their prayers on that day. It proposed that the Muslim clergy hold mourning services in all mosques on Friday.

Ukraine: Nationalist Predicts Nuclear Terrorism if Dudayev is Dead

MK2604070696 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 3

[NEGA Report: "Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Roman Koval, chairman of State Independence of Ukraine, an extreme right association, has said that "if Dudayev is dead, this will be followed by more than one explosion at nuclear power plants in Russia." In his opinion, however, "Russia indulges in wishful thinking, since it is interested in Dudayev's death." As for Mr. Koval himself, he expressed doubts as to the validity of this information "since it is hard to identify a dead body hit by a missile."

The State Independence leader said that, while earlier there was Dudayev to restrain his gunmen, now nothing will stop them.

Ukraine: Policy Viewed in Light of Russian Events

WS2404113296 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 11 Apr 96 p 4

[First of two installments of article by Dmytro Pasternak-Taranushenko from the Fund for Supporting National Security Research: "The 'Russian Field' of Instability in Light of 'Lukashenka's Treaty' and Yet Another Yeltsin Refusal To Come to Kiev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian State Duma's decision to put the Soviet Union treaty back in force, active integrationist actions aimed at establishing a union of four countries by the Russian executive branch, the signing of the treaty with Belarus, and Yeltsin's refusal to come to Kiev were events that can be seen in the context of one process: the battle on the eve of the presidential elections in Russia.

Disregarding the moral side of the issue (the question as to whether one may convert the fate of a nation of 50 million into a bargaining card in someone else's political games), the Ukrainian political elite should define its position at least with regard to a pragmatic wish to reap some profit from the not always well-considered steps taken by the Russian leadership.

This opportunity is really unique. It has been instability brought about by the pre-electoral fever of our northern neighbor that has resulted in the "snowball" effect which is so characteristic in such circumstances. Small gaps, through which Ukraine could hardly break away from dangers and threats, have become larger. This is perhaps one of those unique cases when a camel can pass through the eye of a needle.

Little Russians? A Scapegoat?

The developments in Moscow prompt us to provide answers to the arising questions. It is no secret that these answers may become decisions. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians have long had no doubts about their unwillingness to live in one state with Zhirinovskiy or Anpilov [Russian ultranationalist leaders], or to be citizens of a state which kills tens of thousands of its own citizens. Moreover, it seems obvious that it makes no sense to join any binding unions led by an unstable country torn apart by a war to merely boost ratings of its political leader.

The fundamentally new feature of the current situation lies in the fact that after the Duma's decision, for the first time the Russian mass media have admitted the possibility of CIS countries escaping to the West. This has been admitted in commentaries about the treaty on the union between Russia and Belarus. And Yeltsin, in the course of his visit to Norway, virtually gave a go-ahead for East European countries to join the political structure of NATO.

On the one hand, this confirms that the Russians have wavered. The domestic squabbles are quite grueling, and the international community's support may also mean something. Therefore, the Russian establishment is becoming more circumspect.

On the other hand, an attempt to make a deal with the West with regard to the division of spheres of influence is evident. There is a great threat of such developments. After all, the scenario according to which Ukraine, despite its will, may be farmed out to Russia or, at worst, divided, has not been ruled out.

It is sad that virtually no political force vying for key positions in Russia's political life wants to seriously reckon with an independent Ukraine. This can be

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

confirmed by the openly disrespectful tone of many statements by Boris Yeltsin and Zhirinovskiy's attacks. (To the aforementioned politicians, one can easily add Lebed and Zyuganov). What became a sensation was a speech by Mikhail Yurev, Duma deputy speaker and "Yabloko" faction member. "Ukraine and Belarus are not separate nations at all. They are Slavs, or Russians in the broad sense of this notion. For example, I believe that Ukrainian is a much more poetic language than contemporary Russian; nevertheless, it is a dialect of the Russian language, as are the Moscow accent or the Siberian dialect (let us recall that Yurev is a biologist by education — author's note). The question should not be integration or unification, but return of these lands to the Russian Federation, for example, on rights analogous to Tatarstan's" (the original style was preserved) — KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 2 April 1996 with reference to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

It can be said that with regard to a number of foreign policy issues, Russia's political forces have concurred in their positions. Yeltsin continues the cause of integration in the spirit of slogans outlined by the Russian Communists. What can be more significant? (It is interesting that Lukashenka's integrationist efforts have also been supported by left-wingers, though this time by the Belarusian ones. Yet, what difference does it make whose left- wingers support this....)

Having once again postponed the signing of a treaty with Kiev (for Yeltsin it is currently more convenient to taste the fruit of the two integration treaties and the plan for settling the conflict in Chechnya, and to return from Ukraine as a victor "before the elections" — in May) and having made, as always, peremptory and categorical statements, Boris Nikolayevich did not take into account a variety of circumstances.

First of all, he is currently more interested in signing the treaty than the Ukrainian leadership. Ukraine may get along with Zyuganov as president as well. But will Yeltsin be able to get along with him?! Second, Ukraine of "the 1996 pattern" is a country which has built its domestic structure and all institutes of state power, gained certain experience and political traditions, and learned to live "according to world prices." Third, quite recently the Ukrainian leadership has demonstrated that it is able to respond to forceful pressure from the outside, by correcting its stance after interpreting the situation (what was new, however, was that its stance became tougher). The talk is about the principal reaction to the Russian State Duma's decision.

People in Ukraine are ready to understand the Russian president's problems. Many of them are even ready to support him. However, they are ready to support the president of a great state, responsible and levelheaded, and not a Eurasian Emperor Boris who is able to talk only with the help of guns mounted on armored vehicles. It seems that it is no longer a question why Yeltsin has not found time to think that it was no good to initial the hastily cooked-up treaty with Minsk, at the same time refusing to sign the long-awaited document with Kiev. Boris Nikolayevich, relying on his latest diplomatic achievements and usual passiveness of Ukrainian policy, was not afraid of showing "who is the boss" (as Mikhail Gorbachev used to say). Emperor Yeltsin has demonstrated that he is not going to reckon with those who even hint at their own viewpoint and dare to independently govern their territories. Then, what sense does the friendship treaty make? The talk has been, and will be conducted from a position of force. And there have been, and will be tamed daughters and unloved stepdaughters.

We will not forget that in addition to the ambiguous political contents, the union of Russia and Belarus contains a dangerous hidden military meaning. The talk is about increased military confrontation on the Ukrainian border. Lukashenka is stating his readiness to use the Belarusian Armed Forces (and what is most important — the Belarusian territory!) in the Russian interests. The long border with a weak and unaggressive neighbor (Belarus) is becoming a contact line with a strong and, to put it politely, pushing neighbor. It is interesting that the military alliance between Minsk and Moscow is being forged before NATO's expansion, which is still in the sphere of declarations. A military confrontation in Europe is becoming tangible. Under these circumstances, Ukraine will be surrounded by participants in a confrontation among civilizations (Western, Orthodox, and, perhaps, Muslim ones) which are organized in military blocs.

Russia's traditional continental nature (it has never had a strong navy on a world scale) and the systematic decline of the Russian Navy will prod this country to fight for ground territories. Russia will not renounce its aspirations to the role of a superpower, but the majority of test grounds which it previously used to display its power are currently inaccessible. Therefore, we are not only doomed to remain in the sphere of Moscow's vital interests, but also to be a country which the Russian state will use to reassure itself, if we do not decisively object to this.

Chances and Nuances

Now that the cards have been displayed and the immodest neighbor's intentions have become obvious, the time has perhaps come for Ukrainian diplomats to act energetically, provided they are not paralyzed by Pri-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

makov's alleged knowledge of some wrongdoings by Ukrainian politicians. (There is talk that this knowledge was obtained from the KGB archives inherited by the Russian special services).

The minimum Ukraine can do is to immediately demand not abstract, but precise guarantees for its security.

Guarantor countries should specify sanctions and conditions for imposing them on countries or international organizations threatening Ukraine's security.

A system of bringing pressure on "those disturbing the peace" should be a multi-level one. For example, in case of unjustifiably harsh statements about Ukraine's territorial integrity by representatives of foreign governments (such as, for example, the Romanian foreign minister), diplomatic measures taken by guarantor countries would be sufficient (statements containing condemnation, etc.). If the leadership of a country made decisions similar to the Russian State Duma's resolutions on Crimea or restoring the USSR, diplomatic demarches would be made and limited economic sanctions would be imposed. A threat to use force would immediately bring about all-embracing economic and other sanctions against the aggressor country. (Let international lawyers suggest more precise formulas).

A mechanism and terms of international pressure should be defined so precisely that they can be used automatically. Even if this approach requires unprecedented documents, they would be justified. Has it ever happened that some country gave up the third largest nuclear potential in the world?

Ukraine: Second Installment of Article on National Policy

WS2404125896 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 12 Apr 96 p 5

[Second of two installments of article by Dmytro Pasternak-Taranushenko: "The 'Russian Field' of Instability in Light of 'Lukashenka's Treaty' and Yet Another Refusal by Yeltsin To Come to Kiev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before granting Ukraine appropriate serious guarantees for security, which will soon be given, our country will hardly be able to halt the withdrawal of nuclear weapons (at least before the Russian elections).

The euphoria of the first years after the collapse of the bipolar world and the first independent steps has ended. It has become clear that only the strong are respected. The presence of nuclear weapons would make it possible to prevent threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity for many years, and would make it impossible to use force against it. This option for ensuring military security would be not only reliable, but also economically advantageous.

As for the world community's dissatisfaction with this step, first and foremost, Ukraine has recommended itself as a peaceful state which has not gotten involved in any conflicts since the first years of its existence. Additionally, it behaves much more calmly and soberly than Russia, in which communists and ultranationalists are raising their heads. A conflict between left- and right-wingers threatens to evolve into a civic war (disregarding the threat of the Russian Federation disintegrating into regions, in which case control over nuclear weapons may be lost).... Not a single argument presented by the West, which insists on Kiev handing over nuclear weapons to Moscow, works any longer. Russia has not become a civilized law-governed state, and its proceeding along the path of democratic reforms has not become irreversible. Second, our country may maintain its nonaligned status only by preserving nuclear weapons (although there is an option for deploying strategic nonnuclear missile forces as well, it requires considerable expenditures). As it is, in terms of conventional weapons, we are no match for Russia, the rapidly approaching NATO, or even Turkey, which owing to "proliferation" (transfer of weapons subject to reductions from more developed NATO members to Turkey and Greece), has increased its military potential by over 25 percent.

Therefore, Ukraine will simply have to decisively "cling" to the possibility of maintaining nuclear weapons. Fortunately, we again made it through the winter, though not without difficulties. And following the spring, Ukraine traditionally has possibilities of conducting a more independent foreign policy — for example, independent of Russia. The West will react adequately if the process of drafting the Constitution does not drag on and the executive branch more actively initiates market transformations.

He Who Walks Will Cover the Road....

However, more serious developments are possible as well, should Ukraine suddenly feel the time has finally come to make its geopolitical choice. After all, beautiful declarations about neutrality and nonaligned status were made in a completely different situation. Now that the prosperity of 50 million "live people," and not the success of some abstract statehood, is at stake, one has to be guided by reality.

The reality is that Ukraine has evidently no choice between a movement toward the West and advance toward the East. So, it is time for it to address the issue of joining the political structure of NATO. (Until

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

we join the military structure, if ever, our own nuclear forces could ensure our security).

This is an unprecedentedly appropriate moment to make this decision. Russia is preoccupied with its domestic problems. Moreover, it is bogged down in the war with Chechnya, and will not be able to go for an open conflict. At the end of April, it is to sign an agreement with the Paris Club on reconstructing its foreign debt which totals $50 billion. It has been promised a $10-billion IMF loan. Russia's harsh steps will deprive it of important international support. Such steps will not only make it impossible to "pull up" social problems, but will also prevent its economic oligarchy from reaping profits from Western loans.

An application for NATO membership may be initiated by the executive branch, which was quite ready for a similar statement even before Yeltsin's provocative decision. This principaled stance of Ukraine will be the best guarantee for attracting Western investments. They, in turn, will not only be advantageous for the financial, industrial, and other regional elites, but will also become a foundation for improving the national economy.

I think that Ukrainian regions, except for Crimea, would not overreact to a statement about a wish to join NATO's political structure, provided that public opinion is appropriately prepared. The West currently has levers which are strong enough to bring pressure on Russia to make it refrain from destabilizing the situation in Crimea. If Crimea itself attempts to proclaim its secession, etc., this will become a reason to think wether the disloyal autonomous republic needs such broad rights at all.

True, there is a threat that Yeltsin's entourage may use the sharp deterioration in relations with Ukraine (and even exacerbate them) to postpone the elections. But it is not so easy to raise a hand against Orthodox and Slavic brothers who are afraid of radicals coming to power or the almost inevitable destabilization in the Russian Federation after the elections. Furthermore, how will the 4.5 million ethnic Ukrainians living in the Russian Federation, plus 500,000 Russians who have relatives in Ukraine, react to this?

The events in Belarus made Ukrainian citizens think again how dangerous our "eternal" dependence on Moscow is. The fraternal and equal union no longer exists, and, if one can believe our national-democrats, has never existed. Will it ever exist?!

National Affairs

Ukraine: Kuchma Commemorates Chernobyl Disaster

LD2604091796 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0745 GMT 26 Apr 96

["From Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's speech During the 'Bells of Chernobyl' telemarathon"—UNIAR headline]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — "Today, on this universal day of Chernobyl commemoration, we incline our heads in deep sorrow and honor the bright image of those who without hesitation stepped into the atomic hell and shielded us from it, and in an unprecedented way saved the earth," Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said yesterday in a speech devoted to the 10th anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. "And the world should not and does not have the right to forget the sacrificial nature of their grand planetary feat." The president recalled those who, risking their health, went to subdue the disaster, which was capable of destroying everything living on the earth in a few hours, and that 350,000 people were involved in the clean-up operations in Ukraine alone.

"Ukraine has in fact turned into an ecological disaster zone, with which it has essentially been left alone since the collapse of the Soviet Union," the president continued. "One may assert without exaggeration: the Chernobyl disaster endured its organization [as received] and virtually became the personal matter of the Ukrainian people. Experiencing economic difficulties linked to building a state and the fundamental reform of the principles of existence, we are forced to deny ourselves the most necessary things and to direct 12 percent of the state budget to treat Chernobyl and its aftereffects. In the last four years alone, more than $3 billion were spent on this, which is five times more than what was spent on education, health care, and culture altogether. This is an unmanageable burden for Ukraine. And neither is it known how much longer our long-suffering people must carry this cross. The planetary nature of the disaster demands appropriate specific attention, assistance, and participation in overcoming it from the whole of the world community.

"For this is not just about our fate, but about the future of humanity too. This is precisely how the Ukrainian president put the issue at the meeting with the G7 leaders in Moscow on 20 April. More than $3 billion will be allocated to carry out Ukraine's political decision to close the Chernobyl nuclear power station and resolve the whole range of Chernobyl problems. An additional decision was taken that the G7 and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

European community will finance the construction of a new sarcophagus. This has become possible, first, because the Ukrainian state's political course makes it possible to substantially reduce the nuclear load on the planet. Second, however bitter it is to understand, it is the Chernobyl disaster that made the world close and receptive to the specific peoples of Ukraine and showed to what extent this is the independent and integral essence of civilization [sentence as received]. And so, we are entering this state of development, when mutual support and mutual assistance, concerted efforts, the joint wisdom of peoples will serve as a reliable guarantee that present and future generations will not experience a similar misfortune..."

Ukraine: Official: '$3 Billion Not Enough' To Close Chernobyl

WS2604082396 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0646 GMT 26 Apr 96

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev — In an interview with INFOBANK the first deputy head of Ukraine's State Committee for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy, Nur Nihmatullin, said that the $3 billion promised to Ukraine by countries of the Group of Seven during an April 20th meeting in Moscow is not enough to close down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and to replace its energy capacity. In his opinion at least $4-$5 billion will be needed. Mr. Nihmatullin said that plans had been made to close the first energy block as early as May 1996 but that it has now been agreed by officials from the Chernobyl plant and from Ukraine's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety that block will continue to operate until the end of the year.

Mr. Nihmatullin believes that a planned $500 million to be given to Ukraine in the form of a grant will not cover all expenditures for non-profit projects (those which are not meant to bring in a profit) related to taking the plant out of operation. Taking this into account the State Nuclear Energy Committee and the Ukrainian government plan to submit projects to the G-7 which substantiates that amount of expenditures which is actually needed for financing non-profit projects, such as making the covering over the Chernobyl energy block destroyed in the accident into an ecologically safe system. He also believes that the $3 billion promised should be viewed as only the first phase of international assistance to Ukraine for the closure of Chernobyl.

Mr. Nihmatullin added that the Ukrainian government has informed Western experts that in the case that evaluations and the financing of Ukrainian projects is dragged out two or three years Ukraine will be forced to halt the process of taking the Chernobyl nuclear power plant out of operation.

Ukraine: Commission Reports Abuse of Chernobyl Funds

AU2604110396 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 20 Apr 96 pp 2,4

[Article by HOLOS UKRAYINY correspondent Anatoliy Ben: "The Diagnosis: 'Mutation of Conscience'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For more than six months, the working group of the parliamentary Standing Commission for Issues of Combating Organized Crime and Corruption dealt, in addition to other important problems, with cases of violation of the legislation on Chernobyl and the rights of the liquidators [participants in the cleanup operations after the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Plant] and those affected by the accident. The group, headed by professional lawyer Mykola Khomych, included several other people's deputies — former officers of law-enforcement bodies and participants in the elimination of the aftermath of the accident. Perhaps, precisely these circumstances determined the professional and principled approach to the investigation and, consequently, to its results.

"It is difficult for me to find a word in the rich Ukrainian language that would describe with sufficient accuracy and persuasiveness what some state officials do with funds that were allocated for the treatment and rehabilitation of the people affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe and for the elimination of the aftermath of the accident on the whole," this was how Hryhoriy Omelchenko, head of the commission, emotionally characterized the results of the investigation.

The results are shocking, indeed. As participants in the meeting stated, according to the Ministry of Statistics, 102.6 trillion karbovantsi [K] was received by the Chernobyl Fund; the expenditure amounted to K94.9, and the rest — K7.7 trillion — was unlawfully removed from the fund. The official figures of the Ministry of Statistics and of the Ministry of Chernobyl on the expenditure in 1995 do not match by K775 billion. Where is that money, for whom did it work, and whom did it "rehabilitate"?

The following facts will provide a certain answer to these questions. Following the inquiry by the standing parliamentary commission, the Prosecutor General's Office officially confirmed that, at the instruction of V. Kholosha, who was, at that time, acting minister for protection of the population from the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl AES (he is now minister),

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the research and production association "Prypyat" had transferred K25 billion to the account of the commercial bank "Korn." Several other Chernobyl-related state enterprises transferred another K12.5 billion to "Korn." These are not isolated cases of financing commercial structures at the expense of the meager Chernobyl funds meant for eliminating the aftermath of the hitherto unprecedented technological accident.

Various bodies, including the highest-level state ones, resorted to simply astonishing tricks in dealing with these funds, as follows from events around that same bank "Korn." In December 1995, specialists of Ukraine's National Bank, having analyzed the situation, found it inadmissible to concentrate the financing of the Chernobyl program within the framework of a single commercial bank, which does not have a corresponding network of institutions or proper technological facilities and so on. Why take such a risk? However, in the months that followed, another leader — O. Kyreyev, deputy chairman of Ukraine's National Bank — did confer the exclusive right to fasten on to the Chernobyl funds to the commercial bank "Korn": In conformity with recorded alterations and supplements, the cryptic and obscure word "Korn" in the name of the bank disappeared and a promising and another word, more appealing to the Chernobyl victims, appeared: The" Vitchyzna" [Fatherland] joint-stock bank for servicing the Chernobyl program.

Explanations at the meeting of the commission by Oleksandr Kyreyev himself can be summarized as a lack of sufficient reasons for him to reject "Korn's" demands, because, as he asserts, he was not aware of the fact that the bank had state funds in its fixed capital. However, at the insistence of members of the commission, particularly Hryhoriy Omelchenko, he admitted that the decision adopted by the Standing Supreme Council Commission on Issues of the Chernobyl Catastrophe and the "directive of Minister Shpek" [first deputy prime minister] had influenced his decision in favor of the bank.

To finally find out who is behind that bank, the commission finds it essential to ascertain precisely which natural persons are the founders of those commercial structures that, in turn, became the founders of "Korn." The "benefactors" of the Chernobyl victims must be known by their names.

Nor did the "benefactors" miss their chance to benefit from building housing for the people resettled from the Chernobyl zone. According to Mykola Khomych, head of the working group, 15,034 buildings or apartments were built in 1990-95 in various oblasts of Ukraine for 11,846 families who had been relocated from zones of mandatory evacuation. Thus, there were 3,188 more homes than the evacuees for whom they were intended. At the same time, hundreds of families with children were left to their own devices, face to face with the atomic disaster, because they had nowhere to go. In Polissya Rayon, on the territory affected by radiation, 2,098 families reside in expectation of compassion on the part of the state, which has been promising them housing on clean lands despite the fact that, last year, the number of houses and apartments built in Kiev Oblast was greater by 274 than the number of families relocated from the zone. Who then took the Chernobyl apartments? The commission has a whole list of such persons. For example, in Skvyra Rayon, apartments meant for resettlers were given to the chairman of the rayon court, the rayon military registration and enlistment office, and several more "appropriate" people.

Perhaps every rayon leader has his "own" appropriate people.... Wasn't it because of them that the Kiev Oblast State Administration asked for an additional more than K1 trillion from the Chernobyl fund? On the pretext that it was necessary to relocate, for a certain period of time, those evacuees who remained on the contaminated territory at a risk to their lives.

It turns out that not only rayon leaders have their own people, but also oblast leaders, and not in some insignificant organizations, but in such solid ones as, for example, the Kiev Oblast Administration of Internal Affairs. With the blessing of its former head, General Volodin, and Kudyukin, former head of the notorious Black Sea Steamship Company (the "Blasco" concern), a whole clan of highly-placed persons from the Cabinet of Ministers, oblast and rayon presidential administrations, prosecutors' offices at various levels, and several generals — heads of other oblast internal affairs administrations enjoyed cruises in the Mediterranean free of charge (the cost of the pass is up to $3,500) in the guise of "Chernobyl victims." Last year, at the initiative of people's deputies Hryhoriy Omelchenko and Anatoliy Yermak, our paper published names of many of them, and some of them were eventually forced to relinquish their portfolios.

However common, the abuse of funds allocated for the rehabilitation of children affected by the Chernobyl atom is the height of official heartlessness and cynicism. Just imagine the terrible picture of a child with the swollen thyroid gland writhing in pain, its parents in grief and despair, unable to do anything to help, and, in the background, an official, swollen with his own fat, browning his paunch in the sun in a sanitarium on the Black Sea shore instead of that child. In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast alone, adult gentlemen and ladies received passes worth a total of K14.5 billion from the funds meant

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

for the rehabilitation of children. In the guise of children suffering the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, 276 perfectly healthy adults from Rivne Oblast enjoyed sunbathing at Crimean sanatoriums. As Mykola Khomych asserts, in almost all Ukrainian oblasts, facts of the embezzlement and unauthorized use of the money from the Chernobyl Fund that had been allocated for children's rehabilitation were revealed. By just spot checks, it has been established that almost K70 billion has gone, so to speak, astray. Seventy percent of Ukrainian children affected by radiation have remained without health care.

Parents of preschool children in the town of Korosten (Zhytomyr Oblast) — zone III — affected by radiation, complain that, due to the shortage of funds, including Chernobyl funds, in several kindergartens, the children's diet has been reduced to plain potatoes or pearl barley and tea without sugar (whereas they must get supplementary nutrition!). Isn't it blasphemous, under these circumstances, that the "Prypyat" Research and Production Association had allotted K960 million to the joint-stock company "Atomprofzdravnytsya" [meant to provide special health care for atomic specialists and their families] for the trip to Washington of V. Struk, chairman of the association's trade union committee, to take part in the international trade union congress? It was only after the Prosecutor's Office intervened that this money was returned to the association's account.

We can add to this a series of other facts that were referred to at the meeting: Numerous distortions of estimates during the building of Chernobyl facilities, the squandering of funds on nonessential research, the "division" of false liquidators of the accident who, like leeches, are draining huge sums of money out of the state budget, the looting in the zone, from which equipment, timber, and so on, contaminated with radionuclides, is being removed, even from burial sites.

Gen. Ivan Bilas, deputy chairman of the commission, was right when he said at the commission's meeting that the radioactive disintegration had primarily affected that part of the cerebral cortex of some of our statesmen that is responsible for conscience, honor, and compassion for other people in distress. As a result, he said, a new type of official has appeared in our country — the mutant official, capable of going to any extremes for the sake of his personal gain.

Precisely such officials, according to H. Omelchenko, will do everything to "bury" the criminal cases on the abuse of Chernobyl funds. What else can anyone expect from those prosecutors, judges, or heads of internal affairs bodies who browned their paunches in the sun at the expense of the liquidators and victims of the accident? That is why journalists and representatives of public organizations were invited to the commission's meeting — through them, the people's deputies are appealing to the public.

At present, it is already clear to those of the people's deputies who took part in the investigation that the government, while collecting a pretty penny from us for the Chernobyl Fund, has failed to use this money properly. The Ministry of Chernobyl, as the state's main representative in resolving this problem, has turned out to be an inefficient structure that has testified to its own helplessness. Individual statesmen must be held responsible for all of this.

The commission decided to recommend that the Ukrainian president and head of government should consider the dismissal from their posts of those high-ranking Cabinet of Ministers officials and heads of ministries and departments who permitted violations of the Chernobyl and other current legislations and failed to take the necessary measures. The materials of the investigation will be forwarded to the Prosecutor General's Office with a recommendation that criminal proceedings be instituted against all those state officials, regardless of their ranks, in whose actions there are indications of crime.

Ukraine: Chernobyl Study Reportedly Includes'Cardinally New Aspect'

WS2604082496 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] There is a cardinally new aspect in reasons for the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This was reported today [as heard] to an ITAR-TASS correspondent by a well-informed source in the Ukrainian Government. According to this source, the Cabinet of Ministers has received a report on reasons and circumstances for the accident at the fourth power unit. This 400-page document contains conclusions made by foreign and Ukrainian specialists regarding the first days following the accident at the Chernobyl plant. The report will be made public, the source said.

Ukraine: Scientists Skeptical About Chernobyl Dome

LD2504192296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1638 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Itar-Tass) - Scientists from the Kurchatov Nuclear Physics Institute said the number of deaths from leukemia and malignant tumours among the troubleshooters who

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

worked at the Chernobyl nuclear plant after the 1986 blast is likely to increase significantly in the next 20 years.

RBMK-type Reactor 4 at the Chernobyl plant exploded after a scheduled shutdown at 1.23 a.m. on April 26, 1986 in what proved to be the worst accident in the history of nuclear power generation.

According to the official version, the explosion was caused by the operators' error although some experts also blamed it on the imperfect design of the reactor.

At present, similar disasters are unlilely to occur thanks to the introduction of tougher requirements for personnel and improvements of all the 15 Chernobyl-type reactors currently in use.

The duration of the accident did not exceed a few seconds but the ensuing radioactive emission lasted 10 days, contaminating thousands of square kilometers of adjacent land.

The scientists are unable to predict how long the irradiated people and their posterity will keep dying from the effects of the Chernobyl disaster or even how many of them are doomed.

Currently, the major risk groups are the trouble-shooters and their children born after 1986, and the inhabitants of the contaminated areas.

Experts say the number of deaths caused by leukemia and malignant tumours is likely to considerably increase within the next 20 years. On average, up to 1,000 in every 10,000 descendants of the people exposed to excessive radiation are expected to have health problems in the future.

Doctors are also concerned about an increase in the incidence of cases of thyroid gland cancer among children living in the contaminated territory.

Among the outstanding technical post-Chernobyl issues one is of great concern - that of the sarcophagus, a 1.5-metre-thick contrete vault built over the demolished reactor within four months from the day of the blast.

Although some sources are confident that it can last another 20 to 30 years, scientists from the Kurchatov Institute are sceptical about its reliability.

Ukraine is now mulling over a plan for the promised closure of the three remaining RBMK reactors, but the plan can hardly be fulfilled without foreign investments.

All the existing projects to develop the Chernobyl plant are estimated to cost between dozens and hundreds of billion of US dollars.

To make the matters worse, Chernobyl generated a host of social problems: many people evacuated from the area have yet to be provided with appropriate housing while some of the troubleshooters have been unable to land a job or enjoy free medical treatment and drugs even though they have law to back them.

Russia's President Boris Yeltsin, when giving awards to Chernobyl troubleshooters on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the disaster, said that not all of the problems had been resolved but promised "to increase the state help."

Ukraine: Scientists Concerned Over Chernobyl Cooling Pond

WS2604105996 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0152 GMT 26 Apr 96

[By Yuriy Dronzhkevich, "Special to INTELNEWS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 25. As the April 26 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe approaches, international attention is focused largely on the sarcophagus — the hastily erected ferro-concrete shelter that covers the ill-fated fourth reactor.

But a considerable body of scientific opinion believes that another serious environmental danger lies in the plant's cooling pond. The body of water, used to cool the plant, was significantly contaminated with radioactive fallout in the 1986 nuclear accident Many fear that the radioactive water from the pond proceeds freely to the rivers of Prypiat and Dnipro, the Kiev Reservoir, and further on down to the Black Sea.

However, the real danger poised by the pond for people living in the 20-mile exclusion zone, the population of the Dnipro region and the environment as a whole was determined by a multi-year research commissioned by the plant's management.

Two scientific teams investigated in two directions: (1) assessment of radioactive consequences of [possible] break-through of the cooling pond's containment dam, and (2) examination of the radiation composition of the pond and its radio-ecological status. Both studies were completed by February.

The teams included Aleksandr Kononovich and Lev Khamyanov of the All-Russian Institute for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants; Oleh Asarin of the Kiev-based HydroProject Institute; Anatoliy Nosovskiy, deputy director general for radiation and labor protection, Volodymyr Korotkov, chief of the radiation safety shop, and Borys Oskolkov, chief of the environment protection laboratory, of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant production association; Ivan Riabov of the Institute of Plant and Animal Morphology and Embryology

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and scientists of the Typhoon scientific-production association.

The cooling plant is on the right bank of the Prypiat, a tributary of the Dnipro. It is an artificial reservoir with surface area of 22.7 square kilometers and a volume of 0.16 cubic kilometers. The bottom and banks were made of sandy soils. Its water level is about 7 meters above that of the Prypiat. There is no direct connection between the pond and the Prypiat. Water exchange takes place via filtration to the river and evaporation, the water losses being replenished from Prypiat using a pumping station.

Measurements taken at the pond's bottom deposits in the pool's northern part in May-June 1986 indicated levels of 5.5x107 Bq/m2 to 3.0x108 Bq/m2. Possible ways radiation can impact on population of the surrounding territories and personnel of the exclusion zone include external irradiation from the water surface and that happening during submergence into the water, as well as internal irradiation resulting from eating fish from its waters, or consuming the water for drinking and other purposes. All the above factors were used in the calculations. It was determined that eating fish from the cooling pool should be prohibited since the dose load while doing this exceeds the threshold dose for professionals (5 rem [R(oentgen) E(quivalent in) M(an)]).

Other types of water usage generate radiation load below this threshold. The upper limit of additional dose load on population owing to the water filtration from the cooling pond to the Prypiat is 0.16 mSv/year of strontium-90 and 0.0062 mSv/year of cesium-137, being much lower than threshold norms. What about a possibility of gradual transition of the contaminants into a soluble phase, resulting in worsening of the radioactive situation with time? While this is known to occur through leaching, the studies said this possibility decreases rapidly after two years and conclude there could be no spontaneous worsening in the radiation situation in the pond, and any other reservoir contaminated by the accident, after 1988.

If the pond's water is not replenished by the Prypiat, it will disappear with time due to natural filtration and evaporation — leaving in its place 12 smaller bodies of water with a total surface area of 3.8 square kilometers. The bottom deposits, having dried, will be radioactive waste and become a source of radioactive aerosols.

Over the cooling pool's life-time, a layer of deposits has formed on its bottom where 1.7x1014 Bq (4.6 kCi) of cesium-137 and 2.8x1013 Bq (0.77 kCi) of strontium-90 accumulated.

What will happen if the dam is broken through and all the water along with the radioactive silt gush to Prypiat? Course of events was assessed in cases of the break-through caused by a natural wash-out, earthquake, aircraft crash, and an act of terrorism.

The probability of a natural dam washout appeared to be too small. The process would take not less than a month and half and be accompanied by visible developments, such as formation of streams, and ravines, while the dam is examined twice a week.

A catastrophic destruction caused by the other above-mentioned factors is more probable. The most unfavorable possible dam break-through in terms of radioactivity carry-over is one in the northern part of the pool when more than 20 percent of radioactive substances will be carried out from the pond's most contaminated section.

Assuming continued reaction of Chernobyl, the study concluded, the most serious consequence of a dam washout would be the resultant inability to cool the plant's equipment, which would require a rapid shutdown to avert catastrophe.

Ukraine: UNIAN Reports 'Level 1' Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Incident

LD2504114396 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1110 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — The floors of four compartments of a filter station at generating set No 3 [at Chernobyl nuclear power station] were contaminated with radiation of 100-600 percent more than the established norm on 24 April when filter elements were being replaced in the filter station, which is used to purify the air in the cover facility [over the damaged fourth reactor], because safety procedures were breached.

UNIAN learned at the Ukrainian Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power that the contamination was eliminated at two minutes past midnight on 25 April [2102 GMT on 24 April]. Exposure of personnel to radiation more than the permitted daily levels has not been registered.

The incident has been preliminarily deemed as level one on the International Nuclear Events Scale.

Ukraine: Radioactive Contamination at Chernobyl's Third Reactor

LD2504163696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 25 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Radioactive contamination was registered at the third reactor of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

at 12:25 a.m. on Thursday, Chernobyl Chief Personnel Officer Andrey Shakhman told Interfax - Ukraine.

Four rooms were contaminated as a result of violations of the cleaning procedure. The maximum acceptable limits were exceeded by two to seven times.

The personnel did not receive dangerous doses of radiation. The accident rated one on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). A special commission has launched an investigation of the case.

The maintenance personnel replaced air filters on the fourth reactor, which was the one that caught fire in the 1986 disaster, packed them and left them in the rooms. However, they were not prepared for transportation.

The duty personnel of the third reactor demanded the fourth reactor's personnel clean up the area. Their chief gave orders to this effect, but the filters were not prepared for transportation.

Ukraine: Research Links Radiation to Inherited Genetic Mutations

MS2504122996 London THE GUARDIAN in English 25 Apr 96 p 11

[Report by Tim Radford: "Chernobyl Affects Children's Genes"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Scientists examining the genetic fingerprints of families in the path of the radioactive plume from Chernobyl, the reactor which exploded 10 years ago today, have found mutations inherited by children born years later.

This could be the first evidence that radiation damage to one generation could enter the germline — be passed to children, and to their children.

The research, by Yuri Dubrova of the Vavilov Institute in Moscow, and Sir Alec Jeffreys, the Leicester scientist who pioneered genetic fingerprinting, is published today in the periodical NATURE.

The researchers report that genetic mutations occur twice as often in children of parents exposed to the fallout.

The scientists collected blood samples from 79 families in a heavily polluted part of Belarus, to the north of the reactor. What the families had in common was that both parents had lived in the region since the accident, and that children had been born into each family between February and September 1994.

Although the researchers do not claim that the mutation was directly caused by radiation, they point out that the worse the level of caesium-137 contamination in the area, the higher the rate of mutation in local families.

"From the very beginning we started to see that there was probably something wrong," said Dr Dubrova. "We were absolutely shocked."

But both scientists stressed that the mutations were in the part of the DNA used by forensic scientists to establish paternity, or links with crime. These "mini-satellite" regions of DNA do not seem to be biologically important.

The work developed out of an interest in mutations in the DNA used by scientists for fingerprinting.

"To our great surprise we did indeed find an effect at really low doses of radiation," said Sir Alec.

The British scientist, Dr Dubrova and five others began examining blood samples from the families, which they compared with British families. "What we found in the Belarus sample was evidence for approximately a doubling of the mutation rate," said Sir Alec.

If correct, it would be the first direct evidence for radiation causing mutation through the generations in humans.

Ukraine: Radiation Level Said Unaffected by Chernobyl Fire

WS2504130996 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by O.Chayko and V. Kucherenko, first paragraph read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, a fire has broken out in the vicinity of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This might have happened due to the carelessness of people visiting cemeteries in the protection zone around the power plant during the [Easter] memorial days, at least this is the opinion of experts representing the State Commission for Investigating the Causes and Aftermath of Fires at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

[Begin recording] [Chayko] Around 150 people came into the 30-km zone during the memorial days. Most probably, one of them threw a cigarette butt or a match on the grass. The visitors were evacuated and nobody was hurt. The fire, however, spread onto an area of 60 sq km. On 23 April, the fire was extinguished on a significant part of this area, but the grass in the forest within the 10-km zone continues to smolder.

[Volodymyr Berchiy, manager of the "Chernobyl Forest" specialized enterprise] The grass has been burnt down almost completely, and lower parts of some trees have been burnt, too. Fire brands continue to smolder.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Chayko] Mostly it was grass, and not trees that burnt. Therefore, the fire did not affect the radiation level.

[Volodymyr Lohinov, head of the State Commission for Investigating the Causes and Aftermath of Fires at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, in Russian] There are no grounds for concern. No increase has been observed in the radiation level either within the protection zone or elsewhere in Kiev Oblast.

[Chayko] This is not the first fire of this kind in the 30-km zone. In the summer 1995 alone, around 100 fires occurred here. Specialists believe that the hue and cry around the current fire is due to the fact that it occurred on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. [end recording]

Ukraine: Fires Partially Extinguished in Chernobyl Zone

LD2504212796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2051 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By Aleksey Zhuravel]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 26 (Itar-Tass) — Some of the fires that broke out in the 30 km Chernobyl zone last Sunday have since been localised and put out, Ukrainian Vice-Premier Vasiliy Durdinets told UKRINFORM on Thursday.

Durdinets said no people were hurt by the fires and a group of investigators is looking into what caused the conflagration.

Earlier reports said many abandoned houses were on fire in the area over which the Chernobyl radioactive plume stretched ten years ago.

Reports from the Gomel region named staggering figures reflecting damage to abandoned homes in the region's worst hit areas.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Belarus

Belarus: Lukashenka Declares Chernobyl Anniversary Day of Grief

LD2504192396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 25 Apr 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] President Alyaksandr Lukashenka declared April 26, the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the day of mourning and called on all political organizations and interest groups to work for civil accord.

Lukashenka went on the national television to say that over 2 million people residing on one quarter of the Belarusian territory were exposed to radiation as a result of the disaster. "The damage is estimated as at least 32 annual budgets of Belarus, or $235 billion," he emphasized.

According to Lukashenka, nearly 300 enterprises, 95 hospitals, 600 schools and day care centers, 540 stores and services were closed as a result of the disaster and over villages abandoned.

Lukashenka admitted that the scale of the disaster could not be properly assessed initially by the world community as well as the former leaders of the country and while cover up attempts were made. He was confident that numerous Chernobyl problems would have been resolved if the Soviet Union had existed. Lukashenka explained that in 1995 Belarus strained its efforts but could appropriate in 1995 just one tenth of the funds that the USSR could manage to deal with the effects of the Chernobyl.

"When I was an MP and opposed the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991, I was thinking, before all, of what would happen if Belarus faced the Chernobyl disaster alone," he said. But, he believes, "at that time political ambitions outweighed the interests of the people and certain politicos used Chernobyl as a card in their political game. Instead of approaching the problems, triggered by the Chernobyl disaster, in a balanced way, they called rallies in an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the authorities."

Lukashenka said that the health of the disaster victims was his primary concern. He promised to keep the treatment of 1,500 gravely sick children under his personal control.

The creation of normal conditions for the life of people in the contaminated areas is equally important, he said. "We must maintain free medical treatment in schools and day care centers," he is convinced.

Lukashenka said that the impact of the crazy decision to move people from the Chernobyl zone against their will is felt now. "Numerous people go back to their homes. I am convinced that the authorities have no right to obstruct them. This is non-Christian and inhuman," he said.

Lukashenka wants the government to take immediate steps to "tighten the state discipline and responsibility of the officials at every level for what is going on in the disaster-affected area and enabling people to resume normal life in the areas where they have been moved." He said that he had made appropriate orders and will see to it that they are carried.

Lukashenka will attend the rally on a square in the Belarusian capital on the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster.

The opposition led by the radical right-wing Belarusian Popular Front [BPF] intends to stage a protest action on that day. According to Vladimir Zametalin, presidential deputy chief of staff, the goal of the action is to try to discredit the agreement on the setting up of a Belarusian-Russian community that was signed in early April. The protest will be headed, Zametalin told Interfax, by Zenon Poznyak, the BPF leader who has returned from Poland. As he stayed abroad, Poznyak declared himself a political refugee.

Observers attribute the sudden return of Poznyak to the increasing popularity of Lukashenka in the wake of the signing of the agreement. According to the independent sociological research center owned by Andrey Vardomatsky, Lukashenka's policy was supported in March and April by 62 percent of the poll, a 10 percent increase on the February figure.

Moldova

Moldova: Press Comments on Melescanu's Visit in Chisinau

AU2504162096 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2156 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 24/4/1996 (BASA-press) — In the wake of Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu's official visit to Chisinau, Moldovan press comments on the character of Bucharest-Chisinau bilateral relations.

"The ruling political class in Bucharest shows a stoicism that suggests wisdom in the contacts with the foamy fringes of the multi-party rhetoric," wrote newspaper MOMENTUL (THE MOMENT.)

"The dry pragmatism aiming at major interests is marching soberly, ignoring the Demosthenic effusion of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the little party interests. In Chisinau, the political class is younger, ergo more sensible to verbal stings."

"Between the 'oh dear! how much we have given for Bessarabia' either uttered or implied often in Bucharest, and the proverbial 'they have not given us a single pencil' from Chisinau, there is room for common sense, for a calm and unpretentious cooperation," wrote MOMENTUL.

The FPCDM [Christian-Democratic Popular Front of Moldova] publication TARA (THE COUNTRY) noted the new political conjuncture after the conclusion of the basic treaty with Yugoslavia and the recent revision by Kiev of its foreign policy "offers new opportunities for Romania. It can move more freely on the European stage of operations."

This can be felt even during the visit of Minister Melescanu to Chisinau.

"One has the feeling Chisinau spares no effort to ease the talks on a basic political treaty with Bucharest, while Romania's stance regarding this problem seems to be more rigid than ever."

According to the newspaper, Melescanu's visit to Chisinau will probably result in only a cooperation program between the countries which will prove that "a new stage if not of rapprochement than at least of clarity is setting in."

Moldova: Snegur, Smirnov Hold New Round of Talks on Dniester Status

AU2504161396 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2156 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 24/4/1996 (BASA-press) — The ordinary round of Chisinau-Tiraspol talks started today at 1000 A.M. in the government building in Chisinau.

The meeting agenda includes debates over Dniester's special status and examination of the implementation of the 5 July 1995 joint statement on unification of the monetary-credit systems of Moldova and the Dniester region.

The parties will also examine a decision on the joint actions of the Chisinau and Tiraspol Chambers of Commerce and a draft decision on repair of bridges and resumption of traffic across the Dniester River.

At Dniester's proposal, negotiators will tackle today the problems of higher education, relations between post services, Tiraspol's demand to withdraw the Moldovan Police from Tighina (Bender) and the opening of a Russian consular section in Tiraspol.

President Mircea Snegur and Dniester leader Igor Smirnov made statements during a recess in the round of talks held in Chisinau today.

"After today's meeting, we cannot say for sure that by May we shall have a final version of Dniester's status. I believe in success, but the results will come later," Snegur answered to a question about a final resolution of the Dniester dispute during the meeting between Moldovan and Dniester leaders and Russian President Yeltsin scheduled for May.

"The talks are not over yet, but I guarantee that today we will sign a common decision and will give concrete indications to the expert groups to present until 8 May the final project of the conventional memorandum concerning the basic principles meant to solve the conflict and concerning the mediators' guarantees," said Snegur.

Smirnov, president of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic, viewed today's talks in Chisinau as "a step forward."

"We have made progress in liquidating barriers and reservations. Day by day it is getting more difficult to give up the canons adopted at the beginning of the talks," Smirnov stated.

Asked about a Moldovan-Russian summit concerning the final resolution of the dispute, Smirnov said he is not "an advocate of the idea to establish concrete terms in order to adopt such serious decisions, but the task has been defined and time does not wait any more."

Commenting on proposals made by Yuriy Karlov, the Russian president's envoy to the talks, Smirnov said "the proposals concentrate all agreements to which negotiating parties arrived earlier."

"I am sure that some of these proposals will be materialized in the final document on Dniester's status. I welcome the proposals made by the Russian side," said Smirnov.

Moldovan and Dniester expert groups will develop until 8 May the provisional document on the basic principles of the future Dniester status.

Upon conclusion of today's meeting between President Snegur and leader Smirnov, expert group heads — Moldovan Deputy Justice Minister Mihai Busuleac and Dniester State Secretary Valeriy Litskay — answered to reporters' questions.

Litskay said both parties came at today's talks with their own drafts that would be used to draw up a joint document on 8 May. He said Russian Presidential Envoy

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Yuriy Karlov's draft "could be laid at the basis of a future joint document."

Busuleac said the Chisinau delegation is examining the Russian envoy's proposals.

Litskay said the parties arrived to an agreement on repair of bridges across the Dniester River, which he said is not only an economic achievement, but also bears a symbolic character.

Referring to Tiraspol's demand to remove the police from Tighina (Bender,) Litskay said Dniester authorities follow the referendum conducted in the city, during which most participants favored police's removal. Litskay said this problem should be solved by the Joint Control Commission.

Mihai Busuleac said this question was excluded from the agenda of today's meeting. "The police will remain in Bender. There are many citizens of Moldova who need protection from their government," said Busuleac.

Asked by BASA about the talks on opening a Russian consular section in Tiraspol, Busuleac said this problem has to be addressed by Russia and Moldova. "Moldova, however, still remains on its earlier position," said Busuleac.

Moldovan officials had earlier stated that a Russian consular section might be opened in Tiraspol only after a special status was adopted for Dniester.

The next meeting between Chisinau and Tiraspol officials is scheduled for 11 May in Tiraspol.

Moldova: President Snegur Sounds Warning on Internal Situation

LD2504190896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 25 Apr 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature No. 81 (1074) compiled by Anna Kovalyova, Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovsky, Boris Yunanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] Moldovan President Mircea Snegur sent a message to the parliament Thursday, calling on it to consider the internal situation Thursday, an Interfax correspondent reported from Chisinau.

In part, the document highlighted poverty that had "never been seen before" and increasing discontent with the state socioeconomic policy. "The people's patience is exhausted, a social outburst with unpredictable outcomes may happen at any moment," it continued.

"The situation emerged is by no means a result of a simple misunderstanding between the president on the one hand and the executive and legislature on the other hand," Snegur said. "In fact, we are witnesses to a well-organized campaign to blockade the institution of presidency and all of the president's efforts to step up reforms."

According to the document, delayed wages and pensions exceeded $70 million in early April. The average salary of some $33 a month is the lowest among the former Soviet republics situated in Europe. The effective consumer demand keeps shrinking, while unemployment keeps growing.

The government lacks an efficient mechanism to punish those to blame for delaying wages, Snegur deplored.

He cited Lithuania where a delay of 12 [unit of time not specified] in the payment of pensions is considered an emergency. In Moldova, the delay may reach five to six months, he said.

"Here everything possible is done, first of all by the government, to squander the country," according to the message. Snegur cited data, showing that Moldova had exported 110,000 tonnes of grain at an average of $115 per tonne in 1995, while the world price of grain is higher than $200. The state suffered losses of $11 million from this case alone, he said. Exports of beef at lower prices than usual resulted in the loss of another $10 million, he said. "If these losses alone were avoided, it would help reduce back wages in agriculture standing at more than 100 million lei," he said.

Snegur emphasized that "when the government demonstrated neglect of parliamentary decisions, while the parliament showed reluctance to bring the government to account, when hundreds of complaints came to the president, he signed the February 5 decree to pay off back wages, pensions and compensations."

"The people are waiting on those enjoying real power to provide a clear answer as to whether they are able to bring about order to the country," Snegur said. "The people want to know whether the people they chose are able to sack those who perform their duties bad and appoint others able to cope with the difficulties and pull the country out of the abyss of poverty," he said.

After the defense minister was removed by a presidential decree, some deputies unleashed a campaign to protect this minister's constitutional rights, Snegur recalled. He hoped they will show as much persistence "when the constitutional right of millions of Moldovan citizens to a worthy life is being grossly violated."

He called on the parliament to define the scope of competence of officials responsible for the payment of wages, saying this constitutional right rests with the parliament only.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Aliyev Signs Cooperation Agreements in Norway

NC2504183796 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev's visit to Europe is continuing. As already reported, our head of state arrived in Norway yesterday on an official visit. Our correspondent Qullu Muherremov reports from Norway:

[Begin recording] [Muherremov] As already reported, Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev's official visit to Norway began yesterday. A number of important documents providing for the expansion of the interstate cooperation between Azerbaijan and Norway were signed last night.

Geydar Aliyev and Norwegian Prime Minister Harlem Brundtland chaired a high-level Azerbaijani-Norwegian meeting soon after Aliyev's arrival in the Norwegian capital last night.

Three important documents were signed between Azerbaijan and Norway after the meeting. The first and most important one was the declaration on the expansion of the cooperation between the two countries and the legal and political foundations for this cooperation.

The other two documents concern the abolition of the double taxation and cooperation in the energy sphere. These documents were signed by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov and Norway's energy minister.

Following the signing ceremony [words indistinct], President Geydar Aliyev and Prime Minister Brundtland replied to questions that were asked the Norwegian, Azerbaijani, and foreign reporters.

Commenting on Norway's position on the conflict with Armenia, Brundtland issued a statement fully supporting Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

Yesterday, Geydar Aliyev also met the famous traveler, researcher, and scholar (?Turkhiyerdal) who had come to see the president in Morocco, and the representatives of the Azerbaijani community in Norway.

The Azerbaijani president had a heavy schedule today as well. He granted an extensive interview to Norwegian television early in the morning, and afterwards met the Speaker of the Norwegian Parliament (?Onni Gront). He spoke on Azerbaijan's economic potential before the members of the parliament's foreign and energy commissions.

Geydar Aliyev met the Norwegian King Harald V this afternoon. The king expressed satisfaction with the current pace of development of Norwegian-Azerbaijani relations.

A considerable place was also given on Aliyev's schedule for meetings with Norwegian business people. In accordance with this program, Geydar Aliyev today visited the famous [name indistinct] oil company and familiarized himself with the activities of this firm. In order to get acquainted with Norway's oil industry, Aliyev visited the oil-industry city of (?Stalinger), the homeland of Statoil, which is well known in Azerbaijan.

Aliyev's official visit to Norway is continuing. In the morning, he will get learn about the development of the oil industry in Norway. [end recording]

Azerbaijan: Aliyev Considers Oil Pipeline External to Russia, Georgia

LD2504184896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1414 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Pshenichnikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Oslo, 25 Apr (Itar-Tass) — An international consortium to develop Azeri oil deposits in the Caspian Sea is considering options for building a pipeline which will not go through Russia or Georgia, Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev, who is currently in Norway on official visit, told this ITAR-TASS correspondent today.

Bearing in mind the unstable situation in the northern Caucasus he said, Azerbaijan, together with the international oil consortium, "is looking at several new options" for transporting export oil. "The final decision where the new pipeline will go and where it will have its exit has not been reached yet. But in any case we will try to ensure its construction and exploitation."

At the same time the president avoided giving an answer to the question as to which countries in particular the new oil route would go through. Also, he did not specify who, apart from Azerbaijan and other participants in the international consortium, was taking part in working out alternative solutions.

"As for the already existing option for transporting oil through Russian territory to the Black Sea," Geydar Aliyev continued, "when we were signing an appropriate agreement with Russia, we took into account possible difficulties arising from the unstable situation in the Northern Caucasus. And together with Russia we think that these difficulties can be overcome."

The Azerbaijani president did not specify, however, how the "difficulties" arising from the use of a pipeline which goes, in particular, through Chechen territory could be overcome. At the same time he stressed

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that the question of transporting oil extracted from the Caspian Sea is the most interesting not only for Azerbaijan but for a number of Western oil companies on whose participation the work of the international oil consortium depends. The consortium includes the Azeri State Oil Company, the Russian LUKoil Company, the Norwegian Statoil state oil concern, British Petroleum [BP], and some others.

Aliyev said that a new international consortium will be set up "in the near future" to develop a very promising oil deposit, Shahdeniz, in the Caspian Sea. According to the president, the "Norwegian Statoil concern and BP will definitely take part in it."

It has become known from well-informed sources that the Russian LUKoil Company and the French Elf-Aquitaine will participate in the new consortium. The Shahdeniz deposit's oil reserves are estimated at 200 million tonnes and its gas reserves at 200 billionn cubic meters.

Aliyev will visit the Norwegian "oil capital," the town of Stavanger, today where he will hold talks with the managers of the Statoil concern. The Azerbaijani side is interested in the Norwegian technology of extracting oil from a sea shelf.

Georgia

Georgia: Parliament Passes Decree on Political Solution in Abkhazia

AU2504132796 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 18 Apr 96 pp 2, 3

[SAKINFORM report: "A Constitutional Basis for a Political Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia Has Been Created"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 17 April, at a plenary session, the Georgian Parliament passed a decree on measures to settle the conflict in Abkhazia. This document, which was passed unanimously by the supreme legislative body, lays the basis for a political settlement of the conflict. It is significant that 187 deputies participated in the vote.

"Today's discussion in Parliament of the most painful problem for our country is, to a certain extent, a summary of debates that have continued for almost two years and an answer has been given to the main question: Georgia will never reconcile itself to the loss of Abkhazia," stated Deputy Parliament Chairman Vakhtang Qolbaia, who presented a compromise version of the decree.

Up to now, 12 versions of the decree have been prepared in Parliament. Almost all views and positions have been taken into account in the final version and agreement has been reached on the most important questions. The draft decree under discussion was presented by the "Citizens Union" faction in coordination with the "Union for the Restoration of Georgia" and "Imedi" [Hope] factions, the "Sakartvelos Regionebi" [Georgia's Regions] coalition, and the Supreme Council and Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia [ARA]. As Giorgi Kobakhidze, deputy parliamentary chairman and member of the National-Democratic Party [NDP], pointed out, the final version of the draft resembles to the maximum degree the NDP's version.

According to the decree passed by the Georgian Parliament, in line with the decisions of the ARA Supreme Council of 19 July and 22 November 1995 and 8 March 1996 and on the basis of materials investigated by the Georgian Procurator's Office and submitted by the ARA Supreme Council, the events that have been unfolding and are continuing to take place in Abkhazia have been assessed as aggressive action directed against Georgia's statehood and territorial integrity by separatists aided by Russia's antidemocratic reactionary and other external forces, which has resulted in the violation of the country's territorial integrity and the occupation of an indivisible part of Georgia — Abkhazia — , the formation of a criminal regime, the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Georgian people, and the expulsion of a large number of people of other nationalities, including Abkhazians, from Abkhazia. The current processes in Abkhazia have been defined as a political conflict in Abkhazia and not as a Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

A parliamentary commission has been formed to organize the implementation of the decree and ensure that the proposed measures are carried out.

The Georgian Parliament will discuss the progress of the implementation of this decree in July.

Parliamentary Chairman Zurab Zhvania comments on this most important document passed by the Georgian Parliament: "I believe that the Georgian public should know that each article of the decree passed by Parliament stipulates a whole number of active measures. In particular, I would like to point out that the document does not signify that Parliament has completed its work on this problem; on the contrary, we are now beginning to work daily on Abkhazian problems.

"I think that what the results of the vote showed is unambiguous: Agreement has been reached on a basic strategic plan and a basic policy that Georgia should implement to restore its territorial integrity and Georgian jurisdiction in Abkhazia.

"Georgia has confirmed in practice and officially that the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Georgian

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

population has been going on since autumn 1993 and is continuing today. In this regard, the Georgian procurator general has brought an indictment on behalf of the state.

"The subjects of the process of negotiations have been determined for the first time in practice. It was pointed out that Tbilisi or Georgia's central power will represent the state on whose territory the conflict took place, the state that was opposed by separatist forces, and we establish once again that it was not only the Georgian-speaking population but also Abkhazians, Russians, Armenians, and others — our citizens living in Abkhazia — who resisted the separatists.

"It has been determined in the decree that Georgia envisages broad autonomous rights for Abkhazia within the Georgian state. I think that this should once and for all put an end to speculations on the part of the Abkhazian separatists and their friends in various states that Georgia is ostensibly not granting Abkhazia any rights at all. The fact that Georgia envisages autonomous rights for Abkhazia has not only been confirmed in statements made by the president but also established in the new decree passed by Parliament.

"Moreover, what is important is that there is a provision in the decree that criminal proceedings will not be instigated against those who were dragged into the conflict by deceitful means, disinformation, and other reasons, and who did not commit murders or carry out ethnic cleansing. They will be given a guarantee that they will be full-fledged citizens of the Georgian state and will enjoy all the rights and freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of our country. I think this is an important step that will enable the people currently living in Abkhazia to dissociate themselves from the several dozens and hundreds of organizers of genocide and find guarantees and conditions for their own security, peace, and a normal life following the restoration of Georgian jurisdiction over the entire territory of Abkhazia.

"From this point of view," said the Georgian parliamentary chairman, "I am deeply convinced that the decree passed by Parliament presents, in practice, completely new prospects for a final settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia."

Georgia: Dudayev's Plans for Georgia Reported

MK2604070796 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Apr 96 p 4

[Report by Georgiy Dvali: "Dudayev Planned To Celebrate His Wedding in Tbilisi"]

[FBIS Translated Text] People in Georgia have been actively discussing the developments in Pankis Gorge, Georgia (on the Georgia-Chechnya border) and home to several thousand Kistin Chechens, as well as relations between Chechnya and Georgia.

The Kistins — a numerically small people of the Vaynakh ethnic group — live in Georgia's northeast, in the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range that separates Chechnya and Georgia.

The Kistins' protests were sparked by an episode that had taken place on the Voyenno-Gruzinskaya Doroga [Military-Georgian Road]. Georgian border guards held a certain Margoshvili, of Chechen nationality and a resident of the village of Duisi in Pankis Gorge. Margoshvili was returning from Chechnya where, in his words, he had worked on a construction project. Found on him were two million rubles and $750. The border guards doubted the origin of this sum, all the more so because Margoshvili had on him a map of Chechnya. He was accused of spying for Dudayev, but was then released. Reaching Pankis Gorge, the Kistin demanded that the local authorities punish those to blame [as published]. Armed Chechens even tried to take over the administrative building in Akhmeta, the seat of the rayon's apparatus. (Notably, Kistin Chechens are traditionally well-armed. They have always been able to stand up for themselves under any regime in Georgia, counting on help from their warlike confederates across the Caucasus Range).

However, Dudayev decided against worsening the situation in his interior. On his instructions a delegation of the parliament of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria arrived in Tbilisi; it was received at the top level. According to reliable information, the delegation passed on to Shevardnadze, via a go-between, a personal letter from the president of Ichkeria where the latter expressed readiness to accede to the declaration "For a Peaceful and Stable Caucasus" signed by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Incidentally, an official visit to Tbilisi by Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan had been planned for March. The visit did not take place, however, since Armenia had declined to sign the declaration, which makes the territorial integrity of the countries a priority.

On Monday [22 April] Georgian newspapers carried an appeal by the "first aide to the Chechnya president on Caucasian affairs" Ramzan Goytemirov and "deputy foreign minister" Ruslan Abdurzakov to the people of Georgia. The appeal, couched in impassioned terms, says that, in the opinion of the Chechens, it is Georgia that should become the center of the Caucasus. This, they think, would guarantee the unity and freedom of the Caucasus, with Georgia as its core. "All Caucasus peoples, including the Abkhaz, will stand by you if you eject from your territory the Russian troops. The future

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the Caucasus hinges on Georgia. We have no use for Abkhazia without Georgia, the Georgians and the Caucasus. God save a unified Georgia and a unified Caucasus," the appeal says.

Georgian nationalists true to Zviad's [Gamsakhurdiya's] ideas of "a common Caucasus home" took the appeal with enthusiasm and forwarded a favorable reply to the head of Ichkeria. According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's information, Dudayev did read the letter when on a honeymoon in the village of Dargo (Chechnya's highlands). The thing is that Dudayev recently married a 20-year-old Chechen girl from this village who became his second wife. He did not plan a divorce from his first wife Alevtina Fedorovna [Dudayev]. Dudayev planned to celebrate his wedding in Tbilisi, a city which "will become the capital of a Caucasus federation."

Georgia: Opposition Parties Pledge Support to 'Heroic' Chechens

AU2604095796 Tbilisi ALIA in Georgian 16-17 Apr 96 p 3

["Address to Chechen (Ichkeria) Republic President Jokhar Dudayev and the Freedom-Loving Chechen Nation from the Georgian National-Liberation Movement United Conference, Coordinating Committee of the Georgian National-Liberation Movement" issued in Tbilisi; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Your Excellency, Chechen (Ichkeria) Republic President! Vaynakh people devoted to the freedom of the motherland! Chechen brothers and sisters!

We, the Georgian National-Liberation Movement United Conference, confirming our devotion to the right of self-determination for nations, or their right to determine their own fate independently and create an independent state on territory that is historically theirs, address you at what is such a difficult time for you and for us all to express our solidarity and support in your heroic and selfless struggle for independence!

Each of us is horrified and alarmed at the cruelty and evil actions committed by the Russian empire against the freedom-loving Chechen nation and is inspired by your amazing bravery, self-sacrifice, and courage; it is difficult to find over the centuries in the history of the world another example of such a small nation fighting with such success against such a big invading power.

Each of us emphasizes that the barbaric process of overt and unconcealed genocide of a freedom-loving and heroic nation is taking place before the eyes of the contemporary world. Each of us condemns with extreme indignation the bloody and misanthropic policy of imperial Russia against the small Chechen people who are related genetically to the Georgian people. We are brothers not only by blood but also according to our entire way of life, culture, and history and we will remain brothers for ever in spite of those tragic episodes when our common enemies managed to organize the shedding of blood between us.

The Georgian National-Liberation Movement United Conference emphasizes that Ichkeria, which was conquered and annexed one and one-half centuries ago, does not belong to Russia; this country belongs historically only to the Chechen people. The participants in the Conference unanimously support the state sovereignty of the Republic of Ichkeria and the freedom of the Vaynakh people and categorically demand that the Russian empire halts the genocide of the Chechen people and the escalation of crimes committed against humanity and immediately withdraws its armed forces from the long-suffering Republic of Ichkeria. We also call upon all states in the modern world, all organizations, and all people of goodwill, to express their active solidarity with and support for the heroic and selfless struggle of the Chechen people for freedom and officially recognize the state independence of the Republic of Ichkeria.

The Georgian national parties and political organizations that are struggling for freedom have openly and publicly stated their attitude toward the war in Chechnya and the political issues connected with it in their statement of 2 February 1996. Our will, directed toward the freedom of nations, justice between nations, and their holy right to have a national pride, a historical memory, and a feeling of responsibility before future generations, is unshakable, as is our aspiration for the freedom and strength of the Caucasus.

An independent Georgia and an independent Chechnya (Ichkeria) are a guarantee of freedom and prosperity in the Caucasus. All nations and people who love a free and powerful Caucasus are obliged to stand alongside you, Vaynakh people, in your holy war for freedom so that we can defeat once and for all the most evil archenemy imperial Russia.

Once again accept our sincere and fraternal support in your exemplary and heroic struggle for freedom!

[Signed] Irakli Tsereteli — the Georgian National Independence Party;
Vazha Adamia — the Merab Kostava Society;
Tamar Chkheidze — the Ilia Chavchavadze Society;
Vakhtang Bochorishvili — the Konstantine Gamsakhurdia Society;
Nodar Natadze — the United Republican Party;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Zaza Vashaqmadze — the Georgian Nationalist Party;
Konstantine Gugulashvili — the Georgian National Party;
Amiran Nadaraia — the Georgian State-National Integrity Party — the Shield of the Motherland;
Roin Liparteliani — The Georgian Agrarian Party;
Giorgi Kvezereli — the Union of Georgian Farmers;
Zurab Samushia — the Abkhazian Resistance Committee.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Estonia

Estonia: Foreign Minister Comments on Relations With Russia

WS2604120196 Tallinn BNS in English
1012 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 25, BNS — The Estonian Foreign Minister, Siim Kallas, Wednesday told the Postimees and Sonumileht newspapers that Russian pressure on Estonia had increased, but there was still hope most-favored nation status in trade between the two countries could be achieved.

"I can say that during my term of office as foreign minister, that is, within a period of six months, Russian pressure has grown enormously," Kallas said.

"Russia wants three major things from Estonia. First, a virtal zero version concerning citizenship, second, public and final abstention from cooperation with NATO and western security structures, and third, vagueness in matters concerning the border, so that a person could travel from Estonia freely to St. Petersburg, but going to Sweden, an Estonian would be looked upon as somebody coming from Russia," the foreign minister told Postimees.

Kallas said that several political circles wished to take revenge on Estonia for having caused the Soviet Union to fall apart.

The Estonian foreign minister underlined it was out of the question Estonia would yield to Russian demands. Also the interior political situation would not permit this, he said.

Kallas said, however, that a positive breakthrough in Estonian-Russian relations could be expected soon, because an agreement on trade and economic relations was getting ready to be signed, to grant most-favored nation status to both parties.

Estonia: Moscow Seeks To Involve Estonia in Its Sphere of Influence

LD2504193596 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1612 GMT 25 Apr 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, April 25 (Interfax) — Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas has accused the Russian authorities of the desire to involve this Baltic republic into its sphere of influence.

The Russian leadership has increased its influence on Estonia to this end, says the interview with Kallas carried on Thursday by the local newspaper Postimees. He believes that the Russian side is in favor of Estonia's open and final refusal to cooperate with NATO.

Moscow would like Tallinn to establish a "zero option" in terms of getting citizenship, which envisages the free issuing of an Estonian passport to every inhabitant, Kallas believes.

According to the minister, Russia also wants to establish such border rules under which "an Estonian could freely visit St Petersburg, while Sweden, for example, would look at him as a visitor from Russia."

Kallas said that concessions to Estonia in these aspects would actually "mean the giving up of Estonian statehood."

The Estonian authorities "do not trust Russia, which until recently did its best for the distrust to grow, Kallas said.

Constant threats by the Moscow authorities against Tallinn, he said, "do not promote the country's trust in Russia."

"The key to the normalization of Estonian-Russian relations is in Russia's hands, in the change of its policies regarding its closest neighbors," Kallas said.

Estonia: MP Appeals to CEPA To Influence Russia on Chechen Issue

WS2504091696 Tallinn BNS in English
1757 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 24, BNS — Deputy Speaker of the Estonian parliament, Tunne Kelam, speaking at a full session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (CEPA) on Wednesday, appealed to international organizations for greater activity in the Chechen issue.

A more active attitude by international organizations would certainly influence Russia, Kelam said.

Kelam also said he seconded the Italian delegation's motion for an amendement of the CEPA resolution on Chechnya, suggesting that peoples' right to self-determination laid down both in the United Nations charter and the final act of the Helsinki conference should be taken into consideration in the talks for a solution of the crisis.

The present wording of the CEPA resolution appeals to the parties in the conflict to immediately and without any preliminary conditions to start talks to achieve peace and to determine the status of Chechnya.

Kelam said that he was in favor of the motion that a CEPA debate be organized in the Chechen question,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

in which representatives of both the Russian central government and the Dudayev-led opposition would take part.

The fact of the organization of such a debate would show Russia's readiness of democratic dialogue, because permission for Dudayev's supporters to travel to Strasbourg depended on Russia, Kelam said.

The deputy head of the Estonian parliament said that what was being acted out in Chechnya was a typical scenario of colonial struggle in the 20th century, where fighters for independence are initally seen as rebels and bandits.

"In the sixteen months so far we have clearly seen that Chechens are ready to decide their own fate," Kelam said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.